Commonwealth vs. Todd Rodkey No. CP-38-CR-0000983-2013

Criminal Action-Violations of Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act-Omnibus Pretrial Motion-Miranda Rights-Custodial Interrogation-Warrant for Lessor of Apartment-Other Person Located in Apartment with Contraband

1. Defendant, who was present in the bedroom of an apartment that was not leased to him when the landlord allowed law enforcement to execute a warrant for a lessor of the apartment, was charged with violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq., after synthetic marijuana and a grinder were located in the bedroom in which Defendant was located and Defendant stated to law enforcement that the synthetic marijuana and grinder belonged to him. Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motions to Suppress statements he made to law enforcement on the basis that he was subject to a custodial investigation when he made the statements without first having been provided his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (“Miranda”).

2. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 581 authorizes a defendant to make a motion to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.

3. When an omnibus pretrial motion for suppression is lodged, the burden lies upon the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible.

4. Pursuant to Miranda, a suspect subject to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, anything he says may be used against him in court and he is entitled to the presence of an attorney. Statements that are not made in response to custodial interrogation are gratuitous and are not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings. If a suspect is not advised of Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement, evidence obtained through the interrogation cannot be used against that suspect.

5. A suspect is deemed to be in custody when he physically is denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation where he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.

6. In determining whether a suspect is in custody, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances including the basis for the detention, the duration and location of the detention, whether the suspect was transferred against his will, whether restraints were utilized, the show, threat or use of force and the methods of investigation used.

7. The totality of the circumstances revealed that Defendant was in custody when he indicated that the contraband belonged to him, as a law enforcement official executing the warrant for the lessor of the apartment told Defendant to stay on the bed in the room with the contraband, a law enforcement official thereafter moved Defendant to the porch, a law enforcement official remained with Defendant on the porch, a law enforcement official stood at the porch steps with Defendant and Defendant’s identification was in the custody of law enforcement, who was unaware whether Defendant’s identification had been returned to him. An individual under these circumstances would not reasonably believe that his freedom was unrestricted and that he could walk away.

8. Interrogation is defined as police conduct calculated to, expected to or likely to evoke admission. The functional equivalent of interrogation includes any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know reasonably are likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. In determining what constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation, the court must focus upon the suspect’s perception rather than the intent of law enforcement.

9. A practice that law enforcement should know reasonably is likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect amounts to an interrogation. A statement made in a custodial setting is not subject to suppression where the suspect spontaneously blurts out the statement, makes an incriminating statement in the course of small talk with authorities or is responding with general biographical information such as name, height, weight, residence and/or occupation.

10. Defendant in this case was subject to interrogation when he admitted to possession of the synthetic marijuana and grinder where the law enforcement officer to whom the statements were made was dispatched to the scene to address the potential controlled substance violation, not to assist in execution of the warrant for the lessor of the apartment, the law enforcement officer to whom the statements were made collected the contraband before speaking with Defendant, the Commonwealth failed to develop at the hearing the specific questions posed by the law enforcement officer to whom the statements were made and the testimony developed indicated that the law enforcement official asked Defendant about the contraband found inside the apartment, to which Defendant responded the contraband belonged to him.

11. Under these circumstances, the law enforcement official should have expected that the questions asked about the contraband reasonably were likely to evoke an incriminating response from Defendant. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation that first required the issuance of Miranda warnings, necessitating the suppression of all statements made by Defendant as a result of the questioning.

L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-0002031-2014, Opinion by Samuel A. Kline, Judge, July 17, 2015

Sarah Hart, Esquire, for the Commonwealth

Nicholas Sidelnick, Esquire, for Defendant

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMINAL DIVISION No: CP-38-CR-2031-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TODD RODKEY

ORDER

And now, to wit, this 17^th day of July, 2015, upon consideration of the Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence, the parties’ briefs in support of their respective positions, and the record of the pretrial hearing, the Defendant’s request to suppress any statements made to Officer Patrick McKinney is GRANTED. As previously directed, the Defendant is directed to appear for Call of the List on July 21, 2015 in the designated courtroom with trial to commence the week of August 3, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

SAMUEL A. KLINE, J.

APPEARANCES:

Sarah Hart, Esq. for the Commonwealth

Nicholas Sidelnick, Esq. for the Defendant

OPINION, KLINE, J., JULY 17, 2015

Before the Court is the Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the request to suppress statements made to Officer Patrick McKinney (hereinafter “Officer McKinney”), as specified below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant is charged with two counts of Violation of the Controlled Substance Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act pursuant to 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(36) and (32). On February 6, 2015, the Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion. The Defendant argued that he was subjected to an illegal search/seizure, and he claimed that certain evidence must be suppressed because it was not in plain view. Also, he sought the suppression of certain statements made to a police officer claiming that he was not provided his Miranda Rights.

On May 27, 2015, a pretrial hearing was held. The record of the pretrial hearing reflects the following relevant facts. Brenda Dice-Shuoy (hereinafter “Ms. Dice-Shuoy”) testified first. Ms. Dice-Shuoy is the landlord of property at 332 North 7^th Street in Lebanon City. (N.T. 5). On April 29, 2014, she was leasing the first floor to Frank Darosh and his son, Anthony Darosh. (N.T. 5). On that date, deputies from the Lebanon County Sheriff’s Department contacted her concerning a warrant for Anthony Darosh. (N.T. 5). Based on that, Ms. Dice-Shuoy gave them permission to go into the property. (N.T. 6). Ms. Dice-Shuoy opened the door and let the deputies inside. (N.T. 8). Prior to letting the deputies inside, Ms. Dice-Shuoy called the tenants, but they did not return the phone call. (N.T. 8). Ms. Dice-Shuoy never got consent from the tenants for the deputies to enter. (N.T. 8). Anthony Darosh and Francis Darosh were the only individuals who had permission to live there pursuant to the lease agreement. (N.T. 6).

Deputy Timothy Turasky (hereinafter “Deputy Turasky”) testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. On April 29, 2014, Deputy Turasky was serving a warrant for Anthony Darosh at the above-mentioned address. (N.T. 12). Deputy Kirk Juliani (hereinafter “Deputy Juliani”) accompanied him. Prior to serving the warrant, Deputy Turasky contacted the landlord to confirm that Anthony lived there. (N.T. 12). Deputy Turasky had prior experience with Anthony Darosh at that address, and he stated that “Before we left, I contacted the landlord figuring that Anthony would not answer the door because that’s kind of his MO.” (N.T. 12). Upon arrival, Deputy Juliani went to knock on the front door, and Deputy Turasky went to knock on the side door. (N.T. 12, 17). Nobody answered at either door, then Ms. Dice-Shuoy let them inside. (N.T. 13). Deputy Turasky testified that it is common practice that when he serves a warrant, a landlord is able to let him inside the residence. (N.T. 13).

Upon Ms. Dice-Shuoy opening the door, Deputy Juliani entered first.

(N.T. 13). Immediately upon entering, there was a bed with two people (one

male and one female) sitting on it. (N.T. 13-14). The Defendant was

identified as the male. (N.T. 14). Deputy Juliani told them to stay where they were [on the bed] while Deputy Turasky searched the rest of the house for Anthony. (N.T. 13, 30). Deputy Juliani stayed with the individuals. (N.T. 18). Anthony was not located. (N.T. 13). Anthony’s father was located in a bed, which was in another room, but he was not spoken to. (N.T. 14). The record does not reveal why he was not spoken to, but the record does reveal that he was sick. (N.T. 14).

When he came back to talk to the individuals on the bed, Deputy Turasky noticed a substance that looked like marijuana on the headboard of the bed, and a grinder was on the night stand. (N.T. 13, 15). The purpose of Deputy Turasky coming back to speak to the other individuals after the search was to find Anthony Darosh. (N.T. 14). When the deputies saw the grinder and marijuana like substance, they contacted the city police department and told them they were out on warrant service, and “we had Act 64 and we needed assistance at that point.” (N.T. 15). Officer McKinney subsequently arrived. (N.T. 15). Deputy Turasky never told the Defendant or the female that they could leave the residence. (N.T. 22). Deputy Turasky testified that when they typically approach someone in a residence, one deputy stays with the individual(s) while the other deputy searches in order for safety reasons. (N.T. 23).

Deputy Juliani also testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. (N.T. 23). Deputy Juliani’s testimony corroborated Deputy Turasky’s testimony. (N.T. 23-27). In addition, Deputy Juliani detected a faint smell of marijuana upon entry into the residence. (N.T. 26). After Deputy Turasky was finished searching the apartment and the paraphernalia was found, they conducted a quick search of the bed area while the individuals were still on the bed. (N.T. 30-31). After that, Deputy Juliani went outside with the individuals to the porch while Deputy Turasky remained inside. (N.T. 27, 31).

While outside prior to Officer McKinney’s arrival, Deputy Juliani never told them that they were free to leave, and he stayed with them the entire time. (N.T. 31, 40, 42). Officer McKinney arrived when they were outside on the porch. (N.T. 27). Deputy Juliani testified that Officer McKinney asked them about the materials found inside, and the Defendant stated that they were his. (N.T. 28). Prior to Officer McKinney showing up while they were outside, Deputy Juliani took the Defendant’s identification and ran his name for any active warrants. (N.T. 32). Deputy Juliani did not remember at what point he gave his identification back. (N.T. 33).

Officer McKinney testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. (N.T. 42). Officer McKinney has worked for the Lebanon City Police Department for 16 years. (N.T. 42). Through his training and experience, he is able to identify synthetic marijuana and drug paraphernalia. (N.T. 42). When Officer McKinney was dispatched to the residence, he first went inside to make contact with Deputy Turasky. (N.T. 43). Deputy Turasky directed his attention to the items found in plain view. (N.T. 16, 43). Officer McKinney observed the synthetic marijuana and pieces of drug paraphernalia. (N.T. 43). He subsequently took those items into evidence. (N.T. 16, 43). Following that, he went out on the porch to speak to the two individuals. (N.T. 43). Officer McKinney identified the Defendant. (N.T. 44). He did not direct that they were under arrest, nor were they placed in handcuffs. (N.T. 28, 44). Officer McKinney did not tell the Defendant he did not have to speak to him or he could leave the scene if he wanted. (N.T. 47). The Defendant was not read his Miranda Rights. (N.T. 47).

Officer McKinney proceeded to ask them questions about the drug paraphernalia and synthetic marijuana to figure out what was going on. (N.T. 44, 47). The Defendant indicated that the items belonged to him. (N.T. 44). Following that, the Defendant was advised he would be receiving charges through the mail. (N.T. 28, 45). After checking for warrants and verifying addresses, he released the individuals. (N.T. 28, 45). During the interaction, the Defendant never asked to leave. (N.T. 45). The substance was ultimately tested and determined to be synthetic marijuana. (N.T. 46).

The size of the porch was approximately 12 to 15 feet in length and approximately 4 feet wide. (N.T. 49). There was front and side railing and three or four open steps. (N.T. 49). Upon Officer McKinney’s arrival, the individuals were sitting closer to an alley which was the south end of the porch on two chairs, and Deputy Juliani was standing “at the steps area.” (N.T. 50). “[Deputy Juliani] was standing between them and the steps at one of the available avenues.” (N.T. 50). The railing was about waist-high. (N.T. 50). The individuals would have been able to walk past Deputy Juliani to get off the porch. (N.T. 51). Officer McKinney was standing down on the sidewalk when he spoke to the individuals. (N.T. 50-51).

At the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the Court found that entry/search of the residence was valid. In particular, the deputies had a warrant for the arrest of the named tenant holder, Anthony Darosh, and the apartment was leased in the names of Anthony and Frank Darosh. (N.T. 53). They had previous experience with the individuals, and in addition to knocking and announcing, they also obtained the presence of the landlord with a key so they did not have to break into the property. (N.T. 53). After they waited a period of time and there was no answer, they entered. The Court found this was a proper entry. (N.T. 53). In addition, the items seized were clearly in plain view, and the seizure was proper. (N.T. 53-54). The Court took the matter of whether the statements to Officer McKinney should be suppressed under advisement. (N.T. 54).

The Court directed briefs due within 30 days. In the event a party requested a transcript, the 30 day time period commenced on the filing of the transcript. Both parties requested transcripts, and the transcript was filed on June 9, 2015. The Defendant filed a brief in support of his position on July 9, 2015. The Commonwealth filed a brief in support of its position on July 10, 2015. The case is thus before us and ripe for disposition.

DISCUSSION

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 permits a defendant to “make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Suppression of evidence is an appropriate type of relief to include in an omnibus pretrial motion. Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 578. The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. Com. v. Hamilton, 673 A.2d 915, 916 (Pa. 1996).

The Defendant asks the Court to suppress all statements that he made to Officer McKinney, claiming that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation, and he was not provided his Miranda Rights. The Commonwealth argues that the interaction did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.

It is a fundamental precept enshrined in the United States Constitution that a suspect subject to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in court, and that he is entitled to the presence of an attorney. If an individual is not advised of his Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials, evidence obtained through the interrogation cannot be used against him. [I]n order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda, there must be both custody and interrogation. Statements not made in response to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous and are not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.

In deeming an interaction to be a custodial interrogation, the police officer’s subjective intent does not govern the determination but rather the reasonable belief of the individual being interrogated.

Com. v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

Turning first to custody, the Superior Court has stated:

An individual is deemed to be in custody for Miranda purposes when he “is physically denied … his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.” The court must consider the totality of circumstances, including factors such as “the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions.”

Cruz, 71 A.3d at 1004 (citations omitted). Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Com. v. Gonzalez , 979 A.2d 879, 888 (Pa. Super. 2009).

The Commonwealth argues that the Defendant was not in custody because he never asked to leave nor was he advised that he was under arrest. He was not handcuffed, and there were no threats of force. Further, although Deputy Juliani was standing at the steps to the porch, he did not block their movement with his arms, and they were able to walk past the deputy. The Commonwealth also emphasizes that the point of having the individuals remain was for officer safety.

The Deputies explained that the purpose for this movement was to allow them to more completely search the residence for the subject of their warrant search. The deputies further explained the safety concerns behind having remain on the bed, and then also having them leave the residence.

(Commonwealth’s brief, p. 5). We do not agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment. Although these facts may be true, the Commonwealth ignores several other important facts, and the decision must be made based on the totality of the circumstances.

The record reveals that at 12:45 in the afternoon, two deputies were on “warrant service.” They were seeking to apprehend Anthony Darosh, who they were familiar with from prior experience. They went to his residence, which he leased. They originally tried to knock to gain entry, but there was no answer. The deputies were permitted inside the house via the landlord. Upon entry, the deputies immediately noticed the Defendant and a female on a bed. Deputy Juliani told them to stay on the bed. Deputy Juliani stayed with the two individuals inside the residence while Deputy Turasky searched the house for Anthony. Upon Deputy Turasky’s return, they noticed a marijuana like substance and drug paraphernalia. They searched the bed area, and the individuals were then moved to the porch. Deputy Juliani remained with the individuals on the porch. Deputy Turasky contacted the Lebanon City Police as a result of the marijuana like substance and paraphernalia that was discovered. Officer McKinney was dispatched to the scene. Officer McKinney ultimately arrived at the house, walked by the individuals who were already on the porch and proceeded inside the house. Deputy Juliani stayed with the individuals the entire time while the Defendant and the female were on the porch. The deputy was standing at the porch steps. Officer McKinney then came back outside after the contraband was seized. Officer McKinney started to question the individuals while standing on the sidewalk. The Defendant’s identification was taken at one point prior to Officer McKinney’s arrival, but Deputy Juliani does not remember when he gave it back. The Court finds it hard to believe that an individual under these circumstances would reasonably believe that his freedom was not restricted, and he simply would just be allowed to walk away. Therefore, he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.

With regard to the Commonwealth’s “officer safety” argument, the Commonwealth’s contention fails to take into account the well-settled principle that, “in deeming an interaction to be a custodial interrogation, the police officer’s subjective intent does not govern the determination but rather the reasonable belief of the individual being interrogated.” Gonzalez, 979 A.2d at 888. Therefore, although the individuals may have initially been told to stay where they were by the deputies for safety reasons, we must focus the determination on the reasonable belief of the Defendant.

Analysis of the issue does not end because a suspect deemed to be in custody must also have been interrogated. “Interrogation is defined as police conduct calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke admission.” Cruz, 71 A.3d at 1004.

We also explained that the “functional equivalent” of interrogation includes “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”

We then had the opportunity to expand on what conduct amounts to the “functional equivalent” of interrogation. In performing this inquiry…the court must focus on a suspect’s perceptions and give relevance to the officer’s constructive knowledge…the inquiry must look at the suspect’s perceptions rather than the intent of the police. Moreover, “a practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect … amounts to an interrogation.”

Com. v. Gaul, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted). In addition,

In Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 855 A.2d 783, 796–797 (2004) (Castille concurring), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169, 126 S.Ct. 1330, 164 L.Ed.2d 47 (2006) our Supreme Court stated, inter alia, that a statement made in a custodial setting would not be suppressed where the suspect “spontaneously ‘blurts out’ the statement, … or makes an incriminating statement in the course of ‘small talk’ with authorities, … or is merely responding to biographical questioning,….” “Generally speaking, general information such as name, height, weight, residence, occupation, etc. is not the kind of information which requires Miranda warnings since it is not information generally considered as part of an interrogation.” Such questions are not “calculated to, expected to, or likely to elicit an incriminating response, or … asked with [the] intent to extract or an expectation of eliciting an incriminating [response].” Also, there is no requirement that a suspect be advised of any Miranda rights where the police seek biographical, general information…

Com. v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2012) (certain citations omitted).

Turning to the instant case, upon discovery of the marijuana like substance and paraphernalia in plain view, the Lebanon City Police was notified by Deputy Turasky that there was “an Act 64.” It is important to note that Officer McKinney was dispatched to the scene to address the drug/paraphernalia incident. He was not dispatched to the scene to assist in the possible apprehension of Anthony Darosh. Upon Officer McKinney’s

arrival, he went inside to collect the evidence, then he came back outside to

talk to the individuals. Prior to Officer McKinney going outside to talk to them, the record does not reveal that he or the deputies knew who claimed ownership of the materials. When Officer McKinney went out to speak to the individuals, there clearly were several possibilities. They could have belonged to the Defendant or the female present. They could have belonged to Anthony Darosh or his father, who were the tenants of the building. Furthermore, they could have belonged to a combination of these individuals. Nonetheless, upon the discovery and seizure of these materials, the record reveals Officer McKinney went outside to ask questions, in the words of the Commonwealth, “to figure out what was going on.”

Unfortunately, the Court has absolutely no idea what specific questions were asked by Officer McKinney to the Defendant. This issue was never developed at the hearing. Therefore, we cannot even analyze whether the actual express questions rises to the level of interrogation. This would have been important for our determination. Had Officer McKinney asked the Defendant something along the lines of “Is this substance and paraphernalia yours?” and the Defendant responded affirmatively, then this clearly would be interrogation. However, had Officer McKinney merely asked questions requesting general information such as “What are you doing here?” and the Defendant merely blurted out that the materials were his, then this would not have been interrogation but the admission would have been voluntarily provided.

In its brief, the Commonwealth addresses the interrogation component of Miranda by merely stating, “Further, in regard to the alleged interrogative nature of the questions proffered by Officer McKinney, the officer asked only a few questions targeted at identifying what was occurring at the residence. In response to that request, the Defendant voluntarily offered the information that the drugs and paraphernalia were his own.” (Commonwealth’s brief, p. 6). The Court does not agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment. The record developed certainly does not indicate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant voluntarily offered the information because the Court does not even know what specific questions were asked.

However, the record does reveal the subject matter of the questions. He asked questions about the synthetic marijuana and drug paraphernalia found inside. We will reiterate the relevant portions. Officer McKinney observed the synthetic marijuana and pieces of drug paraphernalia. (N.T. 43). He subsequently took those items into evidence. (N.T. 43). Following that, he went out onto the porch to speak to the two individuals. (N.T. 43). Direct examination reveals the following:

Question: Did you proceed to ask them questions to figure out what was going on?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Through these questions, did you ask about the drug paraphernalia and the synthetic marijuana that you had taken into evidence?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What occurred exactly?

Answer: Mr. Rodkey indicated that the items belonged to him.

Question: So he indicated possession of these items?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Following that, did you advise him he would be receiving charges through the mail?

Answer: Yes.

(N.T. 44-45, emphasis added). Cross-examination reveals the following:

Question: Now, when you went out and spoke with Mr. Rodkey you said—strike that. When you spoke with Mr. Rodkey, before – you started asking him questions about the drugs and the paraphernalia that were found inside the residence, correct?

Answer: I did ask him those questions, yes.

Question: Before doing that, you didn’t tell him like he didn’t have to speak to you if he didn’t want to?

Answer: Nope.

Question: You didn’t tell him hey, he could leave the scene if he wanted to, correct?

Answer: No.

Question: You didn’t read him his Miranda Rights, correct?

Answer: Nope.

(N.T. 47, emphasis added). In addition, Deputy Juliani indicated that Officer McKinney asked them about the materials found inside, and the Defendant stated that they were his. (N.T. 28).

Direct examination revealed that Officer McKinney proceeded to ask questions to figure out what was going on. He asked about the drug paraphernalia and the synthetic marijuana that he had taken into evidence. Cross-examination again revealed that Officer McKinney asked questions about the paraphernalia and drugs found inside. Deputy Juliani also indicated that Officer McKinney asked them about the materials found inside. Officer McKinney should have expected that whatever questions he asked, which in context were about the synthetic marijuana and drug paraphernalia discovered, reasonably likely could have evoked an incriminating response from the Defendant.

For all the aforementioned reasons, we are constrained to rule that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation requiring the Miranda safeguards. Any and all statements made by the Defendant as a result of Officer McKinney’s questioning on the porch are suppressed. We will enter an Order consistent with the foregoing.

 

1) A grinder is “basically used to grind up the marijuana to put in either a smoking device or roll it up into a cigarette.” (N.T. 15). A grinder is a form of drug paraphernalia. (N.T. 15).

2) “Act 64 refers to The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780–101, et seq.” Com. v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 661, footnote 2 (Pa. Super. 2008).