Amy J. Hollinger, v. Michael P. McGinty, Sr.

Amy J. Hollinger, v. Michael P. McGinty, Sr.

Civil Action-Family Law-Support-Child-Termination-Disabled Adult Child-Standing-Emancipation-Permanency-Physical and Mental Ability to Engage in Profitable Employment-Availability of Employment to Adult Child-Failure to Comply with all Treatment Recommendations

The parties are the parents of an adult child, who is twenty (20) years of age and graduated from high school on June 10, 2022.  The child has no legal guardian.  Michael P. McGinty, Sr., (“Father”) has been paying support of the child under an Order to Amy J. Hollinger (“Mother”).  Following termination of the child support Order after the child graduated from high school, Mother contested the termination of support on the basis that the child is unable to obtain employment due to medical issues.  The Domestic Relations Hearing Officer (“DRHO”) issued a Report and Recommendation adopted by the Court finding that the child could not obtain employment and reinstating the Order of support.  Father has filed Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation on the basis that the DRHO erred by finding that the child requires ongoing support.

1. A parent may be liable for support of a child who is eighteen (18) years of age or older.

2. A presumption exists that a child is emancipated when the child attains age eighteen (18) and has graduated from high school.

3. To rebut the presumption of emancipation of an adult child, the test is whether the child physically and mentally is able to engage in profitable employment and whether employment is available to that child at a supporting wage. 

4. Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1910.3 which provides that an action in support may be brought by a parent on behalf of an unemancipated child over eighteen (18) years old to whom a duty of support is owing confers standing upon Mother to pursue a claim for support on behalf of the child.

5. Emancipation is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances presented in each case.

6. Emancipation is not necessarily a permanent status, and the mere fact that a child once was emancipated does not foreclose divestiture of emancipation when circumstances change. 

7. Where the DRHO regarded the expert offered by Mother who had treated the child since he was six (6) years of age as more credible than the vocational expert offered by Father who met with the child one (1) time, the DRHO did not err in consideration of the evidence offered by the parties’ experts. 

8.  In light of the fact that the child did not cooperate with performing an occupational rehabilitation program to help with socialization, was uncomfortable with medication recommendations by his psychiatric provider and is capable of employment if he takes medications and properly is supported by his family, support will be continued for six (6) months while Mother and the child implement a plan including medication, socialization, hygiene training and therapy designed to develop skills that may be useful in the workforce, after which review will occur and support will be terminated if robust efforts are not established that the child is attempting to engage in profitable employment and to support himself.   

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2008-50070, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, April 26, 2024.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION

            AMY J. HOLLINGER,                                :           NO. 2008-5-0070

            Plaintiff                                                          :           PACSES NO. 716109767
                                                                                    :

                        v.                                                         :          

                                                                                    :          

MICHAEL P. MCGINTY,              :          

          Defendant                                            :

                                                                                    :                      

ORDER OF COURT

            AND NOW, this 26^th day of April 2024, upon consideration of the exceptions filed, and in accordance with the attached Opinion, the Order of this Court is as follows: 

1. The Defendant’s exception to the Domestic Relations Hearing Officer’s (DRHO) finding that M.P.M. is not emancipated is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with the attached Opinion.
2. The Defendant’s exception alleging that the DRHO gave undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Karen Medzoyan is DENIED.
3. The Defendant’s exception claiming that the DRHO’s disregarded the testimony of the vocational expert is DENIED.
4. The Defendant’s exception asserting that the DRHO erred in disregarding testimony that even MOTHER has encouraged M.P.M. to obtain employment is DENIED.
5. The Defendant’s exception alleging that the DRHO erred by not addressing why M.P.M. is incapable of obtaining employment in any of the fields recognized by the vocational expert is GRANTED.
6. The Defendant’s exception claiming that the DRHO erred by entering a monetary Order without making any determinations about the incomes of either parent is DENIED.
7. The Defendant’s exception to the DRHO findings and recommendation concluded that FATHER should pay 100% of any non-basic expenses and unreimbursed medical costs is DENIED.
8. A Review Hearing is to be conducted in six (6) months.

ACCORDINGLY, pending the Review Hearing to be conducted in six (6) months, the Order of this Court is as follows:

This Order shall be effective June 11, 2022.

The amount of support to be paid by Defendant is $700.00 per month for child support for Michael P. McGinty, Jr. and $100.00 per month on arrears.

The amount to be paid for each dependent and obligation amount is allocated as follows:

AMOUNT/FREQUENCY     OBLIGATION TYPE            BENEFICIARY

_$700.00 _/_month_               _child support_     Michael P. McGinty, Jr.

_$100.00 _/_month_               _arrears_                        Michael P. McGinty, Jr.

Arrears are due in full IMMEDIATELY.  All terms of this Order are subject to collection and/or enforcement by contempt proceedings, credit bureau reporting, tax refund offset certification, driver’s license revocation, and the freeze and seizure of financial assets.  These enforcement/collection mechanisms will not be initiated so long as Obligor does not owe overdue support.  Failure to make each payment on time and in full will cause all arrears to become subject to immediate collection by all the means listed above.

The monthly support obligation includes cash medical support in the amount of $250 annually for un-reimbursed medical expenses incurred for each child and/or spouse.  Un-reimbursed medical expenses of Obligee or children that exceed $250 annually shall be allocated between the parties.  The party seeking allocation of the un-reimbursed medical expenses must provide documentation of the expenses to the other party no later than March 31^st of the following calendar year in which the final medical bill to be allocated was received.  The un-reimbursed medical expenses are to be paid as follows:  _100_% by Defendant and _0_% by Plaintiff.  ____Defendant _X_ Plaintiff ____Neither party is to provide medical coverage __ 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT (ITEMS CHECKED BELOW APPLY):

_____The defendant is ordered to cover the dependent(s) with health care coverage whenever it is available at a reasonable cost which shall be defined as a cost that does not exceed 5% of defendant’s net monthly income and does not exceed 50% of defendants net monthly income when added to the basic child support plus additional expenses.

_____Health care coverage is currently not available at a reasonable cost to defendant.  Therefore, plaintiff is ordered to continuegovernment-sponsored Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).  The cost of said coverage shall not exceed 5% of plaintiff’s net monthly income.

_____Health care coverage is currently not available at a reasonable cost to defendant.  Therefore, plaintiff is ordered to cover the dependent(s) with health care coverage if it is available at a reasonable cost which shall be defined as a cost that does not exceed 5% of plaintiff’s net income.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

Within 30 days after the entry of this order, the party ordered to provide health care  coverage shall provide written proof to the Lebanon County Domestic Relations Office and the other party that medical insurance has been obtained, including insurance cards and any other material necessary to utilize the coverage.

If Health Insurance is currently unavailable to the party/parties ordered to provide it, such proof shall be provided to Lebanon County Domestic Relations within 7 days of the date of this order.

If Health Insurance coverage is now available or becomes available to the party/parties ordered to provide it, the party/parties shall provide proof of the cost to Lebanon County Domestic Relations within 7 days of the date of availability.

D.  ____DEFENDANT  _____PLAINTIFF SHALL PAY THE FOLLOWING FEES:  

FEE TOTAL   FEE DESCRIPTION             PAYMENT FREQUENCY

__$      _/_once__        _JCS Fee ___             __X__ Previously Taxed or Paid

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

-A REVIEW HEARING IS TO BE CONDUCTED IN 6 MONTHS.

-PLAINTIFF SHALL OBTAIN A PHYSICIAN’S VERFICATION FORM FOR MICHAEL P. McGINTY, JR., 20 DAYS BEFORE THE 6 MONTH REVIEW HEARING.

_____All other provisions from the court order dated ___, not affected by this order, shall remain in full force and effect.

Any money collected pursuant to this Order shall be paid by Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s assignee, or as designated, by other Order of Court.  Said money to be turned over by the Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s assignee, or as designated, by other Order of Court.

            Within thirty (30) days after the entry of this Order, the party or parties providing insurance shall submit to the person having custody of the child(ren) written proof that medical insurance coverage has been obtained or that application for coverage has been made.  Proof of coverage shall consist, at a minimum, of: 1) the name of the health care coverage provider(s); 2) any applicable identification numbers; 3) any cards evidencing coverage; 4) the address to which claims should be made; 5) a description of any restrictions on usage, such as prior approval for hospital admissions, and the manner of obtaining approval; 6) a copy of the benefit booklet or coverage contract; 7) a description of all deductibles and co-payments; and 8) five copies of any claim forms. 

            Payments must be made by check or money order.  All checks and money orders must be made payable to Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit and mailed to P.O. Box 69110, Harrisburg, PA 17106-9110.  Each payment must bear your social security number and member number in order to be processed.

IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE

PARTIES MUST WITHIN SEVEN DAYS INFORM THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION AND THE OTHER PARTIES, IN WRITING, OF ANY MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES RELEVANT TO THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUPPORT ORDER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, LOSS OR CHANGE OF INCOME OR EMPLOYMENT AND CHANGE OF PERSONAL ADDRESS OR CHANGE OF ADDRESS OF ANY CHILD RECEIVING SUPPORT. A PARTY WHO WILLFULLY FAILS TO REPORT A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE ADJUDGED IN CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND MAY BE FINED OR IMPRISONED.

PENNSYLVANIA LAW PROVIDES THAT ALL SUPPORT ORDERS SHALL BE REVIEWED AT LEAST ONCE EVERY THREE (3) YEARS IF SUCH REVIEW IS REQUESTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES. IF YOU WISH TO REQUEST A REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF YOUR ORDER, YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING: CALL YOUR ATTORNEY. AN UNREPRESENTED PERSON WHO WANTS TO MODIFY (ADJUST) A SUPPORT ORDER SHOULD CONTACT THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION.

ALL CHARGING ORDERS FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, INCLUDING UNALLOCATED ORDERS FOR CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT OR CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, SHALL TERMINATE UPON DEATH OF THE PAYEE.

A MANDATORY INCOME ATTACHMENT WILL ISSUE UNLESS THE DEFENDANT IS NOT IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN ONE MONTH’S SUPPORT OBLIGATION AND (1) THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS GOOD CAUSE NOT TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING; OR (2) A WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENT.

UNPAID ARREARS BALANCES MAY BE REPORTED TO CREDIT AGENCIES. ON AND AFTER THE DATE IT IS DUE, EACH UNPAID SUPPORT PAYMENT SHALL CONSTITUTE, BY OPERATRION OF LAW, A JUDGEMENT AGAINST YOU, AS WELL AS A LIEN AGAINST REAL PROPERTY.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon payer’s failure to comply with this order, payer may be arrested and brought before the Court for a Contempt hearing; payer’s wages, salary, commissions, and/or income may be attached in accordance with law; this Order will be increased without further hearing by 10 % a month until all arrearages are paid in full.  Defendant is responsible for court costs and fees.

BY THE COURT:

                                                                                                                        J.

                                                BRADFORD H. CHARLES

BHC/tjb

cc:        Domestic Relations

Jessica E. Smith, Esq.// 11 E. Chocolate Ave., STE. 300, Hershey PA 17033

            Amy J. Hollinger// 82 Austin Dr., Grantville PA 17028

            Michael P. McGinty// 109 Hillside Rd., Middletown PA 17057

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION

AMY J. HOLLINGER,                                            :           NO. 2008-5-0070

            Plaintiff                                                          :           PACSES NO. 716109767
                                                                                    :

                                                                                    :          

            v.                                                                     :          

MICHAEL P. McGINTY, Sr.,                                :          

          Defendant                                            :

                                                                                    :          

APPEARANCES

John Gragson, Esq.  For Plaintiff

Jessica E. Smith, Esq.                                  For Defendant

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., April 26, 2024

             This is a child support dispute that implicates several issues relating to the emancipation of the parties’ adult child:

1. Whether the Plaintiff has standing to seek support for her adult child in the absence of a guardianship determination or order? 
2. Whether the adult child should be deemed to be able to obtain employment if he is refusing needed medical treatment and that refusal of treatment is causing the disability? 
3. Whether the Court may impose an end-date to support if the record indicates that emancipation will likely occur on a future date?

For the reasons we will discuss in more detail, and after a de novo review of the file, we will temporarily affirm the decision of the DRHO to continue child support for the parties’ 20-year-old son.  That said, we do NOT endorse the status quo.  We are NOT convinced that M.P.M. is indefinitely unemployable.  We do NOT believe that MOTHER has used reasonable efforts to motivate her son.  We therefore reject the notion that FATHER should be required to indefinitely subsidize his son’s stubborn refusal to move forward with his life in a productive manner.  Therefore, we will be scheduling a review hearing in six months with the expectation that change will be forthcoming. 

I.      FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            Amy Hollinger (hereafter, “MOTHER”) and Michael McGinty (hereafter, “FATHER”) are the parents of one (1) adult biological child, M.P.M., age 20.  There is no legal guardian for M.P.M.  The parties were married on May 3, 2002, and separated on January 1, 2007.  It is not clear when the parties were divorced but the original Complaint was filed on January 25, 2008.

            A Child Support Order was entered in this case on October 31, 2018.  M.P.M. turned 18 on March 21, 2021, but did not graduate from high school until June 10, 2022.  The Child Support Order was terminated on July 29, 2022.  MOTHER filed a Demand for Hearing on September 21, 2022, and the Hearing was held on December 1, 2022.  The Hearing was continued to February 16, 2023, due to FATHER’s objection that a Physician Verification Forms (PVF) were not filed by MOTHER and M.P.M. 

In the interim, on January 18, 2023, FATHER filed an Objection to Introduction of Physician Verification Forms. This Court issued an Order on January 24, 2023, sustaining FATHER’s objection on hearsay grounds, but granting MOTHER leave to procure testimony from medical providers as she deemed necessary.

The emancipation hearings occurred in two parts.  On June 8, 2023, the DRHO heard testimony from the psychiatrist, Dr. Medzoyan, who diagnosed M.P.M. with schizophrenia^[1], and she indicated that he has a history of autism spectrum disorder.  On September 14, 2023, the DRHO heard testimony from MOTHER, M.P.M., and Vocational Expert Terry Leslie. 

On October 31, 2023, the DRHO issued her Recommendations.  She determined that M.P.M. is not able to obtain employment at this time and she reinstated the former Support Order for $700/month.  FATHER filed timely Exceptions on November 20, 2023.  FATHER listed seven (7) Exceptions which he condensed into the following two (2) issues in his Brief In Support of the Exceptions:

1. Whether the DRHO erred in concluding that the adult child requires ongoing child support?
2. Whether the DRHO erred in calculating an amount of support prior to hearing testimony on the parents’ earnings and/or capacities?

II.        STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court’s standard and scope of review regarding a child support order is well-settled.  In reviewing an order entered in a support proceeding, the Court has a limited scope of review. The trier of fact possesses wide discretion as to the proper amount of child support and a reviewing court will not interfere with the determination of the court below unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. The function of the appellate court is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the order of the hearing judge. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather, it occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, bias or ill-will. Kotzbauer v. Kotzbauer, 937 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. Super.2007) (internal citations omitted).

This Court described the standard of review to be employed when a transcript of the DRHO hearing has been prepared. In Lippi v. Lippi, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2007-5-0676 (May 7, 2013), we stated:

Our Superior Court has provided guidance with respect to the scope of review that we should ordinarily employ.  In reviewing a DRM’s report, we must give “fullest consideration” to the credibility findings of the DRM, who was present to observe the demeanor of witnesses and hear their testimony. Schuback v. Schuback, 603 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 1992); Dukmen v. Dukmen, 420 A.2d 667 (Pa. Super. 1980).  A DRM’s report should not be lightly disregarded.  Pasternak v. Pasternak, 204 A.2d 290 (Pa. Super. 1964).  However, the DRM’s report is only advisory, and we are not bound by its conclusions.  When we have a transcribed record to review, we must consider all of the evidence de novo and make an independent determination of the amount of support due and owing.  Id. (citing Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 1956).

                        Even in a de novo review, the DRHO’s credibility findings must be given great weight. This Court has frequently cited Smith v. Smith, 43 A.2d 371 (Pa. Super. 1945) with respect to credibility determinations.  In Smith, the Superior Court stated:

“Although we are not concluded by a master’s findings upon credibility, his judgment upon that vital factor is entitled to the fullest consideration, and especially in a contested case.  He possesses an advantage not granted to us.  He sees the parties and their witnesses face to face and observes their appearance and demeanor as they testify.  We are restricted to the cold type of the record from which temperament and personality have been subtracted. Yet the demeanor of witnesses is the very touchstone of credibility; in the absence of reactions produced by other applicable tests, the appearance and demeanor of witnesses are the litmus by which the presence of truth is revealed.  They are trifles light as air, imponderables, but for all that they are luminous integrants which ineluctably enter into the calculation by which trustworthiness is appraised.  The spontaneous gesture, the lifting of an eyebrow, the shrug of the shoulders, the intonation of the voice, the flash of the eye, the facial expression – these are a few of the vital and influential indicia of credibility which the master observes and by which he is guided.  The mental and psychological impact of these inarticulate expressions experienced by a master form the basis for a conclusion which, to borrow the telling phrase of an anonymous master, “will depend upon a judgment or intuition more subtle than can be objectively demonstrated.”  Frequently, they speak more eloquently and possess greater significance than the verbal utterance which they accompany, yet they cannot be reproduced upon the record submitted to the reviewing court.”

III.       DISCUSSION 

We will begin our discussion by setting forth the relevant legal principles at issue in this matter.  We will then do an analysis of the facts of this case as they pertain to the legal principles posited.

1. Child Support for Adult Children

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(e)(1), within six months prior to the date a child who is the subject of a child support order reaches eighteen (18) years of age, the domestic relations section shall issue an emancipation inquiry and notice to the obligee, with a copy to the obligor, seeking the following information:  confirmation of the child’s date of birth, date of graduation or withdrawal from high school.  The Explanatory Comment for Rule 1910.19(e) characterizes the Rule as essentially a house-keeping provision established to terminate “old orders [that] have continued to charge long after the subject child has become an adult.” Id.  After proper notice of termination and an opportunity to object, a trial court may then enter an order terminating the child support order. 

Parents may be liable for the support of their children who are 18 years of age or older. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3).  However, a presumption exists that a child is emancipated when he/she is 18 and has graduated from high school.  To rebut the presumption that a parent has no obligation to support an adult child, the test is whether the child is, “physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment and whether employment is available to that child at a supporting wage.” Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d at 1212 (Pa. Super. 1993, citing Com. ex. rel. Groff v. Groff, 98 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super.1953); and Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303 (1929). Any special needs of the child may be a basis for continuing support for that child beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday and graduation from high school.  Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(e)(4). The reasonable needs of a disabled adult child are those needs which he/she is unable to meet through his/her own efforts. DeWalt v. DeWalt, 529 A.2d 508, 511 (Pa.Super.1987).

• Standard Governing Child Support for Adult Children

Two cases are particularly relevant to the issue now before this Court.  In Style v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 2008), a mother filed a new complaint for child support on behalf of her 19-year-old son who had a long history of psychiatric and medical disabilities. The Trial Court heard testimony from the Mother and the adult child, and the expert testimony of a vocational evaluator.  The evaluator testified that he had evaluated the adult child’s performance of a variety of work tasks over a three-week period and found that the adult child demonstrated adequate oral communication skills, but lacked initiative, motivation and was easily distracted. The evaluator also testified that distractions might be alleviated by medication for ADHD. Id. at 19.   Mother testified that her son had an unsuccessful work history, Id. at 31, and that in her view he was not capable of living on his own and that he is not employable. Id. at 37–38. 

In Style, supra, the Trial Court found that, based upon the testimony presented, the adult child had not proven that he was unable to work. The Trial Court summarized its findings as follows:

“In short, this Court is not certain that Dustin’s work history reflects his lack of ability, but rather a bad choice in employment opportunities. The Court further believes that Dustin is capable of doing a job with a minimally distracting environment and simple repetitive tasks, rather than jobs which required him to be in a varied environment and change quickly from one task to another, particularly on his own initiative…Dustin appears to be able to work, albeit at a job which involves consistent behavior and a minimum of distractibility. We all have our limits on the type of job we can perform. Dustin has those limitations, also, but that doesn’t mean he cannot work within his limitations.” Id. At 410.

The Superior Court agreed that the Mother and the adult child had not proven that he was not able to engage in profitable employment because they failed to address what types of jobs the adult child was capable of performing, whether or not such jobs were available in the local marketplace, and whether the level of compensation would allow him to support himself. Id. At 411.

  In Hanson, supra, the parents divorced and entered into a divorce settlement that acknowledged that their youngest daughter had certain handicaps which impaired her employment capabilities.  Several years later, after the daughter had reached the age of majority, Mother filed a petition against Father seeking child support for the daughter, who lived with Mother and had held several part-time minimum wage jobs. Id at 1213. In rejecting Father’s contention that he had no legal duty to pay for the support of his adult daughter, the Court ruled that “[t]here is a duty on parents to support a child that has a physical or mental condition, which exists at the time the child reaches its majority, that prevents the child from being self-supporting.” Idat 1214. 

• Standing to Pursue Support for Adult Child

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3 states:

“(a) An action [in support] may be brought…

(5) by a parent, guardian or public or private agency on behalf of an unemancipated child over eighteen years of age to whom a duty of support is owing…”

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3

The official comment to the Rule makes clear that this provision “is intended to apply to children who are unemancipated by reason of physical or mental disability, consistent with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3) as interpreted by caselaw.”  We conclude that Rule 1910.3 confers standing upon MOTHER to pursue her claim for support on behalf of M.P.M.

Notwithstanding Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3, FATHER claims that MOTHER has no standing to pursue child support on behalf of M.P.M.  According to FATHER, MOTHER should be required to pursue guardianship through a process that would require her to prove that M.P.M. is legally incompetent.  We disagree with FATHER’s position.

Section 4341 of Pennsylvania’s Domestic Relations Code states: “Any person caring for a child shall have standing to commence or continue an action for support of that child regardless of whether a court order has been issued granting that person custody of the child.”  23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4341(b).  That Section must be read in conjunction with another provision of the Domestic Relations Code that states: “Parents may be liable for the support of their children who are eighteen years of age or older.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3).  The term “child” has been defined in a child support context as “any unemancipated person under eighteen years of age.” Walker v. Walker, 523 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. 1987). 

In the case of Jordan v. Jordan, 266 A.3d 641 (Pa. Super. 2021)^[2], a father argued that the trial court erred in determining that an adult child’s mother could meet the burden of proving non-emancipation.  The Superior Court rejected this argument and stated:

“Father interprets [Verna v. Verna, 432 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 1981)] to mean that only an adult child may bring such an action.  But that was not our holding then, and such an interpretation is particularly inconsistent with both the current iteration of our Support Law under Chapter 43 of the Domestic Relations Code, as well as the corresponding Rules of Civil Procedure.”

            We have reviewed a multitude of Appellate Court decisions regarding emancipation of an adult child.  Practically every one of these decisions is litigated between two parents; the adult child is almost never listed as an actual party and the adult is never designated as “Guardian for …”.  In none of the cases did the Superior Court require guardianship as a predicate to a parent’s ability to pursue support for an adult child.  Moreover, we are aware of no Appellate decision that has overtly adopted such a requirement.^[3]  We therefore reject FATHER’s argument in favor of guardianship.

• Conclusions of the Expert Witnesses

MOTHER’s expert witness and FATHER’s expert witness agree that M.P.M. has skills that would make him employable in the right work setting.  However, they disagree about whether M.P.M. is able to obtain employment at this time.

M.P.M. has been a patient of Dr. Medzoyan since he was six (6) years old. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 10). She explained that in his teenage years M.P.M. started displaying “negative” symptoms of schizophrenia, i.e. dressing in bizarre clothing, refusing to take showers on a regular basis, and being amotivational. Dr. Medzoyan reported that M.P.M. believes he has heightened senses, including a sense of what will happen in the near future.   On a positive note, Dr. Medzoyan testified that M.P.M. does not have hallucinations. Also, no hospitalizations or intensive outpatient treatments have ever been required for his schizophrenia.  (N.T. 6/8/23 at 12-15). Dr. Medzoyan does not believe that M.P.M. is ready to enter the workforce because he does not manage his personal hygiene, he struggles with follow through, and he would struggle to keep up with the pace of a repetitive job.  (N.T. 6/6/23 at 19-20).  She acknowledged that M.P.M. could benefit from a job coach, but she does not feel that he will be ready for that step until he is compliant with his medication regimen. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 22). M.P.M.’s history is that he is not compliant with taking the medications prescribed for him to control his symptoms of schizophrenia. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 18).  Dr. Medzoyan stated that M.P.M. is an ideal candidate for a monthly injectable antipsychotic. However, M.P.M. is “uncomfortable” with that idea, though he has given no concrete explanation for his reluctance. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 17, 23).  M.P.M. also has not followed through on referrals for case management services through Service Access Management and other community support, such as peer support. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 25).

Terry Leslie, a vocational counselor/vocational expert, testified that he does not see anything in M.P.M.’s records of his daily activities that would prevent him from maintaining gainful employment. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 28). Mr. Leslie’s opinion is that M.P.M. has no physical or mental limitations that would preclude him from working. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 32). Mr. Leslie stated that diagnoses of being on the autism spectrum and schizophrenia are broad and do not have a vocational meaning.  (N.T. 9/14/23 at 30). Mr. Leslie observed that M.P.M. spends hours playing video games, which shows his ability to maintain concentration. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 29). Mr. Leslie noted that M.P.M. tested at the twelfth-grade level on the Wide Assessment Achievement Test in every category except math. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 31). Mr. Leslie also stated that M.P.M. and MOTHER acknowledged that public transportation is available for M.P.M. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 28).   Mr. Leslie’s research showed that jobs that M.P.M. is able to perform are available in the local area. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 27-28).

• Testimony from M.P.M. and MOTHER

M.P.M. testified that he has never had a job because he does not think that he is capable of working.  However, he did not articulate any reasons why he is incapable of working. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 4).  M.P.M. indicated that his family tells him that he should only do what he thinks that he is capable of doing.  (N.T. 9/14/23 at 6). M.P.M. gave some eccentric testimony about being capable of being a tournament swordsman because he is practicing playing with a sword, and that he is hindered by “derealization”^[4]. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 6-8). However, he stated that he can play a video game for up to twelve (12) hours if he is “invested in it and focused on it”. M.P.M admitted that he would be able to stay in a kitchen washing dishes if he was paid to do so. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 9).

MOTHER testified that she and M.P.M. live with her parents.  She stated that his “Pap” gets frustrated with M.P.M. because M.P.M will not do things like take out the trash.  MOTHER said that at those times, she will talk with M.P.M. and convinces him to complete his chore.  However, she admitted that she cannot get M.P.M. to take showers unless he is going somewhere, “which is like every two or three months”, that M.P.M. will not cook on the stove, he will not go shopping, and he does not fully comply with requests to do chores. MOTHER attributed his lack of motivation to tasks being too hard for M.P.M. and that he is too focused on his games or watching videos. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 16-17). It is MOTHER’s belief that M.P.M. cannot work and she has never forced him to get a job because she “picks her battles”. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 21-22).

• Imposing an End-Date for Support

 According to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(c), a court may, “terminate the existing support order in any appropriate manner based on the evidence presented without regard to which party filed the petition for modification”. (Emphasis added)^[5].  Emancipation is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances presented in each case.  Geiger v. Rouse, 715 A.2d 454, 458 (Pa. Super. 1998) citingMaurer v. Maurer, 555 A.2d 1294, 1297–8 (Pa.Super.1989). Emancipation is not necessarily a permanent status and the mere fact that a child was once emancipated does not foreclose the divestiture of emancipation when circumstances change. Maurer at 1297.  Of necessity, the opposite must also be true.  An unemancipated minor can and should become emancipated when circumstances require such a result. 

In the case of Castaldi v. Castaldi-Veloric, 993 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. 2010), the Domestic Relations Office terminated the Child Support Order when the child turned 18 because Mother did not respond to the emancipation inquiry. Then 15 months later Mother came in with the diploma.  Mother believed the child support should have continued until the date the child graduated from high school.  Mother requested the Domestic Relations Office modify the termination date of child support. The Domestic Relations Office agreed and changed the termination date and then “tacked” onto Father’s account child support payments.  Father filed a petition to modify the termination date.  The DRHO dismissed his petition, and the Trial Court denied his appeal.  Father suggested that it was unfair that he was being retroactively required to pay child support following an official emancipation.  The Superior Court disagreed, determining that the child was not “emancipated” during the five months between her eighteenth birthday and high school graduation for child support purposes. Id at 910.

Based upon all decisional precedent regarding emancipation, it is clear that a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether or when an adult child should be deemed emancipated.

IV.    Analysis

From the above, it is clear that MOTHER has standing to file a Petition for Child Support on behalf of her allegedly disabled 20-year-old son.  It is also clear that a plaintiff seeking support for an adult child has the burden of proving why it is impossible for the adult son to work.  What is less clear to this Court is whether the Plaintiff in this case has met the burden needed to rebut a presumption of emancipation.  What also needs to be decided is the duration of any child support award that is deemed to be appropriate. 

Before we begin our analysis of the issues in play, the Court wants to be very careful to clarify that we do not question whether M.P.M. suffers from some degree of mental illness.  The testimony shows that he has a history of displaying behavioral oddities and a lack of socialization.  The larger question is whether his mental illness is the reason that he has never held a job, or is it because he has been enabled to use his condition as an excuse to avoid work or any kind of responsibility his whole life?  Worded differently, is it nature or nurture that is at the root of M.P.M.’s obvious lack of motivation?

The Court disagrees with FATHER that the DRHO failed to appropriately consider the testimonies of Dr. Medzoyan and Terry Leslie.  To the contrary, the DRHO devoted four (4) pages in her Findings to an analysis of the testimonies offered by all four of the witnesses, before rendering her decision that assigning M.P.M an earning capacity at this time would be premature.  The DRHO stated that the reason that she regarded Dr. Medzoyan as a more reliable witness regarding M.P.M.’s abilities, is that Dr. Medzoyan had worked with M.P.M. since he was six years old, and Mr. Leslie met with M.P.M. once through Zoom.  (F.F. at F4-F8).

We cannot find fault with the DRHO’s reasoning that Terry Leslie’s one interaction with M.P.M. pales in comparison to the 14 years that Dr. Medzoyan has spent as M.P.M.’s treating physician.  However, this jurist is compelled by the totality of the testimonies offered by the witnesses to explore the possibility that Mr. Leslie may bring an alternative perspective to the employability of M.P.M.  We do not question Dr. Medzoyan’s qualifications, professional judgment, or commitment to the treatment of M.P.M.  However, is it possible that Dr. Medzoyan’s perception of M.P.M. is based on his history to the exclusion of his potential?

Mr. Leslie made a persuasive argument as to why his conclusions about M.P.M. should be given significant weight.  He explained that a physician is looking at the science and the symptoms that an individual is presenting, and he is looking at how those symptoms and the science affects the person day to day, and what they can do and what they cannot do.  Mr. Leslie noted that a diagnosis is simply a diagnosis and that people on the autism spectrum function at different levels.  He also stated that an individual with a diagnosis of schizophrenia may be employable or may not.  Mr. Leslie said that his job is to understand the limitations of the individual as it pertains to the world of work. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 30).

The DRHO did not comment on the credibility of M.P.M. or MOTHER. She stated that it was clear to her that M.P.M is not reasonably able to obtain employment at this time, but she did not state specific reasons for that belief. (F.F. at F-8).

This Court finds it troubling that M.P.M. has been enabled to be unfocused and unproductive simply because he is “uncomfortable” with the alternative.  For example, Dr. Medzoyan testified that M.P.M. has struggled with medication compliance since he was a child.  She said that she first started speaking with M.P.M. and MOTHER about the injectable version of the antipsychotic in June 2021, but M.P.M. did not feel “comfortable” with that idea.  Despite having more than two years to address the medication compliance issue, nothing has significantly improved.  (N.T. 6/8/23 at 16-17). In addition, MOTHER only makes M.P.M. shower every two to three months.  She stated that she tells M.P.M. to shower and he tells her he will in a couple of days but that never happens.  No one has taught M.P.M. how to cook, go shopping, do laundry, and he is not accountable for keeping any kind of schedule.  The consistent reasons that MOTHER gives for M.P.M. not taking any personal responsibility is that it is too hard for him, he is too distracted by his video games, and he is incapable of doing it.   These are not reasons that are acceptable to this Court.

M.P.M. was accepted into an occupational rehab program to help him with socialization.  MOTHER testified that he only went one time because, “he does not feel comfortable going to that”. (N.T. 6/8/23 at 19-20). It is evident from her testimony that MOTHER is convinced that M.P.M. will never be able to work and that he should not be made to do so if he is not “comfortable” pushing himself.

It is remarkable that when M.P.M. was truly pushed to do what he does not want to do, he complied.  Dr. Medzoyan insisted that M.P.M. show up to their appointments with good hygiene, and now it is his habit.  (N.T. 6/8/23 at 21).  M.P.M. completed high school because he was prodded to do so. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 19). MOTHER often convinces M.P.M. to do what Pap requests of him.  He had been more compliant with his medication the month before the hearing, and he reported that his derealization sensations were decreasing. (F.F. at F-8).  M.P.M. is forced to visit extended family periodically, even though he protests, and he ends up enjoying the experience. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 18).  MOTHER stated that M.P.M. did not even want to come to the hearing to testify, but she gave him no choice and he complied. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 21). M.P.M. admitted that he could “train his mind” to work, and that he would be able to wash dishes as a job. (N.T. 9/14/23 at 12).

The DRHO agreed with Dr. Medzoyan that M.P.M. would be employable if he continued with compliance with his medication regimen.  An injectable psychotic would be effective for treating M.P.M.’s symptoms and would make him more employable.  Unfortunately, M.P.M. refuses to consider these injections and MOTHER is unwilling or unable to press the issue.  As a result, M.P.M. is on a proverbial road to nowhere.

This Court agrees with FATHER that he should not be made to pay support so that M.P.M. can play video games and watch YouTube videos all day.  The record is clear that M.P.M. is capable of employment if he takes readily available medications and is properly supported by his family.  This Court does not want to continue enabling the status quo.  The question for this Court is whether the support order should be terminated immediately based on a long history of a lack of motivation by M.P.M., or should the Court temporarily continue child support while incentivizing M.P.M. to comply with the efforts to make him self-supporting?  The difficulty in this decision is that so far, no one has ever forced M.P.M. to even try working a job, so no one knows what his potential employability could be.  This Court has no doubt that there are plenty of local entry-level jobs that M.P.M. could have at least attempted to do.  One thing is certain  – this Court will not permit this matter to indefinitely languish in uncertainty just because M.P.M. refuses to take even minimal control of his own destiny.

Based largely upon the DRHO’s credibility findings, we will not immediately terminate support.  However, neither will we retain the status quo.  Because it will take time to get M.P.M. on the path to productivity, we will continue support for six (6) more months.  During this time, we EXPECT M.P.M. and MOTHER to implement a plan that includes medication, socialization, hygiene training and therapy designed to develop skills that could be useful in the workforce.

The Domestic Relations Section (hereafter “DRS”) will be directed to schedule a review hearing in six (6) months.  If evidence presented at the review hearing is anywhere close to what was chronicled in this Opinion, the DRHO will be expected to terminate support.  Simply put, if MOTHER and M.P.M. voluntarily choose to continue on a path to nowhere, they will have to make the journey without FATHER’s continued financial assistance. 

Our decision today is intended to incentivize M.P.M. and MOTHER to partner with the medical, mental health, and vocational readiness services that are at their disposal, and make serious efforts to enable M.P.M. to engage in profitable employment and support himself.  Anything less than an honest and robust effort will result in termination of support.

The Court will now respond to FATHER’s sixth and seventh Exceptions.    FATHER’s objection is that the DRHO reinstated the amount of support from the October 31, 2018 Order.  He averred that the amount of support should be recalculated after hearing testimony of the parties’ current earnings and/or earning capacities.  He asserted that it is also proper for the DRHO to reconsider the proportional split of non-basic expenses and unreimbursed medical costs.

The DRS agreed that a new hearing should have been scheduled to address the question of parents’ earning capacities.  However, the DRS stated that FATHER filed a petition to terminate support and not a complaint to reopen. It argued that the DRHO did not find emancipation for M.P.M., which meant that she found a continuing duty of support and it put the parties back in the same position provided for in the last final Order, which was on October 31, 2018^[6]. 

At this point, no decision needs to be made concerning FATHER’s and MOTHER’s earning capacities.  The issue will need to be revisited if support is deemed to be necessary beyond the six-month review.  If that is the case, then the amount of obligation will have to be based upon a comprehensive evaluation of earnings and earning capacities of everyone involved in this dispute.

V.    Conclusion

             The Court acknowledges that the DRHO had sound reasoning for determining that M.P.M. should remain unemancipated.  Making decisions to help those with mental illness is seldom easy for parents, medical professionals, or those offering services.  However, we are not convinced that it would benefit M.P.M. to let him stay in the same place in life simply because he is uncomfortable with change.  Moreover, we do not think that it is fair for FATHER to support a child who will not work due to a lack of motivation.  M.P.M. has enough solid support in his life, or at least available to him, to help him transition from no responsibilities to the workforce.  To date, no one involved with M.P.M. really knows what his potential could be, because he has never been forced to invest in his own present or future. 

            Today we will deny FATHER’s exceptions, but our decision is not an endorsement of the status quo.  We consider our decision to be temporary AND we expect that our decision will incentivize a change of direction that is desperately needed by M.P.M.

            An Order to accomplish all of the above will be entered for today’s date.

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[1] As a child M.P.M. was diagnosed with ADHD, but he is no longer hyperactive.

[2] Jordan is a non-precedential case and is cited only for its persuasive value.

[3] We are aware of the case of Elkin v. Williams, 755 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. 2000).  In Elkin, a family friend housed and supported an 18-year-old child who was claimed to be unemancipated.  Within this context, the Superior Court stated:

“Because [the adult child] is not by definition a “child” or “minor”, but rather is an unemancipated adult, Elkin does not fall within the parameters of either Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3 or 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4341 as a person permitted to file a Support action on behalf of [the adult child].  Thus, since Elkin lacks standing to file a Complaint for Support, this action must be dismissed.”

Id at page 698.

Given the clear mandate of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3, we reject Elkin as controlling precedent.  Elkin involved a claim for support by someone who was not a blood relative of the adult child.  Here, MOTHER is pursuing support on behalf of M.P.M., who is her biological son.  As such, MOTHER falls squarely within the provision of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3, while the plaintiff in Elkin did not. 

[4] M.P.M explained that this is a state of mind where one perceives things as a faded memory, or a blur.

[5] The Court acknowledges that the Child Support Order in this case was issued on October 31, 2018, and therefore it would be subject to any provisions of Pa.R.C.P 1910.19(h).  However, nothing in that subsection (h) would negate subsection (c).

[6] The DRO concurred that the final Order is subject to recalculation de novo, and typically that process would take less than six (6) months from the date of the initial service. See 45 C.F.R. § 303.101(b)(2)(i).  However, the DRO noted that the matter was not concluded at the first hearing due to FATHER’s objection to the medical evidence, and then the parties agreed that the Emancipation Review needed to be bifurcated for further disposition.  The DRO anticipates that the guideline amount of support will likely exceed $700.00 per month and the question of retroactivity is explicitly preserved, so FATHER will receive any appropriate credits upon the issuance of the final order. (D.R.O. Brief at 16-17).