Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, v. Zachary Nagele

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, v. Zachary Nagele

Criminal Action-Constitutional Law-Simple Assault-Terroristic Threats-Firearm Pointed at Victims-Omnibus Pretrial Motion-Suppression of Evidence-Miranda Warnings-Custodial Interrogation-Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-Warrantless Vehicle Search-Public Safety Doctrine-Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

Zachary Nagele (“Defendant”) incurred multiple charges including Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, Terroristic Threats, Simple Assault and Harassment relating to an incident in which it is alleged that he threatened to shoot two (2) women during an argument by retrieving a revolver from his vehicle, aiming the firearm at the women and fleeing the scene in his vehicle.  Defendant was apprehended in his vehicle, in which two (2) firearms were located in the trunk during a warrantless search of the vehicle.  Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion seeking suppression of evidence obtained during the warrantless vehicle search and statements made to police prior to receiving the required warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 36 (1966). 

1.  Title 18 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a) provides that law enforcement may not arrest a person without first observing recent physical injury to the victim or other corroborative evidence. 

2.  Where law enforcement were provided with reports of the incident by the victims and footage of a Ring camera at the residence where the incident occurred depicting Defendant, other corroborative evidence was sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under § 2711. 

3.  A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings prior to engaging in a custodial interrogation.

4.  Custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise has been deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. 

5.  Where Defendant already had been placed under arrest for Simple Assault involving a gun and immediately was questioned as to whether he had a gun, the gun’s location and the incident forming the basis for the charges, the exchange was likely to elicit incriminating statements from Defendant and constitutes custodial interrogation for which Defendant should have been apprised of his rights under Miranda. 

6.  The public safety doctrine permits limited inquiry of a suspect without Miranda warnings to prevent an immediate harm. 

7.  In light of the fact that there was no immediate threat of danger to law enforcement or any other individual with Defendant having been restrained and unable to access any weapons in the trunk of his vehicle, the public safety doctrine does not excuse the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning Defendant.

8.  A warrantless search of a vehicle is appropriate only when there is probable cause to believe that contraband will be found in a vehicle and exigent circumstances exist. 

9.  Since Defendant already had been removed from the immediate vicinity and was in custody and there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle, a warrantless search of the vehicle was not justified. 

10.  The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of evidence that was discovered illegally if it can be shown that the evidence ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means. 

11.  Law enforcement must demonstrate that the evidence would have been discovered absent the law enforcement misconduct, not simply that law enforcement somehow could have discovered it lawfully. 

12.  In light of the fact that a search warrant could have been obtained prior to the vehicle search with the vehicle remaining secured until obtaining a warrant, the seizure of the items in the truck without a search warrant mandates suppression.

L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-734-2024, Opinion by John C. Tylwalk, President Judge, August 25, 2025.  

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                            PENNSYLVANIA

                                                      CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-734-2024

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

ZACHARY NAGELE                                                           :

                                                            ORDER OF COURT

            AND NOW, this 25^th day of August, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, it is hereby Ordered as follows:

1.  The request for suppression of custodial statements prior to Defendant being apprised of his Miranda rights is GRANTED.
2. The request for suppression of physical evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search is GRANTED.

BY THE COURT:

___________________________, P.J.

JOHN C. TYLWALK

JCT/jah

Cc:  Brian L. Deiderick, Esquire/First Assistant District Attorney

       Megan D. Tidwell, Esquire/Public Defender

       Leslie Fillak/Court Administration

       Judith Huber, Esquire/Law Clerk

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                            PENNSYLVANIA

                                                      CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-734-2024

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

ZACHARY NAGELE                                                           :

APPEARANCES:

BRIAN L. DEIDERICK, ESQUIRE                                  FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

FIRST ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

MEGAN D. TIDWELL, ESQUIRE                                   FOR ZACHARY NAGELE

PUBLIC DEFENDER

OPINION, TYLWALK, P.J., AUGUST 25, 2025.

            Defendant is charged with one count of Firearm Not to be Carried Without a License, two counts of Terroristic Threats, two counts of Simple Assault, and two counts of Harassment^[1] for an incident that occurred on May 29, 2025.  It is alleged that Defendant threatened to shoot two women, Sierra Rutter and Destiny Frederick, during an argument at Frederick’s residence at 101 Hill Street in the City of Lebanon.  The women reported to Officers Shearer and Layton of Lebanon City Police that Defendant retrieved a revolver from the trunk of his vehicle.  They explained that Defendant aimed the firearm at them before fleeing in his vehicle.  Defendant was subsequently apprehended by police as he sat inside his vehicle across the street from the home of Rutter’s relative in Cleona.  Two firearms were located after police conducted a warrantless search of Defendant’s vehicle.

            Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion seeking suppression of evidence obtained during the warrantless vehicle search and statements made to police prior to receiving his Miranda warnings.^[2]  We conducted a hearing on the Motion on June 4, 2025.  The transcript of the hearing has been lodged, both parties have filed post-hearing briefs, and the matter is now before us for disposition. 

            At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Lebanon City Police Officers Colin Shearer and Erin Secoges and Sergeant Adam Rusz.  Defendant also presented a video of Officer Shearer’s bodycam which depicted Defendant’s arrest and questioning. (Exhibits “1” – “3”)

The evidence indicated that on May 29, 2025, Rutter and Frederick appeared at the Lebanon City police station to report the incident.  The women explained that Rutter and Defendant were in a romantic relationship.  Defendant had shown up at Frederick’s residence and began to argue with the women.  During the argument, Defendant told the women that he was going to shoot them.  They observed Defendant retrieve a revolver from the trunk of his vehicle and aim it at them.  

Based on the report, the police believed that Defendant had committed Terroristic Threats, Simple Assault by Physical Menace and Harassment.  Officer Shearer explained that a warrantless arrest was permitted by Section 2711 of the Crimes Code^[3] as the Simple Assault constituted a domestic violence case due to Defendant and Rutter being in a romantic relationship,

The women were accompanied by two of Rutter’s family members.  Those individuals provided the officers with Ring Camera surveillance footage from their home at 206 East Chestnut Street in Cleona.  The video showed Defendant sitting inside his vehicle across the street from the home.  The officers determined that Defendant should be taken into custody and Officer Shearer contacted the Cleona Police Department.

Officer Shearer, Officer Layton, Officer Secoges, Sergeant Rusz and a Cleona police officer arrived at the Cleona address at approximately 10:40 p.m.  Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat of his vehicle.  The officers aimed spotlights at the vehicle and moved forward to make contact with Defendant.  Sergeant Rusz directed Defendant to exit the vehicle and immediately placed him in handcuffs.  Officer Secoges used a flashlight to conduct a plain view search of the interior passenger compartment to check for weapons, but found none.

The following exchange between Defendant and the police occurred after Defendant was handcuffed:

Officer 2:  Do you have a gun in there?

            Zach:  In my car, yeah.

            Officer 2:  Where’s it at? Is it a revolver?

            Zach:  Yeah.

            …

            Officer 2:  Is it a Heritage?

            Zach:   Why?

            Officer 2:  Is it on you right now?

            Zach:  No.

            Officer 2:  Okay. Where’s the gun at, the pistol?

            Zach:  In my car.

            Secoges:  Where?

            Officer 2:  Yeah I know, where?

            Zach:  In a tan bag.

            Officer 2:  Okay, we’re gonna take it so that’s why I’m asking you so –

            Zach:  Why?

Officer 2:  Because right now you’re under arrest for Simple Assault Domestic Violence.

Zach:  Wait, they assaulted me.  What are you talking about?

Officer 2:  Do you want to tell us what happened?

Shearer:  How’d – How did they assault you?

Zach:  They pushed me into my car.  Some dude came up and pushed me in my car.  They told me to come over because I was trying to get my stuff.  Like I’m actually so confused what’s happening.  I’ve been waiting – they said they were gonna get me my stuff.  Like I was waiting here just to get my stuff and then you guys showed up.  And now I’m in handcuffs.

Officer 2:  How do we get to the trunk?

Zach:  How am I being arrested though?

Officer 2:  For pointing a gun

Zach:  I didn’t though.

Officer 2:  Well they said you did.

 (Hearing 6/4/25, Exhibits “1” – “3”) 

            Sergeant Rusz explained that Defendant was questioned about the firearm before his Miranda warnings were given due to safety concerns.   He explained that he had not been able to assess the danger of the situation as it was unknown whether the gun was on Defendant’s person or within arm’s reach.  Defendant was given the Miranda warnings after he admitted that he had a gun and had disclosed its location in the trunk of his vehicle.  Defendant was then transported to Central Booking where he underwent additional questioning.

            After Defendant informed police that the firearm was in the trunk, Officer Secoges retrieved the keys from the console and opened the trunk.  The bodycam video showed several of the officers looking through trunk as they attempted to locate the firearm used in the incident.  The officers found a revolver in a tan bag as directed by Defendant.  This was the type of weapon Defendant had allegedly pointed at Rutter and Frederick. Police also found a .22 caliber rifle in the trunk inside a rifle case that was in plain view. 

Officer Shearer confirmed that Defendant was not asked for consent to the vehicle search. Officer Secoges confirmed that Defendant did not give permission for police to retrieve the keys, unlock the trunk, search the tan bag, or remove the firearms from the trunk. 

The testimony indicated that there was no one present at the scene other than the police officers and Defendant.  However, the officers did not know the identity of the registered owner of the vehicle, whether any other individuals had access to the vehicle, or whether Defendant had communicated to anyone his location or the location of the vehicle or the firearms. 

Sergeant Rusz explained that he was the officer in charge during his shift that evening.  He confirmed that the Lebanon City Police do not have an impound lot or an inventory search policy.  He believed that the police could have obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s vehicle, but noted that it was a lengthy process.  If the officers applied for a search warrant, he would have had an officer remain with the vehicle at all times.  The vehicle would have been towed back to the police department, secured, and an application for a search warrant would have been prepared.  Because Defendant was apprehended at 10:40 p.m., there could have been a delay in seeing a judge to obtain the search warrant.  After the weapons were located, there was no need to have Defendant’s vehicle towed.  Defendant’s mother was permitted to retrieve the vehicle after his arrest. 

Defendant first argues that the officers lacked probable cause for Defendant’s warrantless arrest.  Section 2711 provides, in part, that “[a] police officer may not arrest a person pursuant to this section without first observing recent physical injury to the victim or other corroborative evidence.”  18 Pa.C.S.A. §2711(a).  Defendant contends that this language requires police to observe physical injury to the victim or to property, or some other physical corroboration of the alleged threat.  He argues that Section 2711 is not applicable because physical evidence was not present here. 

We disagree.  Section 2711(a) provides that “other corroborative evidence” is sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest in these types of cases.  The statute does not limit that corroborative evidence to evidence with a physical manifestation.  In this case, police were provided with a report of the incident by Rutter, the victim of the domestic violence.  That report was corroborated by Frederick, who was an eyewitness to the domestic violence assault, as well as the footage of the Ring Camera footage of Defendant waiting outside the home of Rutter’s family members.  This was sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest pursuant to Section 2711.

Defendant also argues that the statements he gave to police without receiving his Miranda warnings and the items seized during the warrantless search of the trunk of his vehicle should be suppressed.  We agree with these contentions and will order the suppression of those statements and evidence. 

A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. 2008).  Custodial interrogation has been defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 11.  “Interrogation” is police conduct calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke admission. Id.  A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect amounts to interrogation.  Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 629 A.2d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 1993). 

The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787 (Pa. Super. 2023) for the proposition that police are permitted to ask questions related to their own safety without first giving Miranda warnings.  That case involved a traffic stop where the officer became aware that the defendant had a firearms permit which had been revoked.  Knowing that individuals who had permits often carried firearms, he asked the defendant whether he was in possession of a firearm out of concern for his own safety.  The court held that this question was permissible.  However, in that case, unlike the one before us, the defendant was still inside his vehicle and had not been restrained at the time the question was posed. 

In this case, Defendant was placed under arrest for Domestic Violence Simple Assault involving a gun.  He was immediately questioned as to whether he had a gun and the gun’s location and type.  He was also asked about the incident which formed the basis for his criminal charges when he was asked  “[d]o you want to tell us what happened?”  (Exhibits “1” – “3”)  These questions were likely to elicit incriminating responses from Defendant and Defendant’s response to these questions led to the officers retrieving the keys to the vehicle from the center console, unlocking and searching the trunk, and seizing two firearms without first obtaining a search warrant.  This exchange constituted custodial interrogation for which Defendant should have been apprised of his Miranda rights.  The officers should have realized that Defendant would likely provide incriminating statements.  Because Defendant was under arrest and had not received his Miranda warnings prior to this exchange, these statements should be suppressed.  

The Commonwealth asserts that the questioning of Defendant was allowable under the public safety doctrine, which permits a limited inquiry of a suspect, without Miranda warnings, in order to prevent an immediate harm, citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) and Commonwealth v. Bowers, 583 A.2d 1165 (Pa. Super. 1990), in support of its position.  This exception to the Miranda requirement applies when an issue of public safety makes it imperative to obtain information from a suspect.  In Bowers, police responded to the scene of a shooting.  The shooter was found but the firearm had not been located.  Police questioned the suspect about the firearm without giving Miranda warnings as the weapon was unaccounted for and several children were present at the shooter’s home where the weapon might have been located.  The questioning was approved under the public safety doctrine. 

In Commonwealth v. Bronson, 2018 WL 1165548 (Pa. Super. 2018), the Superior Court discussed the situation in Quarles: 

The public safety exception is a narrowly tailored exception to the requirement that before a person is subjected to a custodial interrogation, that person must be informed of his or her Miranda rights. The public safety exception was announced in Quarles, supra. The United States Supreme Court, in a divided decision, held that under limited circumstances, Miranda warnings were not required. In Quarels, a rape suspect fled into a nearby supermarket immediately following the crime. The victim also informed the police officers that the suspect was carrying a gun. Officers entered the supermarket and located the suspect, who attempted to flee. Officers briefly lost sight of him. When he was located, he was apprehended and frisked. The police found an empty shoulder holster. One of the officers asked Quarles where the gun was and he nodded his head toward some boxes and replied “the gun is over there.” Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2627. In explaining the public safety exception, the majority stated:

The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.

Id. at *4. 

The court in Bronson made clear that, while the public safety doctrine is applicable in cases where the location of a firearm is crucial to protecting the public from immediate harm, the doctrine is not applicable in every case where a firearm is involved. Bronson, 2018 WL 1165548 at *6.  In Bronson, the court suppressed statements of a gun’s location given 18 hours after a shooting where the Commonwealth argued that the fact of the missing weapon justified custodial questioning absent Miranda warnings under the public safety exception.  The court reasoned that the situation did not present the immediacy of danger which was present in Bowers.

In this case, there was no immediate threat of danger to the police or any other individuals.  There was no immediate danger of Defendant or any other individual accessing the weapon involved in this incident.  Defendant’s vehicle was legally parked on the street.     Rutter and Frederick told police that Defendant had the firearm in the trunk of his vehicle.  Although the incident occurred in a public place, there was no threat to any bystanders.  Defendant was immediately placed in handcuffs and arrested in a nearby location soon after the report of the incident.  Defendant was restrained and unable to access any weapons.   There was no one else present, there was no active scene, the victims of the incident were not present, and police had ensured that there were no weapons in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.  At the pretrial hearing, Officer Shearer acknowledged that although there are always safety concerns in such situations, “the immediate danger was taken care of.”  (N.T. at 25)  Thus, we find the Commonwealth’s reliance on the public safety doctrine to be in error and will order that the statements made by Defendant during the custodial interrogation prior to receiving his Miranda rights are suppressed.

Defendant argues that the weapons found in the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree because the evidence was found as the result of his responses to the questions posed by police prior to receiving the Miranda warnings.  The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from initially illegally obtained evidence.  Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704 (Pa. Super. 2023).   A statement made by a criminal defendant during a custodial interrogation who has not been apprised of the warnings required by Miranda generally must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 833, 836 (Pa. 2019).  However, the violation does not justify the exclusion of physical evidence recovered as a result of the statement.  Id.  Thus, the evidence seized during the search of the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle cannot be suppressed based on the Miranda violation.

Nonetheless, we find that the firearms seized from Defendant’s vehicle should be suppressed.  A warrantless search of a vehicle is appropriate only when there is probable cause to believe that contraband will be found in the vehicle and exigent circumstances exist.  Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020).  A warrantless search of a vehicle will be justified where exigent circumstances occur suddenly in an unforeseen way, and at a time when the vehicle is mobile and might flee.  Commonwealth v. Higgins, 499 A.2d 585 (Pa. Super. 1985).  A potential threat of deadly harm to police is an exigent circumstance that justifies a warrantless search of a vehicle.  Commonwealth v. Perry, 798 A.2d 697 (Pa. 2002). 

The warrantless search of an automobile incident to an arrest is limited to the areas and clothing immediately accessible to the person arrested, in keeping with the purpose of the search which is to prevent the arrestee from securing weapons or destroying evidence or contraband.  Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1995).  When police have advance information that contraband will be found in a vehicle and they have sufficient information, time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant, a warrantless search is unreasonable even when the defendant has been placed under arrest.  Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995).  The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable when a vehicle is searched when the defendant is handcuffed and detained by police outside of the immediate vicinity and cannot access the contents of the vehicle.  See, Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 578 (Pa. Super. 2022). 

This was not a lawful search incident to Defendant’s arrest.  Defendant was handcuffed and there was no risk of him accessing any weapons or destroying any evidence or contraband.  Moreover, there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle.  As previously noted, there was no threat of immediate danger to the police or any other individuals as Defendant was removed from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle and was in handcuffs with several police officers at the scene.  

The Commonwealth argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine is applicable.  That doctrine allows the admission of evidence that was discovered illegally if it can be shown that the evidence would have ultimately been discovered by lawful means.  Commonwealth v. Brinson, 328 A.3d 1096, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2024).  If the discovery of evidence can be traced to a source independent of the initial illegality, suppression is not mandated. Commonwealth v. Metz, 332 A.3d 92, 102 (Pa. Super. 2025).  The Commonwealth must show by a “preponderance of the evidence that the illegally obtained evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 522 (Pa.Super. 2021). “Evidence tainted by illegal police conduct such as an unlawful seizure nevertheless may be admitted into evidence if the evidence can be fairly regarded as having an origin independent of the unlawful conduct.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 A.3d 824, 834 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied, 252 A.3d 234 (Pa. 2021).

The Commonwealth argues that the firearms would have been found by police if they had not searched the car at the time of Defendant’s arrest because probable cause existed to support the issuance of a search warrant for Defendant’s vehicle.  We reject this contention. 

The inevitable discovery doctrine is not a substitute for the warrant requirement.  Commonwealth v. Curry, 277 A.3d 1126, *7 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential unpublished decision).  Police must demonstrate that the evidence would have been discovered absent the police misconduct, not simply that they somehow could have lawfully discovered it.  Id.  “To hold otherwise, … , would eradicate the need for police officers ever to obtain a constitutionally supported search warrant.” Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 185, 196 (Pa. Super. 2014).  If such an argument were countenanced, police would only need to seize an item or search premises and then invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine with the assertion that they could have obtained a warrant. Id. “The inevitable discovery doctrine does not operate in such a constitutionally impoverished manner.”  Id.

The fact that police had adequate support for the issuance of the warrant does not excuse the failure to pursue one under the circumstances present here.  There is no reason why a search warrant could not have been obtained prior to this vehicle search.  Defendant was in custody and the vehicle was legally parked.  No other individuals who could have moved the vehicle or removed the contents of the trunk were present.  Sergeant Rusz described the procedure for obtaining a search warrant.  An officer could have remained with the vehicle, it could have been towed and secured, and an application for a search warrant could have been prepared and presented to a judge for issuance.  Sergeant Rusz acknowledged that the officers knew the gun was in the trunk.  Thus, there was no immediacy which precluded police from undertaking this process and the seizure of those items without a search warrant mandates suppression. 

For these reasons, we will order suppression of the statements made prior to Defendant being given his Miranda rights and the items seized from Defendant’s vehicle.

---

[1] Counts 1 through 7, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2706(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2701(a)(3), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2709(a)(4), respectively.

[2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 36 (1966). 

[3] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2711 provides, in part:

§ 2711. Probable cause arrests in domestic violence cases

• General rule.–A police officer shall have the same right of arrest without a warrant as in a felony whenever he has probable cause to believe the defendant has violated section 2504 (relating to involuntary manslaughter), 2701 (relating to simple assault), 2702(a)(3), (4) and (5) (relating to aggravated assault), 2705 (relating to recklessly endangering another person), 2706 (relating to terroristic threats), 2709.1 (relating to stalking) or 2718 (relating to strangulation) against a family or household member although the offense did not take place in the presence of the police officer. A police officer may not arrest a person pursuant to this section without first observing recent physical injury to the victim or other corroborative evidence. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “family or household member” has the meaning given that term in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102 (relating to definitions).

18 Pa.C.S.A. §2711(a).