Judges Opinions, — December 30, 2015 10:00 — 0 Comments

Greenawalt, et al., v. Krissinger, et al. No. 2014-00178

Civil Action-Law-Action for Dilatory and Vexatious Conduct-42 Pa.C.S. § 2507-Petition to Open Judgment-Promptness of Petition-Reasonableness of Failure to Respond-Attachment of Proposed Answer-Meritorious Defense-Res Judicata-Collateral Estoppel-Petition to Strike Judgment-Fatal Defect-Face of Record-Jurisdiction-Authority of Prothonotary-Judgment Void Ad Initio-Recovery of Damages Incurred in Bankruptcy Court

1. Plaintiffs, who previously were awarded judgment for damages, attorney’s fees and costs by the Court in an ejectment action lodged at a different action number that currently is on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, filed a complaint in Unjust Detention and Unjust Enrichment seeking damages relating to that action, as well as attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2507(7) and (9) on the basis that Defendants’ conduct was dilatory and vexatious relating to the ejectment judgment that currently is on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading to the Complaint, and judgment was entered by the Prothonotary of Lebanon County on behalf of the Plaintiffs and against Defendants upon praecipe for default judgment. Defendants subsequently filed a Petition to Open and/or Strike Plaintiffs’ Default Judgment.

2. To obtain relief from entry of a default judgment, an aggrieved party may file a petition to strike the default judgment and/or a petition to open the default judgment, petitions that present two (2) distinct remedies that generally are not interchangeable

3. A default judgment may be opened if the moving party establishes: (1) it promptly has filed a petition to open the default judgment; (2) it has provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading; and (3) it pled a meritorious defense to the allegations of the complaint.

4. Pa.R.C.P. Rule 237.3(b) provides that if a petition to open judgment is filed within ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment on the docket, the court shall open the judgment if the pleading states a meritorious cause of action or defense. Rule 237.3(a) further requires that a verified copy of the answer that the petition seeks leave to file shall be attached to the petition for relief.

5. The court should not apply an overly strict interpretation of Rule 237.3.

6. A petition to strike judgment operates as a demurrer that may be granted only if a fatal defect or irregularity appears on the face of the record. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies the prothonotary of the authority to enter the judgment. When a prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is void ab initio.

7. Despite the fact that Defendants failed to attach their proposed answer to the complaint to their Petition to Open and/or Strike Judgment and did not file that proposed answer until nearly two (2) months after they filed their Petition to Open and/or Strike Judgment, the Defendants filed their Petition to Open and/or Strike Judgment within ten (10) days of the entry of the default judgment, which excused the later filing of the proposed answer.

8. In order to satisfy the meritorious defense requirement, defendant need only plead a defense which, if proven at trial, would justify relief. While defendant does not have to prove every element of the defense, the defense must be set forth in precise, specific and clear terms.

9. Defendants’ proposed answer indicating that Plaintiffs’ recovery is barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because it seeks to recover damages awarded in the ejectment action at another action number would justify relief if the same were proven at trial. As such, Defendants set forth a meritorious defense to the allegations of the Complaint.

10. A court’s jurisdiction is a threshold issue that the court may consider on its own motion at any time.

11. Part of the default judgment in this case was entered void ab initio, as the default judgment included attorneys’ fees and costs Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint resulted from litigation in the United States Bankruptcy Court to lift an automatic stay in order to institute a cause of action in ejectment in the Court of Common Pleas. Fees sought for attorney’s fees and costs under Section 2507 for vexatious or dilatory conduct cannot be awarded by the Court of Common Pleas resulting from an action in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Only the court before which the alleged dilatory or vexatious conduct occurred may award fees as a sanction for such behavior. As such, the Prothonotary of Lebanon County did not have the authority to enter judgment for attorney’s fees and costs that resulted from litigation that occurred in the United States Bankruptcy Court.

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2014-00178, Opinion by Samuel A. Kline, Judge, September 14, 2015.

Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire, for Plaintiffs

Matthew B. Weisberg, Esquire, for Defendants

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL DIVISION No: 2014-00178

CONNIE L. GREENAWALT and MARTIN W. PETRATOS, Plaintiffs v.

SCOTT KRISSINGER and RACHEL KRISSINGER, Defendants

ORDER

And now, to wit, this 14th day of September, 2015, upon consideration of the Defendants’ Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgment, the Petition is GRANTED. The default judgment that was entered on April 17, 2015 in the above-captioned matter is hereby stricken and opened.

BY THE COURT:

SAMUEL A. KLINE, J.

APPEARANCES:

Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq. for the Plaintiffs

Matthew B. Weisberg, Esq. for the Defendants

OPINION, KLINE, J., SEPTEMBER 14, 2015

Before the Court is the Defendants’ (hereinafter “Krissingers”) Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the Petition, as specified below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Complaint filed in this action number seeks to recover various damages and attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with an ejectment proceeding that occurred before the Honorable Bradford H. Charles. Judge Charles authored several Opinions in the ejectment action, and we incorporate his summarization of the main facts from one of his Opinions as follows:

To summarize, the real estate located at 3204 Route 72, Jonestown, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania (hereafter “JONESTOWN PREMISES”) was foreclosed on by Deutsche Bank (hereafter “BANK”). At the Sherriff’s Sale, BANK purchased the house. When BANK became aware that KRISSINGERS were residing in the residence, BANK filed an Action of Ejectment against them on August 26, 2011. Judgment of Ejectment was entered on February 3, 2012.

On February 14, 2012, KRISSINGERS filed for bankruptcy. BANK apparently did not wish to deal with the Bankruptcy Court. Accordingly, BANK withdrew its ejectment action on March 19, 2012 and instead chose to place JONESTOWN PREMISES for sale. On February 10, 2012, BANK sold the JONESTOWN PREMISES to PLAINTIFFS. PLAINTIFFS filed an Action in Ejectment on June 15, 2012, and moved for Summary Judgment on September 14, 2012.

Because KRISSINGERS’ claimed that they did not receive adequate notice of the Mortgage Foreclosure and the Sheriff’s Sale, we denied PLAINTIFFS’ Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 10, 2014, we held a Bench Trial on the issue of whether the KRISSINGERS had notice of the foreclosure proceedings. On that same day, we entered a verdict in favor of PLAINTIFFS and against the KRISSINGERS, granting PLAINTIFFS possession of the real property at issue and damages in the amount of $7,200.00.

On March 20, KRISSINGERS filed a Motion for a New Trial, and on April 11, they appealed to the Superior Court. Citing the pendency of the post-trial motion now before us, the Superior Court quashed the appeal.

(Greenwalt et. al, v. Krissingers, et. al., Lebanon County Docket No: 2012-01188, December 31, 2014). Judge Charles ultimately denied the Motion for a New Trial. The Krissingers appealed this matter to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the appeal is currently pending. (See Connie Greenawalt and Martin Petratros v. Scott and Rachel Krissinger, 185 MDA 2015).

Turning to the instant case, a writ of summons was issued on January 29, 2014. On February 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Civil Complaint, which contains three counts: Unjust Detention, Unjust Enrichment, and Counsel Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs seek $25,199.95, which sum represents the fair market rental value of the property from March 7, 2012 through April 11, 2014. This amount represents the months that the Krissingers retained possession of the property against the Plaintiffs’ interest less credits owed to the Krissingers in the amount of $7,200.05. In addition, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $63,752.37 pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §2503(7) and (9). Plaintiffs arrive at this sum by asserting that they incurred counsel fees in the amount of $11,830.00 and $176.00 costs in the litigation in the Bankruptcy Court to obtain a lift of the automatic stay to institute the state action in ejectment. Also, they incurred $49,875.00 with costs of $1,692.37 for litigation in the ejectment action. Plaintiffs allege that the Krissingers’ conduct has been dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, arbitrary, and/or in bad faith.

The Krissingers never filed a responsive pleading to the Complaint. Therefore, on March 18, 2015, the Plaintiffs provided the Krissingers notice that it intended to seek entry of a default judgment for its failure to file a responsive pleading. Despite this notice, a responsive pleading was still not filed. As a result, the Plaintiffs filed a praecipe with the Prothonotary of Lebanon County to enter default judgment on April 17, 2015. Accordingly, default judgment was entered by the Prothonotary in the total amount of $88,772.32.

On April 27, 2015, the Krissingers filed a Petition to Open and/or Strike Plaintiffs’ Default Judgment. Pursuant to a rule to show cause, Plaintiffs filed a response on May 20, 2015. On June 24, 2015, Krissingers filed a praecipe to attach a proposed Answer with New Matter to the Petition because it never initially attached the proposed Answer to the Petition.

Plaintiffs filed a praecipe for a hearing, and a hearing was held on June 30, 2015. The Court concluded the matter was more appropriately categorized as an oral argument rather than a hearing, and the Court issued a briefing schedule for the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions. Both parties filed their respective briefs. The case is thus before us and ripe for disposition.

DISCUSSION

“To obtain relief from the entry of a default judgment, the law provides two distinct remedies. An aggrieved party may file a petition to strike the default judgment and/or a petition to open the default judgment.” Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Pa.Super.2009). “It is well-settled that [a] petition to strike a default judgment and a petition to open a default judgment are two distinct remedies, which are generally not interchangeable.” Oswald v. WB Public Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 794, footnote 3 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Krissingers claim that the default judgment should be both opened and stricken. We will first address opening the default judgment.

Generally speaking, a default judgment may be opened if

the moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the default judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the complaint. Moreover, we note the trial court cannot open a default judgment based on the “equities” of the case when the defendant has failed to establish all three of the required criteria.

US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 994-995 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). In addition, “[i]f the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of the judgment on the docket, the court shall open the judgment if the proposed complaint or answer states a meritorious cause of action or defense.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 237.3(b).

To seek the benefit of Rule 237.3(b), the petition first must be filed within 10 days after entry of judgment. The Krissingers argue that the Petition was filed within 10 days from entry of default. The Plaintiffs argue that although they may have filed the Petition within 10 days, they failed to attach a proposed Answer to the Petition, and they failed to even file their proposed answer until 57 days after the filing of the Petition.

The default judgment was entered on April 17, 2015. The Krissingers filed their Petition to Strike/Open on April 27, 2015, which was 10 days after the entry of default. Plaintiffs correctly point out that the Petition to Strike/Open did not have attached the proposed responsive pleading as required by Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(a). The Krissingers assert in their Petition that the Answer would be supplemented by praecipe “in light of the urgent nature of this Motion.” It took the Krissingers almost an additional 2 months to file their proposed Answer with New Matter as they filed it on June 24, 2015. Although the Krissingers did not attach a proposed Answer as required, the

Krissingers did assert some defenses in the Petition, which are also set forth

in the proposed Answer. The Krissingers state the following:

…[T]he within action: (a) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (i.e., there is no lease or otherwise which would enable the collection of rents); this action is barred by the relief being here sought having been previously rejected by the ejectment court and/or not brought therein; and (c) the action is barred for Defendants’ rightful possession.

(See Petition to Open/Strike, Paragraph 7).

A review of the case law indicates that courts should not apply an overly strict interpretation of Rule 237.3, see Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. 2008). If we were to rule that the Petition was not filed within 10 days due to the Krissingers failure to attach the proposed Answer, we would be applying an overly strict interpretation of Rule 237.3. We are reluctant to do this. The Krissingers did assert some defenses in the Petition that are also raised in the proposed Answer/New Matter. Accordingly, the Krissingers failure to attach the proposed Answer to the Petition will be excused, and we find that the Petition was filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment.

Having found that the Petition was filed within 10 days after entry of judgment, Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b) requires us to open the judgment if the proposed answer states a meritorious cause of action or defense. “In order to satisfy the meritorious defense requirement, the defendant need only plead a defense which, if proved at trial, would justify relief.” Estate of Considine, 966 A.2d at 1152. “[The Defendant] must plead an arguable meritorious defense sufficient to justify relief if proven. The defendant does not have to prove every element of her defense, however, she must set forth the defense in precise, specific and clear terms.” Castings Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein, 663 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. Super. 1995).

Two cases where the Superior Court has reached opposite conclusions

as to whether a party has set forth a meritorious defense are Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 29 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2011) and Penn-Delco School Dist. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14 (Pa. Super. 1999). In Smith, the Court stated:

Although timely filed, the petition did not set forth allegations of a defense that, if proven at trial, would entitle Appellants to relief. Instead of alleging facts of record in the petition that support a meritorious defense, Appellants set forth in their petition conclusions of law and challenges to Appellee’s proof. In sum, Appellants allege that they have “a strong defense for this matter and it is highly likely that plaintiff will not prevail on this case in chief.” We conclude that Appellants’ petition does not set forth a meritorious defense supported by verified allegations of fact. Thus, Appellants are not entitled to relief under Rule 237.3(b).

Id at. 29 A.3d at 28. In Penn-Delco, the Court stated:

In its petition to open, Bell Atlantic stated that “Defendant, Bell Atlantic–Pennsylvania, Inc. has a meritorious defense as evidenced by the attached Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.” This statement, in and of itself, is insufficient to meet the requirement of pleading a meritorious defense. However, in its answer, Bell Atlantic provided the trial court with nineteen reasons why the Penn–Delco School is not entitled to relief. Included among the reasons are the arguments that the Penn–Delco School’s causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations, as well as the doctrine of res judicata, and the Penn–Delco School failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. If Bell Atlantic is able to prove any one of the defenses at trial, it would be entitled to relief. As such, we find that Bell Atlantic has met the meritorious defense requirement under Pa.R.C.P. 237.3.

Id., 745 A.2d at 19. We now turn to whether the Krissingers have averred a meritorious defense.

In the proposed New Matter, the Krissingers set forth the following:

1. Plaintiffs’ action fail to set forth a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. Plaintiffs’ action is estopped and/or res judicata precluded.

3. Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrines of statute of limitations, laches, failure of consideration, discharge in bankruptcy, impossibility of performance, justification, and their fraud and breach of contract.

(See Attached New Matter, Paragraphs 1-3). In their brief, they argue:

To highlight a portion of Defendants’ proposed response pleading, this action fails to set forth a cause of action precluded by res judicata/collateral estoppel. That is, Plaintiffs seek damages which they attempted to seek in the underlying ejectment (and which were awarded in part). Pa.R.C.P. 1055.

To the extent Defendants claimed they were not awarded entirely, they could have but but [sic] did not to [sic] seek post-trial relief (and then appeal) therefrom. Even though this Honorable Court’s trial opinion in the ejectment perhaps granted leave for instant Plaintiffs to here pursue, respectfully, this Court’s then judgment in ejectment was final and binding-now precluding that leave.

(See brief, p. 2). The Krissingers claim, inter alia, that the Plaintiffs are attempting to seek damages that they attempted to seek in the underlying ejectment action. The Krissingers assert that the principles of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel apply. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses recognized by Pa.R.C.P. 1030.

At the conclusion of the ejectment hearing, a discussion with regard to the monetary issue was held after the Krissingers were ordered to be ejected. (2012-01188, 3/10/14 Hearing, N.T. 176-181). An Order was entered which

states the following:

And now, to wit, March 10, 2014, after Trial, the Court entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants regarding the Plaintiffs’ ejectment cause of action. That Order was already signed by this Court. In addition, the Court awards monetary damages to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,200. The Court considers this Order to finally resolve all issues before it related to the above-referenced docket number.

This Order is without prejudice to the ability of either side to file any separate actions to pursue other claims that may relate to the property located at 3204 State Route 72, Jonestown, including any causes of action against Deutsche Bank with respect to the manner in which it handled mortgage foreclosure of said property.

(See Order dated March 10, 2014, entered on the docket March 12, 2014).

The Krissingers assert that the Plaintiffs are seeking to collect on matters that were already determined. If the Krissingers are able to prove at trial that any amount of damages and attorneys’ fees that the Plaintiffs are attempting to collect were matters that were already determined, then that would justify relief. We emphasize that the Krissingers do not have to ultimately prove their defense at this time. Whether the Plaintiffs’ instant claims for damages and attorneys’ fees fall under the first or second paragraph of the above-mentioned Order and whether they are allowed to recover these damages and attorneys’ fees are issues that will be determined another day. Accordingly, they have met the meritorious defense requirement, and Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b) requires us to open the default judgment.

Even assuming the default judgment should not be opened, we find grounds for striking the default judgment. There is one matter that requires attention as part of the default judgment that was entered is void ab initio. Although the Krissingers did not raise the issue, the matter involves a question of jurisdiction, and jurisdictional issues are matters that Courts can raise sua sponte.

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record. [A] petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. When a prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is void ab initio. When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a [default] judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when the judgment was entered.

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three jurisdictional elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the parties; subject matter jurisdiction; or the power or authority to render the particular judgment. The term “jurisdiction” relates to the competency of the individual court, administrative body, or other tribunal to determine controversies of the general class to which a particular case belongs.

Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1267-1268 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Turning to the instant matter, Plaintiffs have filed a Civil Complaint in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, where they seek to collect $63,572.37 for various attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs assert that a portion of the sum of $63,572.37 derives from litigation associated with the bankruptcy proceeding. The Complaint states, “During the litigation, Plaintiffs incurred counsel fees in the amount of $11,830.00 for counsel fees and $176.00 costs in litigation in the Bankruptcy Court to obtain a lift of the automatic stay to institute a state action in ejectment…” (Complaint, Paragraph 65).

In Ludmer v. Nernberg, 699 A.2d 764 (Pa. Super. 1997), an appellant argued that a trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a request for counsel fees in connection with answering a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The appellant claimed that such a request for counsel fees could only be granted by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules. The Superior Court agreed and stated the following, in relevant part:

Similarly, in a recent decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court addressed the issue of awarding attorney fees for matters that had occurred before another court. In Raymark Industries, Inc. v. Baron, No. CIV. 96–7625, 1997 WL 359333 (E.D.Pa. June 23, 1997), Baron had initially petitioned the bankruptcy court to initiate involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Raymark Industries, Inc. The bankruptcy court subsequently dismissed the involuntary petition. Raymark then sued for damages in the district court, alleging that the involuntary bankruptcy petitions were wrongfully filed. Raymark sought to recover its attorneys’ fees for work that arose in connection with defending the bankruptcy court proceedings. The district court analyzed section 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes attorneys’ fees for the wrongful filing of an involuntary petition. In discussing this section of the code, the district court stated that “the same court that dismisses the petition is the court that can award damages. Subsection (i) was not meant to be utilized by any other judge.” Moreover, under another alleged avenue to support the award of attorney fees, the District Court held that “a judge cannot impose sanctions pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 1927 for conduct that did not occur as part of the proceedings in front of that judge.”

Finally, Raymark had requested attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) and § 2503(9), the same sections of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes that Ludmer argues apply in this case. In Raymark, the district court noted that “the statute itself provides for fees for conduct that occurred ‘during the pendency of a matter’ and ‘in commencing the matter.’ 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7) and (9). Id. at. Further, ” ‘matter’ within the meaning of § 2503(7) and (9) applies ‘only to those matters pending or commencing in a court of the unified judicial system of this Commonwealth.’ Therefore, any fees alleged to be proper under the Pennsylvania provisions for vexatious or dilatory conduct were only recoverable in Pennsylvania courts; the fees recoverable under this section were not available in regard to matters pending in the bankruptcy court or the district court.

We therefore hold that a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court judge does not have jurisdiction to award counsel fees under 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) or (9) in relation to proceedings that took place before the United States Supreme Court. Only the Court before which the alleged frivolous appeal was filed, or the alleged dilatory or vexatious conduct occurred, may award fees as a sanction for such behavior.

Our analysis is further strengthened by the recognition of our well-established traditions relating to the principles of federalism. State courts possess no authority over the Federal court system…

Ludmer, 699 A.2d at 766-767 (citations omitted).

Keeping these principles in mind, the Prothonotary of the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas does not have the authority to enter judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs that arise from matters that occurred in bankruptcy court. Accordingly, we will strike the judgment.

Having already found grounds to grant the Petition, we will not address any other specific arguments raised by the parties. The Motion to Strike/Open Default Judgment is granted. We will enter an Order consistent with the foregoing.

1) The subsections state the following:

The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:

(7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter.

(9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another party in commencing the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §2503(7) and (9).

2) “A petition for relief from a judgment of non pros or of default entered pursuant to Rule 237.1 shall have attached thereto a verified copy of the complaint or answer which the petitioner seeks leave to file.” Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(a).

3) “Res judicata, which is also known as claim preclusion, holds that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction will bar any future action on the same cause of action between the parties and their privies. The doctrine has application where the following are present: (1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons or parties to the actions; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. [A]ll matters which might have been raised and decided in the former suit, as well as those which were actually raised therein, are res [ ] judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties and their privies.”

Rearick v. Elderton State Bank, 97 A.3d 374, 380 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “The phrase collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, simply means that when an issue of law, evidentiary fact, or ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Collateral estoppel does not automatically bar a subsequent prosecution, but rather, it bars redetermination in a second prosecution of those issues necessarily determined between the parties in a first proceeding that has become a final judgment. Traditionally, Pennsylvania courts have applied the collateral estoppel doctrine only if the following threshold requirements are met: 1) the issues in the two actions are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material to justify invoking the doctrine; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; and 3) a final judgment on the specific issue in question was issued in the first action.” Com. v. Holder, 805 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).

4) “A court’s jurisdiction is a threshold issue that the court may consider of its own motion and at any time.” McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa. 2002).

 

 

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