Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, v. Shalin Corbet

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, v. Shalin Corbet

Criminal Action-Constitutional Law-Admissibility of Evidence-Prior Bad Acts-Prohibition against Double Jeopardy-Harassment-Stalking-Course of Conduct-Probative Value-Prejudicial Effect

Shalin Corbet (“Defendant”) was charged with Stalking for a course of conduct under Title 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(2) for repeatedly communicating with the victim between March 1, 2021 through October 11, 2022 after having been advised not to contact the victim or her family members by a no contact Order served on March 1, 2021.  The Commonwealth filed a Notice pursuant to Pa.R.E. Rule 404(b) advising its intention to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts relating to the victim and her family at trial.  Defendant previously had pled guilty to Harassment charges at three (3) criminal action numbers for violating the no contact Order and attempting to contact the victim.  Defendant contends that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars subsequent prosecution of Stalking because he already pled guilty to the lesser included Harassment charges based upon the same conduct alleged in support of the current Stalking charge and due process precludes introduction of evidence of prior bad acts at trial.   

1. Title 18 Pa.C.S. § 109(3) provides that when a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution if it resulted in a conviction.

2. The same conduct that amounts to Harassment, if committed repeatedly with the intent to place the victim in fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress, would rise to the level of Stalking. 

3.  For purposes of the Stalking statute, a course of conduct is a pattern of actions composed of more than one (1) act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct. 

4. The elements of Stalking are not established until the occurrence of a second prohibited act, and any additional acts extend the course of conduct.

5.  No violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy occurs where the charges in the current Stalking case were not included in the previous actions and are predicated upon separate and distinct facts of the pattern through Defendant’s repeated acts directed toward the victim and her family with the fact that those acts fell within the same general timeframe as the acts at issue being of no accord since the additional acts, in conjunction with the prior acts, create a new course of conduct comprising the Stalking charge.

6. Where the prior bad acts are necessary to establish the element of course of conduct and Defendant’s intent to arouse fear and to cause emotional distress to the victim in support of the Stalking charge, the probative value of the prior bad acts outweighs any prejudicial effect upon Defendant.

L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-0001496-2022, Opinion by John C. Tylwalk, President Judge, June 4, 2024.    

                        IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                            PENNSYLVANIA

                                                         CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-1496-2022

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

SHALIN CORBET                                                    :

                                                            ORDER OF COURT

            AND NOW, this 4^th day of June, 2024, upon consideration of the Commonwealth’s Amended Notice Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), the comments of Counsel at the hearing conducted on April 3, 2024, and the Briefs submitted by the parties, it is hereby Ordered as follows:

1.  The Commonwealth’s request to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts is GRANTED.
2. The Commonwealth’s request to introduce evidence of Defendant’s subsequent bad acts is GRANTED.

                                                                        BY THE COURT:

                                                                        ___________________________, P.J.

                                                                        JOHN C. TYLWALK

JCT/jah

Cc:  Daniel Linares-Herrador, Esquire/Assistant District Attorney

        Megan Tidwell, Esquire/Public Defender

        Leslie Fillak/Court Administration

        Judith Huber, Esquire/Law Clerk

                        IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

                                                            PENNSYLVANIA

                                                         CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :           NO. CP-38-CR-1496-2022

                                                                                    :

            v.                                                                     :

                                                                                    :

SHALIN CORBET                                                    :

APPEARANCES:

DANIEL LINARES-HERRADOR, ESQUIRE    FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

MEGAN TIDWELL, ESQUIRE                           FOR SHALIN CORBET

PUBLIC DEFENDER

OPINION, TYLWALK, P.J., JUNE 4, 2024.

Defendant is charged with one count of Stalking, Course of Conduct (M1), for incidents that occurred “on or between March 1, 2021 through October 11, 2022.”^[1]  It is alleged that Defendant repeatedly communicated with the victim, A.M., after being put on notice that he was not to contact any member of her family by a no-contact order served on March 1, 2021.  The Second Amended Information also charges Defendant with two counts of Harassment (M3) for sending letters postmarked October 7, 2022 and October 11, 2022, to A.M. in violation of the no-contact order.^[2] 

The charge of Stalking is defined as follows:

            § 2709.1. Stalking

(a) Offense defined.–A person commits the crime of stalking when the person either:

(2) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates to another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §2709.1(a)(2).  “Course of conduct” is defined as

“ a pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct. The term includes lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings, caricatures or actions, either in person or anonymously.  Acts indicating a course of conduct which occur in more than one jurisdiction may be used by any other jurisdiction in which an act occurred as evidence of a continuing pattern of conduct or a course of conduct.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. §2709.1(f).

            On February 6, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a Notice pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b) informing Defendant that it intended to introduce evidence of his prior bad acts with regard to A.M. and her family at trial.  On February 12, 2024, the Commonwealth filed an Amended Notice indicating that it intended to also introduce evidence of Defendant’s subsequent actions regarding the victims which would constitute a continuing course of conduct.  We conducted a hearing on the Commonwealth’s Notice on April 2, 2024.   Both parties have filed post-hearing Briefs and the matter is now before us for disposition.

            At the time the criminal complaint in this matter was filed, Defendant had three pending dockets for Harassment in which he was charged with violating the no-contact order and contacting the same victims as in the present action.   On Docket No. CP-38-CR-86-2022, Defendant was charged for an incident that occurred on November 21, 2021 when he sent a member of A.M.’s family a friend request on Facebook using the name “Shea Corbett.”  On Docket No. CP-38-CR-797-2022, Defendant was charged for an incident that occurred in April of 2022 when he again sent a Facebook friend request to a member of A.M.’s family under the name of “Shea Corbett” and for placing disturbing posts on his public Facebook page about the family.  On Docket No. CP-38-CR-854-2022, Defendant was charged for an incident that occurred in June of 2022 when he sent a Facebook friend request to a member of A.M.’s family using the name “Arky Labs.”  On November 16, 2022, Defendant entered a guilty plea on those three dockets and was released from prison on ROR bail.

            In its initial 404(b) Notice, the Commonwealth indicated that it intends to introduce evidence relative to the Facebook posts in the prior harassment dockets as evidence of Defendant’s engagement in a course of conduct or repeated communications with either an intent to place A.M. in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to A.M. and her family in accordance with the Stalking charge.  In its Amended Notice, the Commonwealth indicates that it also intends to introduce evidence of Defendant’s conduct which occurred subsequent to the charges filed in this action as showing a continuing course of conduct.  These acts include:

November 27, 2022 – Defendant calling police for a well-being check on A.M.;

December 12, 2022- Defendant sending A.M. a friend request on Instagram;

July of 2023 – Defendant sending an Instagram friend request to a member of A.M.’s family and a friend request to A.M. on TikTok;

August 5, 2023 – Defendant sending A.M.’s family member a Facebook message asking him to relate a message to another family member that Defendant was going to “fucking kill him;”

December 2023 – Defendant sending an anonymous Christmas card to A.M. (There was no name on the card or envelope; however, the Commonwealth submits that the handwriting on the envelope is similar to Defendant’s handwriting on the two envelopes he had previously sent to A.M.).

Defendant argues that the introduction of his prior convictions would violate his right against Double Jeopardy and that the introduction of evidence of his subsequent acts would violate his right to due process. 

            Double Jeopardy

            Defendant claims that the introduction of evidence of his prior convictions is barred by the 5^th, 6^th and 14^th Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Double Jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution at Article 1, Section 10, and by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§109-110.

§ 109. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense

When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:

(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §109(3).

            § 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:

• The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

• any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;

• any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense or the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or a summary traffic offense; or

• the same conduct, unless:

(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or

(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §110.

The prohibition against double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.  More specifically, the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects against being sentenced for both a greater and a lesser-included offense, as such a result would punish a defendant twice for the same conduct.

Commonwealth v. States, 891 A.2d 737, 742 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted), aff’d 938 A. 2d 1016 (Pa. 2007). 

            Defendant contends that, when read together, Sections 109 and 110 bar the subsequent prosecution of different offenses when the subsequent offense is a greater or lesser-included offense.  He reasons that Harassment is a lesser-included offense of Stalking and that the prosecution of the Stalking charge in this case is barred because is it based on the same conduct for which he was previously prosecuted and convicted.

            The Commonwealth cites several cases in which a defendant was charged with stalking and prior bad acts were admitted as evidence.  In Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. 1995), the defendant’s prior violent acts against the victim and the entry of a Protection From Abuse Order were admitted to show the defendant’s intent to stalk the victim, his intent to cause his victim to fear for her safety and/or suffer emotional distress, and to show a course of conduct, one of the elements of the stalking offense.   “Course of conduct by its very nature requires a showing of a repetitive pattern of behavior.  Therefore, where evidence of prior bad acts is necessary to establish the pattern, the evidence is admissible.”  Id. at 710. 

 In Commonwealth v. Roefaro, 691 A.2d 472 (Pa. Super. 1997), the defendant was convicted of stalking for sending letters to the victim after he had previously been convicted of two counts of stalking.  After he was convicted of the new stalking charge, he appealed, claiming a violation of his right against double jeopardy because his prior stalking convictions were introduced to establish the “course of conduct” element of the new stalking charge.  In rejecting this claim, the court noted:

As a general rule, a defendant’s prior bad acts including convictions, are not admissible to prove criminal propensity or bad character.  There are, however, numerous exceptions to this rule, two of which hold that one’s prior acts may be admissible to prove intent and course of conduct provided that their probative value is not outweighed by their prejudicial impact.

Id. at 474 (citations omitted).  The court further explained: “[d]ouble jeopardy protections prohibit a person from being twice tried for actions arising from the same factual predicate.  It does not bar successive prosecutions based upon temporally distinct actions that happen to impinge the same section of the Crimes code. Id.  The court found that double jeopardy was inapplicable because the defendant had been convicted for actions arising out of separate and distinct factual predicates.  Id.  “It is true that the former convictions were introduced at the later trial; however, their introduction was purely a matter of evidence.  Id. at 474-475. 

            In Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. 1999), the court discussed the elements of stalking and the relation between stalking and harassment:

In determining that section 2709(a), Harassment, is a lesser-included offense of section 2709(b), Stalking, a panel of this Court opined the same conduct which amounts to harassment, “if committed repeatedly with the intent to place the victim in fear of bodily injury or cause substantial emotional distress would rise to the level of stalking.” 

                        Course of conduct is established by proof of two related but separate events. For purposes of the stalking statute, course of conduct is a “pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct.” Section 2709(f), Definitions.

                        The elements of stalking are not established until the occurrence of a second prohibited act and any additional acts extend the course of conduct. These additional acts, in conjunction with the prior acts, also create a new “course of conduct” and are, by definition, stalkings.

Id. at 611-612 (emphasis in original).

            Defendant notes that the Second Amended Information in this case is for “crimes between March 1, 2021 through October 11, 2022” and that the conduct underlying the three previous Harassment charges occurred within this timeframe – on November 19-21, 2021, April 14, 2022 and June 8, 2022.  He reasons that since the conduct which formed the basis for the Harassment charges in his three previous cases is now included as the basis for a charge for the “greater offense” of Stalking, the Commonwealth is seeking to prosecute him for the same conduct for which he was already convicted in violation of his right against double jeopardy.  He argues that Roefaro is inapplicable because the defendant’s prior stalking convictions in that case were not included in the stalking charge and, thus, were not being re-prosecuted. 

            We find no violation of Defendant’s double jeopardy rights.   The charges in this case were not included in the previous actions and are predicated on the separate and distinct fact of the pattern which has been established by Defendant’s repeated acts directed at A.M. and her family.  The fact that those acts fell within the same general timeframe as the ones at issue in this action is of no accord as “these additional acts, in conjunction with the prior acts, … create a new ‘course of conduct’” in accordance with Leach.

The fact that harassment is a lesser-included offense of stalking has no bearing on the admissibility of this evidence.   The conduct involved in the previous Harassment actions is not the basis for the present charges and will be only matter of evidence in the present case.  Defendant will not be retried or repunished for those bad acts.  Thus, we reject Defendant’s double jeopardy claim. 

We will permit the introduction of evidence of the prior bad acts at the trial of this matter to establish the element of the course of conduct and Defendant’s intent to arouse fear and cause emotional distress to A.M. and her family.  We believe the probative value of these prior bad acts outweighs any prejudicial effect as this evidence is necessary to establish the elements of the offense of Stalking.

            Subsequent Bad Acts

            The Commonwealth also intends to introduce evidence of the bad acts that occurred after the dates of the incidents set forth in the Second Amended Information.  These acts are relevant to show a “continuity of conduct” in accordance with Section 2709.1(f).  “These additional acts, in conjunction with the prior bad acts, also create a new “course of conduct” and are, by definition, stalkings.”  Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d at 611-612.  Each act, constituting the course of conduct leading to arrest and trial, is not merely cumulative evidence of stalking but a stalking in and of itself.”  Id. at 612.

Defendant objects to this evidence, contending that his due process rights were violated by insufficient notice.  He contends that if he had known that he would also have to defend these subsequent acts he may have chosen to have a preliminary hearing or a negotiated plea.

            Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) provides:

Notice in a Criminal Case.  In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). 

            The Commonwealth filed its Amended Notice indicating its intention to introduce this evidence on February 12, 2024.  Trial had been scheduled for April 2, 2024.  Defendant failed to appear for Call of the List on April 2, 2024 and a Bench Warrant was issued.  We proceeded with the hearing scheduled for the Commonwealth’s 404(b) Notice on April 3, 2024.  Defendant did not appear at the hearing and the matter is not presently on any Call List.  We believe there has been sufficient time for Defendant to prepare his defense, including his response to the acts that occurred after the incidents at issue in this matter.  Defendant will have had ample time to prepare for the introduction of all of this evidence by the time trial occurs.  Thus, there is no due process violation.

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[1] Second Amended Information, Count 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2709.1(a)(2).

[2] Second Amended Information, Counts 2 and 3, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2709(a)(7).