Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nathanael William Clark

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nathanael William Clark

Criminal Action-Constitutional Law-Traffic Stop-Hit and Run-Mailboxes-Omnibus Pretrial Motion-Investigative Detention-Reasonable Suspicion-Vehicle Code Violation-Independent Criminal Conduct-Totality of the Circumstances

Nathanael William Clark (“Defendant”) was charged with Driving Under the Influence and related charges for an incident that occurred on April 30, 2022 in which it was alleged that a small white truck had struck and damaged mailboxes before fleeing the scene.  The responding law enforcement officer located a fiberglass shard inside of a damaged mailbox that the officer explained was not commonly used in vehicles but instead often was used in wide body fender kits.  A relative of the individual reporting the hit and run conveyed that he observed a matching small white truck with damage upon the passenger side fiberglass front fender parked in the parking lot of a nearby ice cream store.  When the officer arrived on the scene, the truck appeared vacant.  The piece of fiberglass recovered by the officer from the mailbox exactly matched an area of the wide body fender of the truck that was missing a piece of fiberglass.  When an individual was located by the officer in another part of the parking lot, the officer observed that the pupils of the individual’s eyes appeared very small, which the officer knew often may be an indicator of narcotic use.  The individual also had a raspy voice and appeared hyperactive, which the officer knew also could be indicators of narcotic use.  The individual confirmed that he was the operator of the truck, but he denied having struck any objects while operating the truck.  While the driver initially denied ingesting any controlled substances, he eventually admitted ingestion of controlled substances that evening.  The officer conducted field sobriety tests and a blood draw prior to the lodging of the above charges.  Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion seeking suppression of evidence resulting from the incident.

1.  A mere encounter requires no level of suspicion and carries no official compulsion to respond.

2.  An investigative detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

3.  A law enforcement officer has authority to stop a vehicle when the officer has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code has occurred.

4.  If a violation requires further investigation to prove, an officer needs reasonable suspicion.  If a violation is not immediately apparent and does not require any further investigation, the officer needs probable cause. 

5.  To extend a traffic stop beyond the purpose of enforcing a traffic violation, there must be reasonable suspicion that a defendant may have been engaged in criminal activity independent of the traffic violation. 

6.  In conducting a reasonable suspicion inquiry, the court is required to afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience. 

7.  Under the totality of the circumstances including locating and identifying the operator of the truck, Defendant’s confirmation that he was the operator of the truck and had driven a route where the accident occurred and observing signs in the claimant’s physical appearance indicative of substance use, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for the purpose of investigating whether he left the scene of the incident and additional observations made by the officer during that investigation warranted extension of the investigative detention to determine whether Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.

L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-0001285-2022, Opinion by John C. Tylwalk, President Judge, March 22, 2023.

                   IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                PENNSYLVANIA

                                             CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :         NO. CP-38-CR-1285-2022

                                                                   :

          v.                                                       :

                                                                   :

NATHANAEL WILLIAM CLARK                      :

                                                ORDER OF COURT

          AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, the evidence adduced at the hearing conducted on February 1, 2023, and the Briefs submitted by the parties, it is hereby Ordered that said Motion is DENIED.  Defendant is directed to appear for Call of the List on April 4, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. and the term of Criminal Jury Trials to commence on April 17, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. in the designated Courtrooms.         

                                                          BY THE COURT:

                                                          ____________________________, P.J.

                                                          JOHN C. TYLWALK

JCT/jah

Cc:  District Attorney

       Jay Nigrini, Esquire/Sodomsky & Nigrini, LLC/606 Court Street, Suite

           400/Reading, Pa  19601

      Leslie Fillak/Court Administration

      Judith Huber, Esquire/Law Clerk

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                PENNSYLVANIA

                                             CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :         NO. CP-38-CR-1285-2022

                                                                   :

          v.                                                       :

                                                                   :

NATHANAEL WILLIAM CLARK                      :

APPEARANCES:

MIMI MILLER, ESQUIRE                               FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

JAY M. NIGRINI, ESQUIRE                   FOR NATHANAEL WILLIAM CLARK

SODOMSKY & NIGRINI, LLC

OPINION, TYLWALK, P.J., MARCH 22, 2023.

          Defendant is charged with one count of Driving Under the Influence of any amount of a Schedule II or III Controlled Substance, one count of Driving Under the Influence of a metabolite of a Schedule I, II or III Controlled Substance or any amount of a Schedule II or III Controlled Substance, one count of Driving Under the Influence of any drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impaired his ability to drive safely,[1] and the summary offense of Accidents Involving Damage to Unattended Vehicle or Property[2] for an incident that occurred on April 30, 2022 in South Lebanon Township.  On January 3, 2022, he filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion seeking to suppress the evidence obtained by the police.  We conducted a hearing on the Motion on February 1, 2023.  Both parties have filed post-hearing Briefs, and the matter is now before us for resolution.

          At the hearing, Officer Dominic Juliani of the South Lebanon Township Police Department testified that on April 30, 2022, he received a dispatch to 520 South 14th Avenue in South Lebanon Township.  When he arrived at that location, the complainant reported that a small white truck driving southbound on 14th Avenue had struck two mailboxes and that the driver had failed to stop.  Officer Juliani observed that one of the mailboxes was hanging off its post and the other had been completely ripped from its post.  Officer Juliani found a one-inch long and three-quarter-inch wide shard of fiberglass inside one of the mailboxes.  Officer Juliani explained that fiberglass is not a common material used in vehicles, but that it is often used in wide-body fender kits.  He therefore believed that the shard had come from an aftermarket fiberglass fender from the truck which had struck the mailboxes.  While he was on the scene, the daughter of the complainant informed Officer Juliani that her boyfriend had been out looking for the truck.  He had called her and reported that he had observed what he believed to be the truck in the parking lot of the nearby Patches Family Creamery (“the Creamery”) which was located on Fonderwhite Road and that the truck appeared to have fresh damage on the passenger-side fiberglass front fender.

          Officer Juliani responded to the Creamery where he observed a white Toyota Tacoma as described by the daughter’s boyfriend.  No one was inside or around the vehicle.  Officer Juliani inspected the front passenger-side of the vehicle and observed that it had a fiberglass wide body fender kit with numerous scratches and scuffs on it.  When he held the piece of fiberglass which he had obtained at the scene next to where the fender was missing fiberglass, he observed that it was an exact match.  This led Officer Juliani to believe that this truck had been involved in the crash in which the mailboxes had been damaged.

Officer Juliani took photographs of the truck which were admitted at the hearing.  (Exhibits “2” and “3”)  The photographs showed numerous scrapes and scuff marks on the truck’s fender and showed Officer Juliani holding the piece of fiberglass up to the hole where the fiberglass was missing. 

          Officer Juliani checked with individuals at the Creamery playground to attempt to find the driver of the truck, but no one knew who owned the truck.  He eventually encountered Defendant in a different area of the parking lot and made contact with him.  When he approached, Officer Juliani observed that Defendant’s pupils appeared extremely small for that time of day.  Based on his training and experience, Officer Juliani knew that pinpointed pupils were often an indicator of the use of narcotics.  Officer Juliani testified that Defendant’s pupils were approximately one to one-and-a-half millimeters while the normal range would have been from three to six and a half millimeters. 

Defendant confirmed that he was the driver of the truck and that he had only been at the Creamery for several minutes, having just come from the area of Walmart.  Officer Juliani knew that a typical path from Walmart to the Creamery would be via 14th Avenue where the mailboxes had been struck.  Defendant denied that he had hit anything on his way to the Creamery and became upset when Officer Juliani explained the damage to the truck.  Defendant stated that he could not figure out how he had hit anything and began pacing back and forth and scratching at his neck.  Officer Juliani found this to be an unusual response in this situation and he was concerned that Defendant did not realize that he had struck the mailboxes.  Officer Juliani also noted that Defendant’s voice was very low and raspy.   From his training and experience, Officer Juliani knew that a raspy voice, hyperactivity, pacing back and forth, and scratching at the neck were also indicators of the use of narcotic analgesics and drug intoxication.  Based on the totality of these factors, Officer Juliani believed Defendant to be under the influence of one or more controlled substances.  Defendant initially denied having ingested any controlled substances recently; however, he eventually admitted that he had consumed controlled substances on the evening prior to the incident but did not specify the time.  Based on his observations, Defendant’s physical demeanor, the physical indicators, the fact that Defendant was unaware that he had struck the mailboxes, and Defendant’s admission of having recently consumed controlled substances, Officer Juliani determined that field sobriety tests and a blood draw were warranted. 

On cross-examination, Officer Juliani acknowledged that prior to his contact with Defendant, he had suspected that the individual who struck the mailboxes was Defendant due to a previous encounter in which controlled substances and paraphernalia were involved.  When he ran the truck plate, he learned that the truck was registered to Clark and Clark Engineering, a company that was owned by Defendant’s father.  Officer Juliani acknowledged that the truck was reported to have a loud exhaust system.  He did not see any signs of contraband inside the truck, noting that its windows were too tinted for him to view the interior of the vehicle.  He did not detect the odor of alcohol, marijuana or any other controlled substance on Defendant’s clothing. 

Officer Juliani confirmed that Defendant was wearing glasses with transitioned lenses when he first encountered him at the Creamery, but stated that he was still able to see that Defendant’s pupils were pinpointed.  Officer Juliani was unsure whether his body camera would have been able to catch Defendant’s eyes.  Officer Juliani ordered Defendant to remove his hat and glasses a few moments into their encounter.  Officer Juliani further acknowledged that the truck belonged to a company owned by Defendant’s father and that Defendant had initially been calm and only became upset when he learned of the damage. 

Defendant introduced a DVD of the interaction between Defendant and Officer Juliani at the Creamery which appeared to be from the police vehicle dashcam.  The DVD was admitted at the hearing as Exhibit “4.”  The video shows that when Officer Juliani first encountered Defendant, the lenses of Defendant’s glasses had transitioned and were darkened as noted during Officer Juliani’s cross-examination.  Unfortunately, the camera’s angle and distance from Defendant’s face was such that we were unable to observe whether the size of Defendant’s pupils could be seen through his glasses.  After a few seconds of encountering Defendant, Officer Juliani had Defendant remove his hat and his glasses.  When told of the accident, Defendant paced around, vehemently denying that he had hit anything.  Officer Juliani stated his suspicion that Defendant was unaware that he had hit the mailboxes because he had been nodding off while driving on 14^th Avenue due to being on drugs.  Defendant initially denied having recently ingested any controlled substances.  However, after Officer Juliani commented on the appearance of Defendant’s eyes, Defendant admitted that he had taken controlled substances during the evening prior to the incident.  The video then showed Defendant being administered field sobriety tests by Officer Juliani.  Defendant was subsequently taken for a blood draw and the lab results detected the presence of controlled substances in his blood.  Defendant contends that the evidence should be suppressed due to the illegality of the police conduct.

Pennsylvania Courts recognize three types of encounters between citizens and the police: (1) a mere encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3) a custodial detention.  Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046  (Pa. Super. 2008).  A mere encounter requires no level of suspicion and carries no official compulsion to respond, an investigative detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and an arrest or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause.  Id.  An investigative detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, it does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.  Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 269 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

In Pennsylvania, a police officer has authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred. Our Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as:

a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Thus, under the present version of Section 6308(b), in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code[.]

 “[W]hether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113, 116 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95-96 (Pa. Super. 2011).

          The level of required suspicion turns on the kind of violation in question:  if it is the kind of violation that would require further investigation to prove, the officer needs a reasonable suspicion; if it is the kind of violation that is immediately apparent and would not require any further investigation, the officer needs probable cause.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013).  The officer’s authority for the seizure extends only as long as is necessary to attend to the business of the stop., i.e., investigate the infraction that provoked the stop, issue a citation, and attend to any related safety concerns.  Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

… [A] traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket…. An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 470-471, quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).  Therefore, to extend a traffic stop beyond the purposes of enforcing a traffic violation, there must be reasonable suspicion that a defendant “may have been engaged in criminal activity independent of” the traffic violation. Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d at 471. 

The officer must articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.  Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1248 (Pa. Super 2021).   If an initial detention is lawful “nothing precludes a police officer from acting upon the fortuitous discovery of evidence suggesting a different crime than that initially suspected – such as the odor of alcohol on the breath of a driver.”  Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 927-928 (Pa. Super. 2019).  It is well settled that even in a case where one could say that the conduct of a person is equally consistent with innocent activity, the suppression court is not foreclosed from concluding that reasonable suspicion nevertheless existed. In conducting a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a suppression court is required to afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience.  Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 39 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

          In this case, Officer Juliani was initially investigating the offense of leaving the scene of an accident.  Of necessity, this involved locating the truck and identifying the driver.  After receiving the information from the complainant’s daughter, Officer Juliani located a white truck fitting the description in the parking lot of the Creamery, observed the damage to the front passenger-side fender and saw that the shard of fiberglass from the scene of the accident matched the damage on the white truck.  Upon locating Defendant, Officer Juliani confirmed that he was the driver and that he had just come from a location where he would have driven along 14^th Avenue where the accident occurred.  As Officer Juliani was discussing the accident with Defendant, he observed several indicators of narcotics use:  Defendant’s pinpointed eyes, raspy voice, and his agitation, pacing, and scratching.  In addition, Officer Juliani believed that Defendant had nodded off while driving as he had no recollection of having hit the mailboxes. 

          Defendant points to the fact that he was wearing glasses with transition lenses and that the lenses were darkened when he was first approached by Officer Juliani.  Officer Juliani insisted that he could see Defendant’s pupils through the darkened lenses.  We were unable to assess this testimony when we viewed the video of the Creamery due to the angle and distance of the dashcam from Defendant’s face.  However, the video showed that Officer Juliani had Defendant remove his glasses and hat within moments of their interaction when he would have been able to see Defendant’s eyes during their discussion of the accident. 

          Defendant also argues that the fact that the truck had a loud exhaust system would explain his failure to recognize that he had hit the mailboxes.  Admittedly, it is possible that the loud exhaust system could have drowned out the sound of Defendant’s truck hitting the mailboxes.  However, in light of the extensive damage to the mailboxes and the truck, we believe that Defendant would have certainly seen and felt the impact under normal circumstances regardless of the volume of the truck’s exhaust.  Thus, it is reasonable to infer that he was not in a state of alertness at the time of the accident due to the effect of controlled substances he had ingested at some point prior to the accident.

          Under the totality of the circumstances, we believe that Officer Juliani had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for the purpose of investigating his having left the scene of the accident on 14^th Avenue and that the additional observations made by Office Juliani during that investigation warranted the extension of the investigative detention to determine whether Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance and the subsequent blood draw. For these reasons, we will deny Defendant’s Pre-Trial Motion and direct him to appear for the Call of the List scheduled for April 4, 2023 and the term of Criminal Jury Trials to commence April 17, 2023.

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[1][1] Counts 1 through 3, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(1)(ii), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(1)(iii), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(2), respectively.

[2] 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3745(a).