Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Matthew Butler

 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Matthew Butler

Criminal Action-Law-Driving Under the Influence-Controlled Substance-Erratic Behavior-Motion in Limine-Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement Tests-Expert Testimony-Issue of Impairment-Training and Experience of Law Enforcement Officer-Corpus Delecti Rule-Operation of Vehicle-Circumstantial Evidence

Matthew Butler (“Defendant”) was charged with Possession of Suboxone, Methamphetamine and Paraphernalia and Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance relating to an incident in which he is alleged to have driven a vehicle the wrong way down a one (1) way street, entered the police station and acted erratically and exhibited signs of impairment.  After admitting that he was driving and using marijuana and consenting to a search of the vehicle in which Suboxone was located, a law enforcement officer conducted Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”) tests.  Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to exclude testimony from the law enforcement officer about the ARIDE tests, any conclusions as to the controlled substances law enforcement believed to be the cause of impairment and Defendant’s acknowledgement that he had been driving the vehicle in question. 

1.  Pursuant to Title 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was under the influence of a drug to a degree that impaired his or where ability safely to drive the vehicle without establishing any amount or specific quantity of drug. 

2.  Evidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a finding of guilt under Section 3802(d)(2). 

3.  Expert testimony is not required to prove that a driver’s impairment was caused by drugs.

4.  Expert testimony is necessary only where there is no other independent evidence of impairment.

5.  Based upon his training and experience in the field of Driving Under the Influence, the law enforcement officer may testify as to his observations of Defendant during administration of the ARIDE tests including Defendant’s erratic behavior in the police station, slowed speech, delayed reaction and bloodshot eyes and the admission of Defendant that he had used marijuana.    

6.  The law enforcement officer is precluded from providing testimony as to the controlled substance he believed to be the cause of impairment.

7.  The corpus delecti rule requires the Commonwealth establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime actually occurred. 

8.  Corpus delecti may be shown by circumstantial evidence that is sufficient if the circumstances are consistent with a crime. 

9.  Where Defendant entered the police station from the parking lot and returned to the parking lot where the vehicle was parked after being directed to leave, there is no suggestion of any other individual present in the area who drove the vehicle into the parking lot or public transportation was available from the parking lot and the vehicle clearly was under Defendant’s control as he consented to the search, the evidence is sufficient for purposes of the corpus delecti rule at this juncture of the proceedings. 

L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-944-2024, Opinion by John C. Tylwalk, President Judge, May 2, 2025.

                            IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                                     PENNSYLVANIA

                                                                CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-944-2024

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

MATTHEW BUTLER                                                           :

                                                                  ORDER OF COURT

            AND NOW, this 2^nd day of May, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motions in Limine, the evidence adduced at the hearing conducted on April 1, 2025, and the briefs submitted by the parties, it is hereby Ordered as follows:

1.  Defendant’s Motion in Limine regarding results of ARIDE tests is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.  In accordance with the accompanying Opinion, Officer Travis Pidcock may testify regarding his observations during the administration of the ARIDE tests along with other observations regarding Defendant’s alleged impairment.  However, he is precluded from offering testimony of the controlled substance to which he attributed those indicators of impairment. 
2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine regarding unproduced video footage is DISMISSED as MOOT. 
3. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to preclude Defendant’s admission of having driven the vehicle pursuant to the corpus delecti rule is DENIED at this juncture of the proceedings.  The Court will defer final ruling on this issue based on the evidence adduced at trial.
4. Defendant shall appear at the Call of the List scheduled for May 6, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. in the designated Courtroom with trial during the Term of Criminal Jury Trials to commence on May 19, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

_________________________, P.J.

JOHN C. TYLWALK

JCT/jah

Cc: Scott Werner, Esquire/Assistant District Attorney

       Megan Tidwell, Esquire/Public Defender

       Leslie Fillak/Court Administration

       Judith Huber, Esquire/Law Clerk

                            IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                                     PENNSYLVANIA

                                                                CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-944-2024

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

MATTHEW BUTLER                                                           :

APPEARANCES:

SCOTT WERNER, ESQUIRE                               FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

ASSISTANT DISTRICIT ATTORNEY

MEGAN TIDWELL, ESQUIRE                            FOR MATTHEW BUTLER

PUBLIC DEFENDER

OPINION, TYLWALK, P.J., MAY 2, 2025.

            Defendant is charged with one count of Possession of Suboxone, one count of Possession of Methamphetamine, one count of Possession of Paraphernalia, one count of Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance,^[1] and the summary offense of Driving on One-Way Roadway^[2] for an incident that occurred at the Lebanon City Police Department on May 14, 2024.  Those charges are still pending.  Defendant has filed Motions in Limine seeking to preclude the admission of evidence by the Commonwealth.  We conducted a hearing on these Motions in Limine on April 1, 2025.  The transcript of the hearing has been lodged, both parties have filed Briefs, and these matters are now before us for disposition.

            The Affidavit of Probable Cause reveals that on May 14, 2024, Defendant drove a silver Subaru SUV the wrong way down the 700 block of Spring Street, a one-way street, and entered the rear parking lot of the Lebanon City police station.  A surveillance video captured Defendant driving the vehicle.  After Defendant exited the vehicle, he entered the police station and let himself into a maintenance supervisor’s office.  City employees directed him to leave the property due to his erratic behavior.  When he re-entered the rear parking lot, he was stopped by police officers because he was looking inside city vehicles. 

During this incident, Defendant was displaying signs of impairment, such as slow speech, delayed reaction, and blood shot eyes.   Defendant admitted that he had been driving and consented to a search of the vehicle. The search yielded a packet of Suboxone for which Defendant did not have a prescription.  Defendant admitted to the officers that he had been driving and that he had used marijuana. 

Several officers who knew Defendant were at the scene.  They informed the City police that Defendant was not displaying his normal behavior.  After City Police Officer Travis Pidcock conducted Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”) tests, Defendant was placed under arrest for DUI – Controlled Substance.   Defendant refused a chemical blood test and was transported to Central Booking. 

In his Motions in Limine, Defendant requests that we preclude testimony of the ARIDE tests and any conclusions as to what controlled substance the police officer believed to have caused his impairment, prohibit the introduction of the surveillance video of Defendant driving, and preclude Defendant’s admission that he was driving.  The Commonwealth counters that it should be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the ARIDE tests and Defendant’s admissions to driving.  However, it has advised the Court that the issue regarding the surveillance video is moot as it does not intend to offer the footage of Defendant driving or testimony regarding the video at trial as it appears that the video cannot be located. 

ARIDE TESTS

At the hearing, Officer Pidcock testified that he had been an officer with the Lebanon City Police Department for seventeen years.  During that time he attended various trainings pertaining to DUI investigations.  He attended a basic three-day SFST training which involved a wet lab where people were consuming copious amounts of alcohol.  He attended ARIDE evaluation courses in 2010 and 2023 and numerous DUI courses which included setting up sobriety checkpoints.  He conducted over 300 DUI investigations involving alcohol, controlled substances, and alcohol/controlled substance combinations.  The Commonwealth presented Officer Pidcock’s certifications from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Pennsylvania DUI Association indicating his successful completion of the four-hour Sobriety Checkpoint Basic Training on April 23, 2024  and the Advanced Roadside Impairment Driving Enforcement training in October of 2023.  (Exhibit “1”)  Office Pidcock also testified that he had completed the Medical Marijuana Workshop presented by the Pennsylvania DUI Association on November 29, 2023.  (Exhibit “1”)

Officer Pidcock performed the Modified Romberg test and the Lack of Convergence test during this investigation in this case.  He explained that he received instruction on the Modified Romberg Test during his trainings.  He explained that the Romberg Balance Test is a neurological test which tests an individual’s inner clock and ability to balance.  The individual is instructed to stand with their feet together, hands at their side, and to close their eyes and tilt their head back.  They are told to tilt their head forward and say “stop” when they believe thirty seconds has passed.  While the test is being conducted, the officer runs a stopwatch and evaluates the individual for any swaying, or other neurological/biological exhibits of impairment. Officer Pidcock explained that during his training, he was given the opportunity to conduct the test on other officers and confirmed that he had conducted this test during previous DUI investigations. 

Officer Pidcock also explained the Lack of Convergence test.  In that test, the individual is instructed to stand with their feet together, hands to their sides and to focus on a stimulus (such as a finger) approximately twelve inches from their face.  The stimulus is made to travel in a circle around the individual’s face to ensure that the eyes are tracking equally.  Then the stimulus is brought into the bridge of the nose at which point the officer looks for the individual’s ability to cross their eyes.  If the eyes do not cross or if the eyes cross and then one separates, it is a sign of impairment.  Officer Pidcock confirmed that he had also performed this test in prior DUI investigations.

On cross-examination, Officer Pidcock acknowledged that he had no medical training or licensing and had never received medical training regarding the effects of lighting conditions on pupil sizes.  He explained that during ARIDE training, he was given an indicator card with baseline pupil sizes.  He uses that card to decide whether an individual’s eyes are dilated or constricted.  He also explained that he checks for reaction to light, how fast the pupil constricts, and any type of rebounding or pulsating in the pupils which would indicate that the body is trying to maintain homeostasis.  Officer Pidcock confirmed that he asked Defendant whether he wore glasses or contacts but did not ask whether he had naturally large pupils. 

            ARIDE TESTS        

            Defendant contends that Officer Pidcock is not qualified to offer an expert opinion to the conclusions regarding Defendant’s impairment pursuant to the ARIDE tests he conducted at trial.  While we agree that Officer Pidcock is not qualified to testify as to what controlled substance he believed was causing Defendant’s impairment, we find that under the circumstances of this case, Officer Pidcock may offer testimony on the ARIDE tests in accordance with his training and experience. 

Defendant is charged with DUI – Controlled Substance pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(2):

§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance

(d) Controlled substances.–An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(2).  Under this section, the Commonwealth must only prove that the defendant was under the influence of a drug to a degree that impaired his ability to safely drive the vehicle and is not required to establish any amount or specific quantity of the drug.  Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 307 (Pa. Super. 2012).  Evidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a finding of guilty under section 3802(d)(2). Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). “The Commonwealth may prove that a person is incapable of safe driving through the failure of a field sobriety test.” Id. (citations omitted).

            Section 3802(d)(2) does not require expert testimony to prove that a driver’s impairment was caused by drugs.  Commonwealth v. Cahill, 324 A.3d 516, 527 (Pa. Super. 2024), citing Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011).    Expert testimony is necessary only where there is no other independent evidence of impairment.  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). 

            In Commonwealth v. Nestor, 314 A.3d 863 (Pa. Super. 2024), the appellate court approved the trial court’s admission of a police officer’s observations during the Modified Romberg Balance and the Lack of Convergence tests along with the officer’s observation of other indicia of the defendant’s impairment.  The trooper testified that based on his training and experience in conducting the field sobriety and ARIDE testing, he looked for indicators of impairment, but did not make pass/fail conclusions regarding the tests.  The trooper testified that he observed several indictors of impairment on sobriety tests, no indicators on the Lack of Convergence test and eyelid tremors and severe hand tremors on the Modified Romberg Balance test.  Based on these and additional observations, the trooper opined that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.

In addressing the defendant’s claims that the trial court had allowed the trooper to give improper expert testimony, the court first looked to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 which governs the admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses:

            Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is:

(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701.

            The Nestor court also examined the holding in Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc).  In Gause, the DUI suspect admitted to police that he had consumed one beer; however, he did not exhibit any difficulty with balance and coordination during field sobriety tests.  When the police officer administered the Romberg test for suspected marijuana use, the defendant exhibited eyelid tremors.  There was no other evidence of recent marijuana use.  The trial court allowed the officer to opine that, based on the eyelid tremors, the defendant was under the influence of marijuana.  On appeal, the Superior Court held that the officer’s testimony was inadmissible: “it is eminently clear that attributing body or eyelid tremors to marijuana use requires specialized knowledge.”  Id. at 539.   The court noted the absence of any other indicia of marijuana use, stating that although the officer “could testify as to her observations of an apparent physical condition, a qualified expert was required to provide the connection between the symptoms observed and the drug allegedly influencing the appellant’s driving.”  Id.

            In Nestor, the court noted that the trooper did not give an opinion as to which controlled substance the DUI suspect had ingested, but instead “relied on the totality of his observations, including … mood swings, dilated pupils, ongoing complaints of dry mouth, general excitability and agitation, difficulty in performing field sobriety tests, and indicators displayed during the ARIDE tests” in reaching his opinion that the defendant was acting consistent with someone that was impaired by a controlled substance stimulant: 

Trooper Zimmerman’s opinion was based on his observations and informed by his training and experience as a police officer.  Under the totality of these circumstances, expert testimony was not necessary to support Appellant’s section 3802(d)(2) conviction. 

Nestor, 314 A.3d at 872-873.  In Commonwealth v. Cordoba, 268 A.3d 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished, non-precedential decision), the appellate court also approved the trial court’s admission of a police officer’s testimony regarding the eye convergence test and the Romberg balance test. 

            In the matter before us, Officer Pidcock testified that Defendant was observed to be exhibiting several indicia of impairment during this incident – his erratic behavior inside the police station, including his entering a private office, slowed speech, delayed reaction and blood shot eyes.  In addition, he advised Officer Pidcock that he had used marijuana.  We believe that based on Officer Pidcock’s training and experience, he may testify as to his observations of Defendant during administration of the ARIDE tests and that expert testimony is not necessary along with his other observations of Defendant’s impairment. He may not testify as to what controlled substance he believed to be the cause of such indicia.  Based on this evidence, along with testimony regarding the other indicators of impairment, the jury will determine whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.  

            CORPUS DELECTI

            Defendant next challenges the admissibility of his acknowledgment to the police that he had been driving the SUV which was located in the Police Station parking lot.  He claims that the Commonwealth is unable to produce any independent evidence that Defendant was in the actual physical control of a vehicle and thus will be unable to establish the elements of the crime required under Section 3802(d)(2).   He argues that under the corpus delecti rule, the Commonwealth will not be able to obtain a conviction based solely on this extra-judicial inculpatory statement and cannot show that Appellant was operating the motor vehicle by any corroborating evidence.  He contends that a finding that he had been operating or in actual physical control of the vehicle would require proof such as a running motor.  We disagree with Defendant’s contention.

The corpus delecti rule requires the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime actually occurred. The rule is one of evidence, and requires that before a statement of the accused may be admitted into evidence, the Commonwealth must first establish both that a loss has occurred and that this loss occurred through a criminal agency. The order of proof is within the trial court’s discretion, and the Commonwealth may be permitted to introduce the confession first so long as the corpus is eventually established. The statement need not constitute an admission to each element of the crime; the criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the rule.

The corpus delecti rule requires the Commonwealth to sustain an initial burden of proof by preliminarily establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge the existence of a corpus delecti.   However, before the case is submitted to the jury, the court must instruct the jury that they must first be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the corpus delecti before they may consider an admission or confession by the accused as evidence of guilt.

16A West’s Pennsylvania Practice, Criminal Practice §20:3.  The criminal responsibility of a particular defendant may be proven by a confession.  Commonwealth v. Friend, 717 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. 1998).  Corpus delecti, like other facts, may be shown by circumstantial evidence; it is sufficient if the circumstances are consistent with a crime.  Commonwealth v. Reyes, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

            To establish the corpus delecti of the crime in this case, the Commonwealth must show that Defendant drove his vehicle when he was under the influence of a controlled substance. In the Friend case, the DUI suspect admitted to police at the scene of an accident that he had been driving the car which was involved in a single-vehicle accident and that he had been drinking beer.  When police responded to the accident, they observed the defendant was present at the scene but was not inside the vehicle.  He had a cut on his nose and emitted the odor of alcohol.  He also had glassy, bloodshot eyes, and spoke with a slow, stuttering speech.  He was dressed in regular clothing, while the other individuals who were on the scene were dressed in nightclothes and slippers.  The officers determined that the vehicle was registered to the defendant.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was the operator of the vehicle.  However, the appellate court noted:

No one saw appellant driving, but this hardly ends the issue.  The above evidence shows appellant was temporally and physically proximate to the crash site.  He appeared as the only candidate likely to have been the operator.  Appellant was not dressed as if roused from bed, unlike all those he stood among.  He had a bleeding cut on his nose, as would someone in a crash.  A subsequent registration check indicated he was the owner of the wrecked pickup.  This evidence strongly suggests appellant was the operator of the vehicle, and there is no evidence of record suggesting the contrary.

Friend, 717 A.2d at 571.

            In Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099 (Pa. Super. 2022), the defendant was also convicted of DUI.  The police had responded to a residence for a call of a domestic dispute.  When they arrived, they found the defendant sitting on the porch of the residence exhibiting signs of impairment due to alcohol consumption.  Defendant did not live at the address.  The residence was in a residential neighborhood and there was no public transportation in the area.   His vehicle was parked in the driveway.  It was not running but the hood was warm. The officer did not see the defendant driving, did not see him in the vehicle, and the keys were not in the ignition.  The defendant admitted to the police officer that he had driven the vehicle to the residence and that he had consumed a six-pack of beer.  On appeal, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he was in actual physical control of the vehicle.^[3]  He argued that the Commonwealth was required to prove that he was in the car with the car running. 

            The appellate court noted that the Commonwealth can establish that a defendant was driving, operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle by circumstantial evidence, noting that the courts review “a combination of factors” to determine whether a person had actual physical control of an automobile:  the motor running, the location of the vehicle, and additional evidence showing that the defendant had driven the vehicle.  Fallon, 275 A.3d at 1105.  The court found that the evidence was sufficient to establish this element of the defendant’s DUI charge.

            As in the Friend and Fallon cases, we believe the Commonwealth will be able to present other evidence, besides Defendant’s admission, that he had been in actual physical control of his vehicle.   Defendant entered the Police Station from the parking lot and he returned to the parking lot where the vehicle was parked after being instructed to leave the property by City employees.  There is no suggestion of any other individual present in the area who could have driven the vehicle into the parking lot.  There is also no suggestion that there was any public transportation available from the parking lot.  Had Defendant not parked the car in the lot, he would have had no reason to be present there after leaving the building.    The vehicle was clearly under Defendant’s control as he consented to the search.  We believe this evidence is sufficient for purposes of the corpus delecti rule at this juncture of the proceedings.  However, we will reserve final determination of the admissibility of Defendant’s admission to driving pending the evidence presented at the trial of this matter.

            For these reasons, we will deny Defendant’s Motions in Limine.

---

[1] Counts 1 through 4, 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(32) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(2), respectively.

[2] 75 Pa.C.S.A.§3308(b).

[3] Defendant also attempted to raise an argument regarding the corpus delecti rule; however, the Superior Court found that the issue had been waived.