John M. Gogets v. Tanya G. Gogets No. 2012-20676

Civil Action-Law-Divorce-Equitable Distribution-Student Loan Debt-Bankruptcy-Alimony

Both parties filed Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation of the Special Master in Divorce adopted by the Court including assertions that the Court erred by requiring Plaintiff to pay a portion of the nearly $55,000.00 in student loan debt that Defendant had accumulated during the marriage, awarding sixty percent (60%) of the martial estate to Defendant and forty percent (40%) of the marital estate to Plaintiff and by awarding Defendant alimony.

1. While the Pennsylvania Superior Court indicated in Hicks v. Kubit, 758 A.2d 202 (Pa.Super. 2000), that student loans incurred during a marriage must be considered martial debt, it also indicated that the distribution of assets or liabilities is to be based upon the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the assets or debts along with all other factors relevant to fashioning a just distribution.

2. In light of the fact that no evidence was presented that Defendant’s student loans were incurred against the wishes of Plaintiff, Plaintiff collaterally will benefit from Defendant’s education with regard to the alimony awarded, Defendant’s student loans essentially are the only marital debt remaining due to the parties’ discharge of debt in bankruptcy in 2010 and Plaintiff’s income that is almost twice that of Defendant, the Special Master did not err in requiring Plaintiff to pay a portion of Defendant’s student loan debt acquired during the marriage. However, Plaintiff’s obligation to pay to Plaintiff the awarded portion of the student loan debt will not commence until November of 2017, after Defendant’s projected graduation.

3. The Special Master committed no error of law in awarding sixty percent (60%) of the marital estate to Defendant and forty percent (40%) of the marital estate to Plaintiff when Plaintiff’s income is nearly double that of Defendant, Plaintiff has non-marital property set aside for his benefit in the form of United States military retirement that Defendant does not have, Defendant is the primary custodian of the parties’ sixteen (16) year old son and Plaintiff was responsible for dissipating marital assets and largely responsible for causing the parties’ bankruptcy.

4. Alimony always has been recognized to be a secondary remedy. If economic justice can be effectuated through equitable distribution alone, the court generally should eschew an award of alimony. Before awarding significant alimony, it is incumbent that the court assess the degree to which alimony is needed by the obligee and how the award will affect the obligor.

5. Since under the Court’s Order the awarded amount of alimony of $300.00 per month, when added with Plaintiff’s child support obligation and obligation to pay a portion of Defendant’s student loan debt, effectively would require Plaintiff to pay Defendant more than fifty percent (50%) of his net income and sixty percent (60%) of the marital estate was awarded to Defendant, the secondary remedy of alimony neither is necessary nor appropriate in this case.

L.C.C.C.P. No 2012-20676, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, November 17, 2015.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION – FAMILY NO. 2012-20676

JOHN M. GOGETS

v.

TANYA G. GOGETS

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, to wit, this 17^th day of November, 2015, upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and after review of the file, the Court affirms the Special Master’s Recommendations as follows:

1. Effective today’s date the parties are divorced from the bonds of matrimony pursuant to Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code.

2. The trade-in proceeds from the 2005 Chrysler Pacifica automobile of $4,000.00 shall be awarded to WIFE.

3. The 2000 Ford Ranger vehicle with a value of $6,074.00 shall be awarded to HUSBAND. WIFE shall execute all necessary documents to transfer title of that vehicle to the sole name of HUSBAND.

4. The 2000 Ford Focus vehicle with a value of $3,727.00 shall be awarded to HUSBAND. WIFE shall execute all necessary documents to transfer title of that vehicle to the sole name of HUSBAND.

5. The 2006 Honda 599 motorcycle with a value of $2,535.00 shall be awarded to HUSBAND. WIFE shall execute all necessary documents to transfer title of that vehicle to the sole name of HUSBAND.

6. The proceeds from the Hershey Medical Center retirement account of $13,789.55 and the Fidelity IRA of $10,263.25, both in the name of WIFE and both of which had previously been cashed in, shall be awarded to WIFE.

7. The marital portion of the military retirement account in the name of HUSBAND with a value of $21,007.00 shall be awarded to HUSBAND.

8. The Principal 401(k) account in the name of HUSBAND with a value of $182,022.07 shall be awarded to HUSBAND subject to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order in favor of WIFE. The Qualified Domestic Relations Order on the Principal 401(k) account shall be for the amount of $117,997.72 in favor of WIFE.

9. After creation of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order in favor of WIFE, the remaining portion of the Principal 401(k) account shall be awarded to HUSBAND. WIFE shall execute all required documents to release further claims on that account.

10. The student loans in the name of WIFE, with a balance of $49,600.00 shall by paid by WIFE.

11. Commencing in November of 2017, HUSBAND shall contribute the sum of $1,040.00 per month for 27 consecutive months as his share of WIFE’s student loans plus interest.

12. HUSBAND shall pay to WIFE the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00) per month as alimony pendente lite between the date of the Special Master’s Report and today’s date.

13. WIFE’s claim for ongoing alimony is denied.

14. The claim for counsel fees, costs and expenses is respectfully denied.

15. The parties shall be equally responsible for the Special Master’s fees in this matter except as otherwise stated.

16. The parties shall cooperate in executing any required documents to effectuate the scheme of distribution in this matter.

BY THE COURT:

BRADFORD H. CHARLES, J.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION – FAMILY LAW NO. 2012-20676

JOHN M. GOGETS

v.

TANYA G. GOGETS

APPEARANCES:

Nora Blair, Esquire For John M. Gogets

Harry W. Fenton, Esquire For Tanya G. Gogets

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., November 17, 2015

Before us are Exceptions filed by John M. Gogets (hereafter “HUSBAND”) to the Recommendations of a Special Master in Divorce. While we will address all of HUSBAND’s exceptions, particular attention will be paid to two issues that were emphasized at argument and that are of particular concern to the Court:

(1) Whether HUSBAND should be required to pay a portion of the student loans incurred by Tanya G. Gogets (hereafter “WIFE”)? and

(2) Whether HUSBAND should be required to pay alimony to WIFE?

For reasons we will articulate in more detail within the body of this Opinion, we cannot affirm the Special Master on both of these key issues; we will find in favor of WIFE with respect to the first and in favor of HUSBAND with respect to the second.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 17, 2012, HUSBAND filed a Complaint in Divorce. WIFE filed a Petition requesting equitable distribution, counsel fees, alimony and alimony pendente lite on September 27, 2012. Thereafter, the parties’ divorce dispute remained dormant.

On January 21, 2015, HUSBAND filed a Motion seeking the appointment of a Special Master. On January 29, 2015, Attorney Loreen Burkett was appointed as Special Master. A hearing before Special Master Burkett (SM) was conducted on April 28, 2015. After receiving Briefs from both sides, SM filed a forty-four page report with accompanying recommendations on August 17, 2015.

HUSBAND filed Exceptions to the Recommendation of SM. HUSBAND raised the following issues:

(1) Whether SM erred by requiring HUSBAND to pay a portion of WIFE’s student loans?

(2) Whether SM erred in using the trade-in value for WIFE’s vehicle but not those possessed by HUSBAND?

(3) Whether SM erred by not including post-separation earnings in her valuation of WIFE’s retirement?

(4) Whether SM erred in awarding WIFE a larger percentage of the martial estate?

(5) Whether SM erred in determining the separation date?

(6) Whether SM erred in awarding alimony?

Following HUSBAND’s Exceptions, WIFE filed Counter-Exceptions on September 8, 2015. WIFE alleged that SM erred by not affording her enough alimony.

Both parties have filed Briefs in support of their respective positions. All issues outlined above are now ripe for disposition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

HUSBAND and WIFE were married on August 7, 1993. (SM Finding of Fact 3). This was the first marriage for both parties. (SM Finding of Fact 7). Three children were born to the marriage. The oldest two children are now emancipated and are serving this country in the United States Military. (SM Findings of Fact 8-10). The parties’ youngest son is sixteen and attends high school. (SM Finding of Fact 9).

The parties’ sixteen-year-old son currently lives with WIFE. However, custody litigation is pending. A pre-trial conference was conducted before this Jurist on September 23, 2015. A custody hearing has not yet been scheduled, but it is not expected to take place until early 2016.

A dispute exists with respect to the date of separation. In the fall of 2011, WIFE took a medical leave from her job and left to care for her parents in Tennessee. (SM Finding of Fact 14). When she returned, HUSBAND moved into the basement of the marital residence. (SM Finding of Fact 16). However, WIFE testified that she did not consider her marriage to be over when HUSBAND moved to the basement, but she did not want to sleep with him because he was sleeping with other women. (SM Finding of Fact 19). During the period when the parties lived in separate bedrooms, they attended marriage counseling. (SM Finding of Fact 21). Eventually, HUSBAND moved out of the marital residence in July of 2012. (SM Finding of Fact 28).

HUSBAND is forty-six years of age. (SM Finding of Fact 4). He has an Associate’s Degree. (SM Finding of Fact 37). He works for Harrisburg Property Services caring for electrical and fire systems. (SM Finding of Fact 58). His earnings for the past four years were as follows: $65,069.00 in 2011, $72,868.00 in 2012, $64,009.00 in 2013 and $64,775.00 in 2014. (SM Findings of Fact 61-64). At the time of the hearing before SM, HUSBAND was paying $1,157.46 per month in child support. (SM Finding of Fact 70). According to records of the Domestic Relations Office, HUSBAND’s child support was lowered after the parties’ middle child became emancipated. He now pays $696.45 per month.

WIFE is forty-one years of age. (SM Finding of Fact 5). She has attended the University of Phoenix, the Harrisburg Area Community College and Penn State University. (SM Finding of Fact 39). Her goal is to obtain a Bachelor of Science Degree in healthcare administration. (SM Finding of Fact 38). She hopes to obtain this degree in October of 2017. (SM Finding of Fact 45). Currently, WIFE is employed at the Veteran’s Administration. In 2013, WIFE earned $35,700.00. In 2014, she earned $32,708.00. The SM determined that once WIFE obtains her degree, she will be eligible for a promotion that would increase her wages. (SM Finding of Fact 49).

During the marriage, both parties worked and both parties divided household chores. (SM Findings of Fact 54-56). Generally speaking, HUSBAND worked during the day and WIFE worked during the evening, and so both shared childcare responsibilities. (SM Findings of Fact 56-57).

During the marriage, the parties lived beyond their means. In 2010, they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. (SM Finding of Fact 87). Eventually, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy was dismissed and a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was initiated. (SM Finding of Fact 88). A Chapter 7 bankruptcy was then awarded. Most of the parties’ debt was discharged as a result of that bankruptcy.

Despite the 2010 bankruptcy, both debts and assets existed that had to be divided. We will not include a summary of all of the debts and assets that were found to exist by the SM. To the extent necessary, we incorporate by reference the SM’s discussion regarding debts and assets. Also to the extent necessary, we will address specific assets and specific debts as needed to resolve the parties’ exceptions.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Student Debt

During the marriage, WIFE accumulated student loans of nearly $50,000.00. The SM declared these loans to be marital debts and apportioned them equally between the parties. Under the SM’s distribution scheme, HUSBAND will be required to pay four equal payments of $6,200.00 over the next twenty months. HUSBAND argues that only WIFE will benefit in the future from these loans and she should be exclusively responsible to repay them.

Both parties have cited and relied upon the case of Hicks v. Kubit, 758 A.2d 202 (Pa.Super. 2000). Language can be found in Hicks which supports the positions proffered by both sides. In Hicks, the Pennsylvania Superior Court clearly held that student loans incurred during a marriage must be considered marital debt. On the other hand, the Superior Court recognized that student loans ordinarily will benefit only one party. The Court ruled that this is a factor that must be considered by a Trial Court when determining whether or how to apportion responsibility to satisfy the marital debt. Specifically, the Superior Court stated:

Relying on this Court’s decision in Litmans v. Litmans, 449 Pa.Super. 2009, 673 A.2d 382 (1996), she contends that the point in time at which the debt is incurred determines whether it is marital or otherwise, and, since $30,776.00 was borrowed during the marriage, that whole amount is marital debt. She is indeed correct in asserting that case authority supports her position…The trial court erred in so far as it characterized the debt as non-marital on the basis of how the loan proceeds were expended…

[N]omenclature does not determine the ultimate distribution of either assets or liabilities. Rather, that decision is to be based on the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the debt or asset, along with all other factors relevant to fashioning a just distribution…

Id. at 204, 205 (internal citations omitted).

At some point during their marriage, the Gogets family determined that it would be in the best interest of the family that WIFE return to school. No credible testimony was presented that WIFE’s student loans were incurred unilaterally or against the wishes of HUSBAND. While it may turn out that WIFE will benefit primarily from the education she receives, we cannot ignore the fact that HUSBAND has and will continue to benefit collaterally. For example, it is likely that the decision of the SM – and ours also – with respect to alimony would have been far different had it not been anticipated that WIFE would obtain her degree and a correspondingly increased earning capacity within the next two years. Without WIFE’s education, and the student debt that paid for it, HUSBAND could have been required to pay alimony of a greater amount and for a longer duration.

In 2010, almost all of the parties’ debt was discharged by bankruptcy. Other than WIFE’s student loans, very little in marital debt is left to divide. The primary asset awarded to WIFE was liquidated by her during the pendency of the divorce in order to pay living expenses and litigation costs. Moreover, the primary asset accumulated by HUSBAND was his pension, and that will be divided by a QDRO that does not afford WIFE with any immediate compensation in the form of cash or tangible assets. Given that HUSBAND earns almost twice WIFE’s current salary, apportioning the entire responsibility upon her to pay the primary remaining marital responsibility would not effectuate economic justice.

For all of the above reasons, and for all of the reasons articulated by the SM in her report, we will deny HUSBAND’s exception with respect to the student loan apportionment. However, we will modify the manner by which HUSBAND will be required to pay said amount.

The obligation to repay student loans is deferred by law during the period of time when a student remains in school. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1078(7)(A) (stating that repayment “shall begin the day after 6 months after the date the student ceases to carry at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload.”). In order to complete her education, WIFE will be required to return to classes and remain there until her anticipated graduation in October of 2017. During this period of time, WIFE’s obligation to repay her student debt will be deferred. Therefore, we perceive no immediate need for HUSBAND to contribute monies over the next twenty months toward WIFE’s student loan debt.

In addition to the above, the parties’ youngest child is now sixteen. At this point in time, HUSBAND is required to pay WIFE the sum of $696.46 per month in child support. When the parties’ youngest son is emancipated, FATHER’s child support obligation will cease. At that point in time, HUSBAND will have more cash available to help WIFE repay her student loan debt.

Given all of the above, we will affirm the SM’s decision that requires HUSBAND to repay the sum of $24,800.00 to WIFE. However, we will defer HUSBAND’s payment obligation until November of 2017. At that point in time, HUSBAND will be required to pay $1,040.00 per month to WIFE for a period of twenty-seven months, which will satisfy his obligation to pay his marital share of WIFE’s student debt plus interest.

B. Vehicle Valuation

HUSBAND argues that the SM was inconsistent in using private sale values for HUSBAND’s vehicle and the trade-in value for the one vehicle possessed by WIFE. In his Brief, HUSBAND points almost exclusively to the testimony and evidence he presented and argues that the SM erred by not adopting it.

The record is clear that WIFE possessed a 2005 Chrysler Pacifica during the marriage. In 2013, she traded in her eight-year-old vehicle and received $4,000.00 for it. The SM implicitly determined that WIFE was not attempting to devalue a marital asset or otherwise deprive HUSBAND of an asset to which he was entitled. The SM therefore determined that the amount WIFE received for the Pacifica vehicle of $4,000.00 was an appropriate amount. We see no reason to challenge this finding.

With respect to the Ford Ranger, Ford Focus and Honda motorcycles possessed by HUSBAND, the SM afforded an aggregate value for all three of these vehicles of $12,336.00. These figures were not drawn out of thin air. They were based upon Kelly Blue Book values that were presented. (See Exh. 22). Once again, we see no reason to disturb the finding of the SM with respect to HUSBAND’s vehicles.

C. Increase in Retirement Accounts

HUSBAND complains that the SM included post-separation earnings on HUSBAND’s retirement account while eschewing consideration of hypothetical earnings that could have been received by WIFE had she not liquidated her retirement accounts. While HUSBAND’s characterization of the SM’s decision is essentially accurate, his argument that the SM acted either unintentionally or unfairly is not.

In her Report, the SM specifically addressed HUSBAND’s argument requesting a “presumed rate of return.” The SM stated:

It is undisputed that Wife cashed in her Fidelity IRA and her retirements after the separation in order to continue to provide for herself. Wife testified that she had lost her job and had no other means by which to support herself. Husband has requested that the value of Wife’s retirements be offset against the value of his retirements in order to determine a net value of his retirements from the date of separation forward.

Husband has suggested that the presumed rate of return on Wife’s accounts be subtracted from the rate of return on his 401(k) in order to equalize the value of his 401(k). However, Husband was responsible for a great deal of dissipation of marital assets, including the fact that he did not pay the mortgage on the marital residence for several months, unbeknownst to Wife, who continued to place her pay into the parties’ joint account, believing that Husband was managing their joint finances. Ultimately, the residence was foreclosed upon. It is understood that Wife left the marital residence prior to the foreclosure, and that Husband was residing in the residence up until the date of foreclosure, but there is no doubt that Husband was responsible for dissipation of this asset just prior to the parties’ separation. Had Husband not dissipated this asset, and had he not been irresponsible with the parties’ income, it is unlikely that Wife would have been placed in a position to have been forced to cash in her retirement accounts to make ends meet. Therefore, the Special Master will not add any speculative returns to Wife’s retirement accounts.

(SM Report at 21).

We adopt the language of the SM quoted above as our own. As a result of the conduct of HUSBAND as outlined above, and because of the normal financial stress that always accompanies separation, WIFE was forced to cash in her retirement accounts. We will not chastise her for doing so, and we will not reward HUSBAND for the role he played in placing WIFE in her position of financial stress.

We are well aware that marital fault is not a factor to be considered in equitable distribution. Nevertheless, we can and must consider HUSBAND’s conduct in dissipating assets. Moreover, as the Superior Court declared, “One of our goals with respect to equitable distribution must be to treat different individuals with differing circumstances in a fashion so as to equate them to one another as nearly as possible.” Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369 (Pa.Super. 1990).

It is hornbook law that courts may consider different assets differently in order to effectuate economic justice between the parties. Cerny v. Cerny, 656 A.2d 507 (Pa.Super. 1995); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102. In this case, economic justice requires us to affirm the decision of the SM to reject HUSBAND’s request to award a presumed rate of return.

D. Distribution Percentage

The SM awarded sixty percent of marital assets to WIFE and forty percent of marital assets to HUSBAND, and she allotted seven pages of her Report to justifying the 60-40 split. The SM summarized her decision regarding distribution of assets at pages 29 and 30 of her Report:

In considering all of the relevant factors under the Divorce Code, the Special Master has determined that an award of sixty percent (60%) of the martial assets to Wife and forty percent (40%) of the marital assets to Husband is an appropriate scheme of distribution in this matter. In making that determination, the Special Master considered the long duration of the parties’ marriage, the relatively young ages of the parties, the fact that Wife has been attempting to increase her earning capacity, and the higher income of Husband, as well as the greater assets which he has established through his employment. Further, the Special Master considered the fact that Husband did contribute to Wife’s increased education during the marriage. The Special Master considered the fact that Husband will have a greater opportunity for future acquisition of income for the short term until Wife begins to have a greater income through employment at some point within the next few years. The Special Master considered the dissipation by Husband of marital assets, leading to both the bankruptcy and the foreclosure of the marital residence due to his irresponsible handling of marital finances. The Special Master considered the fact that Husband resided in the marital residence for eighteen (18) months rent free. The Special Master considered that there are greater assets set aside to Husband at the present time and that Wife is the custodian of the parties’ minor child.

(SM Report at 29-30).

We have examined the totality of the record, and we agree with the SM’s analysis and decision. Although we will not reiterate everything that the SM said (even though we agree with it), we wish to highlight just a few observations that were of particular importance to us:

Throughout the marriage, HUSBAND has earned consistently and considerably more than WIFE. In 2014, HUSBAND earned almost double what WIFE was able to earn. While we have little doubt that WIFE’s earning capacity will improve when she obtains her Bachelor’s Degree, we nevertheless conclude that the equitable distribution factors relating to earnings, earning capacity and ability to acquire future assets must all be weighed in favor of WIFE.

HUSBAND has non-marital property set aside for his benefit in the form of retirement through the United States Military that WIFE does not.

WIFE has been and continues to be the custodial parent to the parties’ sixteen-year-old son.

The parties were married for an extended period of time.

The primary remaining marital debt – WIFE’s student loan – was divided equally by the SM rather than in accord with the 60-40 distribution of marital assets.

HUSBAND was responsible for dissipating marital assets and was largely responsible for causing the parties’ bankruptcy.

For all of the above reasons, and for all of those that were articulated specifically by the SM, we will affirm the SM’s decision to award sixty percent of marital assets to WIFE. HUSBAND’s exception to this decision will thereby be denied.

E. Separation Date

The SM devoted an entire section of her Report to the question of when HUSBAND and WIFE separated. (See pgs. 17-19 of SM Report). HUSBAND asserts that the date of separation should be designated as occurring in the fall of 2011 when WIFE left the marital residence. WIFE responds that she left the marital residence because her parents became ill and she was needed in Tennessee to provide care and assistance for them. Both parties agree that WIFE eventually returned from Tennessee in order to again use the marital residence as her abode.

The parties expended considerable effort presenting conflicting arguments regarding their date of separation. The SM was present to observe the parties as they provided their conflicting information. In essence, the SM believed WIFE when she said that the date on which the marriage finally came to an end occurred in July of 2012. We will not disturb this credibility finding. We therefore affirm the SM’s decision that the parties separated in July of 2012.

F. Alimony

The SM awarded alimony to WIFE of $300.00 per month for a period of twenty-seven months. In rendering this award, the SM noted: “The amount of alimony awarded would have been higher had Husband not been required to assume responsibility for fifty percent (50%) of Wife’s student loans pursuant to the scheme of distribution.” (SM Report at 39). We agree with the SM that the student loan allocation is a factor to be considered, but we believe the SM did not go far enough in weighing HUSBAND’s obligation to pay half of WIFE’s student loan debt.

In Pennsylvania, alimony has always been recognized to be a “secondary remedy.” See, e.g., Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa.Super. 2004). Therefore, if economic justice can be effectuated through equitable distribution alone, Courts should generally eschew an award of alimony. Id.

We are well aware that marital fault is a factor in calculating alimony. Like the SM, we will weigh the factor of marital fault against HUSBAND. However, marital fault is not the only factor when assessing whether and to what extent alimony must be paid.

Before awarding significant alimony, it is incumbent upon a Court to assess the degree to which alimony is needed by the obligee and how it will affect the obligor. In this case, the SM’s recommendation would require HUSBAND to pay $4,600.00 quarterly toward WIFE’s student loan debt, which equates to $1,150.00 per month. In addition, HUSBAND will be required to pay child support of approximately $700.00 per month for as long as the parties’ son remains in WIFE’s custody. Adding $300.00 per month in alimony on top of these payment obligations would effectively require HUSBAND to set aside for WIFE more than fifty percent of his net income. Given that sixty percent of marital assets will be distributed to WIFE, requiring HUSBAND to pay in excess of $2,000.00 per month to WIFE would not be fair.

The SM placed great weight on the fact that HUSBAND was living with his parents and had few household expenses. However, HUSBAND reported that he was not planning to live with his parents indefinitely and his lawyer represented at oral argument that HUSBAND had indeed moved away from his parents’ house since the date of the hearing. Given HUSBAND’s age, we do not believe that it would be fair to craft a payment obligation for HUSBAND that effectively requires him to remain under the roof of his parents. The practical impact of the SM’s decision would do just that.

From a visceral perspective, forcing HUSBAND to pay $300.00 per month alimony in addition to all of his other obligations strikes us as “piling on.” From a cash flow perspective, we do not perceive that WIFE will need alimony and it will be difficult for HUSBAND to pay it given all of his other obligations. As we consider all of the factors set forth in the Divorce Code, and as we specifically consider the distribution of assets and debts that largely favored WIFE, we do not perceive the secondary remedy of alimony to be either necessary or appropriate.

We are well aware that HUSBAND earns almost double the income of WIFE. In part because of this, we have no desire to require WIFE to repay anything to HUSBAND. We will therefore affirm the SM’s decision to require HUSBAND to pay $300.00 per month from the date of the Special Master’s Report until today’s date. Effective immediately and prospectively only – we will terminate HUSBAND’s requirement to pay any type of spousal support or alimony.

IV. CONCLUSION

At oral argument, HUSBAND’s attorney complained vehemently that the SM’s decision was “extremely favorable” to WIFE. We acknowledge that most of the SM’s findings and conclusions favored WIFE. However, our analysis of everything presented to the SM leads us to agree that a decision largely favoring WIFE is justified in order to effectuate economic justice between the parties.

On the other hand, we simply cannot justify an award of prospective alimony. Simply stated, the equitable distribution scheme crafted by the SM was sufficient to afford economic justice to WIFE, and additional alimony on top of the equitable distribution award simply strikes us as too much.

We will enter an Order today affirming the SM’s decision with the exception of her alimony award. Between the date of the SM’s Report and today’s date, we will affirm the SM’s decision to require that HUSBAND pay $300.00 per month and we will classify that $300.00 per month obligation as alimony pendente lite. Effective today’s date, which will be the date of the parties’ divorce, we will terminate alimony pendente lite and deny ongoing alimony to WIFE.

1) As of the date of the hearing before the SM, HUSBAND was required to pay WIFE in excess of $1,000.00 per month. The figure quoted above is the amount of HUSBAND’s current support order.

2) The SM directed payment of interest at 4%. At this rate, HUSBAND’s portion of the student loan debt will increase to almost $27,000.00 by the time he starts repaying the debt. The extra $40.00 per month to be paid by HUSBAND reflects interest on the unpaid balance. We recognize these figures are not precise, but they roughly effectuate our decision to require HUSBAND to pay $24,800.00 plus 4% per annum interest.

3) The SM valued the Ranger at $6,074.00, the Ford Focus at $3,727.00 and the Honda motorcycle at $2,535.00.

4) The largest marital asset that will be divided is HUSBAND’s pension. HUSBAND will increase the value of that pension with post-separation earnings for years to come, and his retirement will be supplemented by a military pension. In contrast, WIFE liquidated her entire pension after separation simply to have enough money to live. If WIFE is going to be able to have any sort of “seed money” for a retirement of her own, she will need more than fifty percent of the existing value of HUSBAND’s pension. We agree with the SM that WIFE will require sixty percent of the existing value of HUSBAND’s pension if she is going to be able to accumulate enough funds to be able to retire comfortably. Conversely, we see no necessity for HUSBAND to retain more than forty percent of the existing value of his pension given his greater ability to acquire pension monies in the future and given the existence of his military pension.

5) We will classify this as alimony pendente lite.

6) If either party appeals this decision, we would consider a request to extend alimony pendente lite until the conclusion of the appeal.