Judges Opinions, — November 5, 2024 15:20 — 0 Comments

Margaret Alice Rash, v. Patrick Goss Miller

Civil Action-Family Law-Support-Exceptions-Earnings of the Parties-Earning Capacity-Niche Field-Fulltime Job-Deviation-Other Household Income-Payment of Bills by Parents of Party-Childcare Expenses-Effect of Custody Order-Shared Physical Custody

Patrick Goss Miller (“Father”) filed Exceptions to the Order adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Domestic Relations Hearing Officer (“DRHO”) establishing support for the parties’ child. Father asserted that the DRHO erred and/or abused her discretion in calculating the parties’ earnings, failing to deviate from the Guideline support amount based upon support provided by Margaret Alice Rash’s (“Mother’s”) parents and the number of overnights Father had with the child and by including an amount for childcare as part of the Order where family members are available to care for the child.

1. The general rule is that support should be based upon actual earnings.

2. When imposition of earning capacity is appropriate, the court must consider a party’s age, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history and childcare responsibilities.

3. Where both parties piece together part-time jobs in a niche field working with birds of prey which has a seasonal component, the work is not the type that typically generates W-2 compensation by a fulltime employer, the work was performed by the parties prior to their separation and no evidence was presented that either party intentionally was minimizing income, the DRHO appropriately calculated the parties’ incomes.

4. Full-time employment is not predicated solely upon the number of hours a person works.

5. In determining whether someone works on a full-time basis, the court must examine what is considered customary or standard for others similarly situated.

6. Where Father works more than forty (40) hours per week and the income the DRHO calculated for him roughly equates to what most working adults earn in Lebanon County, the DRHO did not err or abuse her discretion by holding Father to a greater than full-time income.

7. Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1910.16-5 provides for deviation from the Guideline support amount for unusual needs and fixed obligations, other household income and parties’ assets and liabilities.

8. In light of the fact that Mother lives with her parents without payment of housing expense or utilities and Mother’s parents purchase items for the child, deviation from the Guideline support amount is appropriate.

9. In determining whether to expect a primary custodial parent to seek childcare, the court must balance factors such as the age and maturity of the child, the availability and adequacy of others who might assist the custodial parent and the adequacy of available financial resources if the parent remains at home to provide care.

10. Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1910.16-6(a) provides that reasonable childcare expenses should be allocated if necessary to maintain employment or appropriate education in pursuit of income.

11. A party is under no obligation to use the other party’s services for daycare when exercising their custodial time.

12. Where Father agreed to use the childcare provider in custody proceedings, the DRHO did not err or abuse her discretion in allocating the cost of childcare between the parties.

13. Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1910.16-4(c)(1) provides that when a child spends forty percent (40%) or more of annual overnights with the obligor, a rebuttable presumption arises that the obligor is entitled to a reduction in the basic support obligation to reflect the increased direct spending for the child during custodial time.

14. In light of the fact that Father had thirty-seven percent (37%) of overnights that is very close to the forty percent (40%) threshold and during a specific period of time had custody that actually exceeded the forty percent (40%) threshold, Father’s physical custody is a factor that should be considered for potential deviation from the recommended Guideline support amount.

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2022-50569, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, November 3, 2023.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION

MARGARET ALICE RASH, : NO. 2022-5-0569

Plaintiff : PACSES NO. 959301831
:

v. :

PATRICK GOSS MILLER, :

Defendant :

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 3^rd day of November 2023, upon consideration of the exceptions filed, and in accordance with the attached Opinion, the Order of this Court is as follows:

This Order shall be effective November 4, 2022.

This is a multiple-step order. The amount of support to be paid by Defendant is $850.00 per month for the period of November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023 for child support for Veronica G. Miller, and $750.00 per month effective January 13, 2023 and $90.00 per month on arrears.

The amount to be paid for each dependent and obligation amount is allocated as follows:

The amount of support to be paid for the period of November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023.

AMOUNT/FREQUENCY OBLIGATION TYPE BENEFICIARY

_$850.00 _/_month_ _child support_ _Veronica G. Miller

_$90.00 _/_month_ _arrears_ _Veronica G. Miller

The amount of support to be paid effective January 13, 2023.

AMOUNT/FREQUENCY OBLIGATION TYPE BENEFICIARY

_$750.00 _/_month_ _child support_ _Veronica G. Miller

_$90.00 _/_month_ _arrears_ _Veronica G. Miller

Arrears are due in full IMMEDIATELY. All terms of this Order are subject to collection and/or enforcement by contempt proceedings, credit bureau reporting, tax refund offset certification, driver’s license revocation, and the freeze and seizure of financial assets. These enforcement/collection mechanisms will not be initiated so long as Obligor does not owe overdue support. Failure to make each payment on time and in full will cause all arrears to become subject to immediate collection by all the means listed above.

The monthly support obligation includes cash medical support in the amount of $250 annually for un-reimbursed medical expenses incurred for each child and/or spouse. Un-reimbursed medical expenses of Obligee or children that exceed $250 annually shall be allocated between the parties. The party seeking allocation of the un-reimbursed medical expenses must provide documentation of the expenses to the other party no later than March 31^st of the following calendar year in which the final medical bill to be allocated was received. The un-reimbursed medical expenses are to be paid as follows: _34_% by Plaintiff and _66_% by Defendant. __X__Plaintiff is to provide medical coverage

_X_ Plaintiff is to provide dental & vision coverage

____Neither party is to provide medical coverage

IT IS ORDERED THAT (ITEMS CHECKED BELOW APPLY):

_____The defendant is ordered to cover the dependent(s) with health care coverage whenever it is available at a reasonable cost which shall be defined as a cost that does not exceed 5% of defendant’s net monthly income and does not exceed 50% of defendants net monthly income when added to the basic child support plus additional expenses.

_____Health care coverage is currently not available at a reasonable cost to defendant. Therefore, plaintiff is ordered to apply for/continuegovernment-sponsored coverage, such as Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). The cost of said coverage shall not exceed 5% of plaintiff’s net monthly income.

_____Health care coverage is currently not available at a reasonable cost to defendant. Therefore, plaintiff is ordered to cover the dependent(s) with health care coverage if it is available at a reasonable cost which shall be defined as a cost that does not exceed 5% of plaintiff’s net income.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

Within 30 days after the entry of this order, the party ordered to provide health care coverage shall provide written proof to the Lebanon County Domestic Relations Office and the other party that medical insurance has been obtained, including insurance cards and any other material necessary to utilize the coverage.

If Health Insurance is currently unavailable to the party/parties ordered to provide it, such proof shall be provided to Lebanon County Domestic Relations within 7 days of the date of this order.

If Health Insurance coverage is now available or becomes available to the party/parties ordered to provide it, the party/parties shall provide proof of the cost to Lebanon County Domestic Relations within 7 days of the date of availability.

D. ___X__DEFENDANT _____PLAINTIFF SHALL PAY THE FOLLOWING FEES:

FEE TOTAL FEE DESCRIPTION PAYMENT FREQUENCY

__$40.25 _/_ONCE _JCS FEE___ Previously Taxed or Paid

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

_____All other provisions from the court order dated ___, not affected by this order, shall remain in full force and effect.

Any money collected pursuant to this Order shall be paid by Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s assignee, or as designated, by other Order of Court. Said money to be turned over by the Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s assignee, or as designated, by other Order of Court.

Within thirty (30) days after the entry of this Order, the party or parties providing insurance shall submit to the person having custody of the child(ren) written proof that medical insurance coverage has been obtained or that application for coverage has been made. Proof of coverage shall consist, at a minimum, of: 1) the name of the health care coverage provider(s); 2) any applicable identification numbers; 3) any cards evidencing coverage; 4) the address to which claims should be made; 5) a description of any restrictions on usage, such as prior approval for hospital admissions, and the manner of obtaining approval; 6) a copy of the benefit booklet or coverage contract; 7) a description of all deductibles and co-payments; and 8) five copies of any claim forms.

Payments must be made by check or money order. All checks and money orders must be made payable to Pennsylvania State Collection & Disbursement Unit and mailed to P.O. Box 69110, Harrisburg, PA 17106-9110. Each payment must bear your social security number and member number in order to be processed.

IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE

PARTIES MUST WITHIN SEVEN DAYS INFORM THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION AND THE OTHER PARTIES, IN WRITING, OF ANY MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES RELEVANT TO THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUPPORT ORDER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, LOSS OR CHANGE OF INCOME OR EMPLOYMENT AND CHANGE OF PERSONAL ADDRESS OR CHANGE OF ADDRESS OF ANY CHILD RECEIVING SUPPORT. A PARTY WHO WILLFULLY FAILS TO REPORT A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE ADJUDGED IN CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND MAY BE FINED OR IMPRISONED.

PENNSYLVANIA LAW PROVIDES THAT ALL SUPPORT ORDERS SHALL BE REVIEWED AT LEAST ONCE EVERY THREE (3) YEARS IF SUCH REVIEW IS REQUESTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES. IF YOU WISH TO REQUEST A REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF YOUR ORDER, YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING: CALL YOUR ATTORNEY. AN UNREPRESENTED PERSON WHO WANTS TO MODIFY (ADJUST) A SUPPORT ORDER SHOULD CONTACT THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION.

ALL CHARGING ORDERS FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, INCLUDING UNALLOCATED ORDERS FOR CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT OR CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, SHALL TERMINATE UPON DEATH OF THE PAYEE.

A MANDATORY INCOME ATTACHMENT WILL ISSUE UNLESS THE DEFENDANT IS NOT IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN ONE MONTH’S SUPPORT OBLIGATION AND (1) THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS GOOD CAUSE NOT TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE INCOME WITHHOLDING; OR (2) A WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENT.

UNPAID ARREARS BALANCES MAY BE REPORTED TO CREDIT AGENCIES. ON AND AFTER THE DATE IT IS DUE, EACH UNPAID SUPPORT PAYMENT SHALL CONSTITUTE, BY OPERATRION OF LAW, A JUDGEMENT AGAINST YOU, AS WELL AS A LIEN AGAINST REAL PROPERTY.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon payer’s failure to comply with this order, payer may be arrested and brought before the Court for a Contempt hearing; payer’s wages, salary, commissions, and/or income may be attached in accordance with law; this Order will be increased without further hearing by 10 % a month until all arrearages are paid in full. Defendant is responsible for court costs and fees.

BY THE COURT:

BRADFORD H. CHARLES

BHC/tjb

cc: Domestic Relations

Alexis M. Miloszewski, Esq. C/O James Smith Dietterick// 11 E. Chocolate Ave., STE. 300, Hershey PA 17033

Matthew Kopecki, Esq. C/O Bentley, Gibson, Kopecki// 1118 Penn Ave. Wyomissing PA 19610

Margaret A. Rash// 1310 King Arthur Dr., Mechanicsburg PA 17050

Patrick G. Miller// 1415 Sandhill Rd., Lebanon PA 17046

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION

MARGARET ALICE RASH, : NO. 2022-5-0569

Plaintiff : PACSES NO. 959301831
:

v. :

PATRICK GOSS MILLER, :

Defendant :

APPEARANCES

Matthew S. Kopecki, Esq. For Plaintiff

Alexis Miloszewski, Esq. For Defendant

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., November 3, 2023

This is a child support dispute that implicates several issues:

Did the Domestic Relations Hearing Officer (DRHO) err in her determinations of the parties’ earning capacities?
What constitutes full-time employment?
Should a support litigant be entitled to downward deviation if the other party is living with, and being supported by, his/her parents?
Whether childcare expenses should be included in the support order if the parties have extended family members who are willing to provide childcare?
How many overnights must a parent spend with a child to trigger a shared custody support reduction?
Was the child support order excessive?
Did the DRHO properly assess the credibility of the parties?

For reasons that we will articulate in more detail below, we will reject most of the arguments of Patrick Miller (hereafter “FATHER”). However, FATHER’s arguments pertaining to two issues have resonated. Therefore, we will employ a deviation analysis under Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16.5.

I. FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

FATHER and Margaret Rash (hereafter “MOTHER”) are the parents of one child, V.G.M, who is 3 years old. FATHER and MOTHER share legal and physical custody. The parties were never married.

MOTHER filed a Complaint for Child Support on November 4, 2022. MOTHER appealed and a hearing was held before the DRHO on March 23, 2003. The DRHO issued her Recommendations on June 5, 2023. FATHER filed timely Exceptions on June 27, 2023.

MOTHER and FATHER both have specialized careers working with birds of prey. FATHER is employed by Refreshing Mountain Camp, and he owns two businesses, Miller Wildlife and Palmyra Plow Service. He also works part-time for the Hershey Falconry Experience. FATHER earned a net income of $2,763.01 per month from Refreshing Mountain Camp. In addition, FATHER also earned $12,394.30 annually from the Hershey Falcon Experience, and a profit of approximately $6,900.00 per year from Miller Wildlife. Palmyra Plow Service did not produce appreciable income due to a mild Winter. MOTHER earned a net income of $1,398.14 per month from Zoo America-Hershey Park. She also works at Hershey Falcon Experience and earned an annual income of $8,347.34 in 2022.

The DRHO considered all information presented and issued findings and a recommendation on June 5, 2023. The DRHO recommended that FATHER pay $1,087.00 per month in Child Support for the period from November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023, and $907.29 per month effective January 13, 2023.

FATHER filed thirteen (13) Exceptions to the DRHO Recommendations:

That the DRHO erred in determining MOTHER’s income for support purposes, as she is qualified to earn substantially more income than was attributed to her;
That the DRHO erred in determining that MOTHER does not have a more substantial earning capacity, given her educational background, work history, and availability to work full-time;
That the DRHO erred in determining that MOTHER does not have a more substantial earning capacity, given that MOTHER has not exerted substantial good faith efforts in finding full-time employment, nor has she availed herself of additional work hours through her part-time employment opportunities;
That the DRHO erred in determining that FATHER’s earning capacity at Refreshing Mountain;
That the DRHO erred in determining that FATHER’s earning capacity at Miller’s Wildlife;
That the DRHO erred in determining that FATHER’s earning capacity at Hershey Falconry Experience;
That the DRHO erred in determining that FATHER’s income for support is consistent with full-time work hours while also concluding that MOTHER’s income is consistent with part-time work hours;
That the DRHO erred in failing to deviate from Basic Child Support obligation in FATHER’s favor since MOTHER is living with her parents, who provide most of MOETHER’s household and personal expenses, as well as providing for the needs of the child;
That the DRHO erred by including childcare expenses and failing to consider that MOTHER enrolled the child in daycare over FATHER’s clear objection and when FATHER’s family and MOTHER’s family were otherwise available to provide childcare;
That the DRHO erred in determining that FATHER should not be awarded an adjustment for shared physical custody for the period of November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023;
That the DRHO erred in recommending that child support be paid for the period of November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023, in the sum of $1,087.02 per month, as such amount is excessive;
That the DRHO erred in recommending that child support be paid for the period of January 13, 2023 through the present, in the sum of $907.23 per month, as such amount is excessive;
That the DRHO erred in determining that MOTHER’s testimony was more credible than FATHER’s testimony.

We will address each of FATHER’s issues below. Because some of FATHER’s issues are related, we will address them together.

II. DISCUSSION

Earning Capacity

FATHER’s first six Exceptions are issues related to the DRHO’s calculations of MOTHER and FATHER’s earning capabilities. Most often, earning capacity equals actual income. The general rule is that support should be based upon actual earnings. Citing the Pennsylvania Superior Court case Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 246 (Pa.Super. 2002), we have stated:

“As a general rule, a person’s earnings are the benchmark by which support is gauged…Thus, absent unusual circumstances, we will not base an obligor’s support obligation upon artificially high amount that exceeds his or her actual income.” Feudale v. Regus, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2009-5-0087 (September 7, 2010).

Many factors must be considered in assessing earning capacity. When an earning capacity is appropriate, it must be determined based upon all of the factors set forth in the Support Guidelines, and not just upon a party’s former income. In Seibert v. Gosnell, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2010-5-0630 (August 15, 2011), we stated:

“Pennsylvania’s Support Guidelines relative to earning capacity state: “Age, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history and childcare responsibilities are factors which shall be considered in determining earning capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be assessed, the trier of fact must state the reasons for the assessment in writing…” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4). On multiple occasions in multiple contexts, we have repeatedly rejected an approach that simply declares: “The Defendant formerly earned X amount. Because the Defendant should still be employed at that location, his earning capacity will be deemed X.” At the risk of appearing obstinate but with the desire to promote consistency, we will once again issue an Opinion that will require a comprehensive analysis of earning capacity instead of a simplistic “this is your earning capacity because this is what you formerly earned” approach.”

FATHER argued that MOTHER should have been assigned a full-time earning capacity because she is young, in good health, has a bachelor’s degree, and she has considerable experience in her field. He also contended that she formerly worked full time as a veterinary technician, and she has not attempted to secure that opportunity again. FATHER averred that MOTHER testified that she turned down full-time employment from Zoo America. FATHER believes that the DRHO should have concluded that MOTHER deliberately minimized her income, because she presented no evidence of barriers to her working full-time.

MOTHER provided evidence that she is employed at Zoo America two full days per week plus some extra hours during the week. She stated that she also worked for the Hershey Falconry Experience one to three days a week, depending on the weather, and that between the two jobs she works nearly every day, and a minimum of 30 hours a week. MOTHER argued that FATHER misconstrued her prior employment as a veterinary technician, and that she would have to work overnight shifts to earn what FATHER claims that she could be earning at that job. She also pointed out that she can no longer work for Miller Wildlife, which would have been a third source of income in her specialized field. MOTHER noted that she testified that she has not worked full-time since their child was born.

FATHER implied that MOTHER needs to “get a real job”, instead of continuing to piece together part-time jobs in her very niche field. He could just as easily come to the same conclusion about his own situation. Both parties’ chosen career paths mirror each other very closely. We do not find that FATHER has given any compelling reasons why MOTHER should make compromises in her career, and he should not. FATHER’s description of MOTHER being, young, healthy, having a bachelor’s degree, and considerable experience in the field, also describes him.

We agree with the DRHO’s assessment of the parties’ work situation:

“Both parties in this case work in a highly specialized niche field- caring for birds of prey and presenting educational events about birds of prey. The work has a seasonal component and does not lend itself to full-time positions being available. As a result, each party’s income comes from more than one part-time source. During the course of the hearing each party seemed to be arguing that the other party should be held to a greater/full-time earning capacity. The Hearing Officer rejects this argument from both sides. Both parties were doing this type of work with multiple part-time income sources when they were an intact household; this is nothing new for them. Additionally, there was no evidence that either party was intentionally minimizing or reducing his/her income.” (DRHO Recommendations at pg. 4).

We do not find that the DRHO erred in her determination of MOTHER’s earning capacity.

We will next examine FATHER’s claims that his income was incorrectly calculated by the DRHO. FATHER claimed that the DRHO incorrectly calculated his income from Refreshing Mountain, Miller Wildlife, and the Hershey Falconry Experience. Because there are some nuances with each employment situation, we will examine them separately.

FATHER was originally a 1099 contractor with Refreshing Mountain. He subsequently accepted part-time W-2 employment with the same company in January 2023, doing essentially the same job, working with birds of prey. FATHER insisted that he testified that he works for Refreshing Mountain 20-25 hours bi-weekly, but the DRHO concluded based upon documents presented that FATHER was working 20-25 hours weekly, or 43.7 hours bi-weekly.

FATHER testified that he worked 20-25 hours bi-weekly. He also stated that there was the potential that he may be doing additional duties at Refreshing Mountain, which would give him more hours. (N.T. at pp. 32-33; 35). FATHER submitted four (4) paystubs from Refreshing Mountain, with pay periods covering January 16, 2023 to March 12, 2023. (Ex. 11). There was a fluctuation in his hours with each paycheck (we assume that is due to weather conditions). FATHER averaged 37.61 hours bi-weekly in that time period. The calculation by the DRHO of 43.7 hours bi-weekly was based on FATHER’s 1099 from 2022. He showed an income of $24,977.53, and he billed Refreshing Mountain at $22 per hour. That would reflect 1,135.34 hours per year. The DRHO took that same number of hours to estimate FATHER’s earnings for 2023^[1]. FATHER is making $20.00 as an employee of Refreshing Mountain, and the DRHO wage income estimate for FATHER was $22,706.80. This Court does not agree with FATHER that DRHO erred in her conclusions of FATHER’s earning capacity from Refreshing Mountain.

As it relates to Miller Wildlife, FATHER reported a loss. The DRHO assigned FATHER an earning capacity of $6,403.12 from 2022 income and expenses. FATHER averred that the DRHO used income from Refreshing Mountain, so that the W-2 income from Miller Wildlife and the 1099 income received from Refreshing Mountain are essentially the same income that is being doubly counted in determining support.

MOTHER argued that the DRHO specifically stated that she removed the money received on the Refreshing Mountain 1099, which left $12,530.72 as income specifically from Miller Wildlife. She asserted that the DRHO estimated an annual profit of $6,403.12 for Miller Wildlife.

FATHER estimated that he had a loss of $1,600.00 for the first three months of 2023. (Ex. 10). However, he testified that January and February are historically slow months because schools don’t schedule presentations at that time. When FATHER was asked the question, “You are keeping the business alive because you anticipate that you will make a profit?”, FATHER responded by saying: “Right”. (N.T. at pp. 43-44).

The DRHO determined FATHER’s earning capacity by stating:

“He provided a profit and loss statement for 2022 (Ex. 9) showing gross receipts of $37,508.25. Backing out the money he received on the Refreshing Mountain 1099, his projected gross receipts going forward are $12,530.72 annually. Refreshing Mountain accounted for two-thirds of his revenue. For estimation purposes, one-third of his reported expenses of $18,382.79 (or $6,127.60) will be subtracted from the projected gross receipts of $12,530.72 to give an estimated annual profit of $6,403.12.” (DRHO Recommendations at pg. 4b).

These conclusions are supported by the record and we will not disturb them.

FATHER argued that the DRHO should have assigned the same earning capacity for the Hershey Falconry Experience to FATHER and MOTHER because they both have the same number of hours available to them to work there, but MOTHER declines to work more hours. This is basically a recycling of his contention above that we rejected, that MOTHER should be working more.^[2]

As we review the totality of the record before this Court, we reach the conclusion that the DRHO did a commendable job wading through a confusing confluence of documents and arguments. Both parties possess a unique skillset that is not of the type that typically generates W-2 compensation from a full-time employer. The DRHO did not believe that either party intentionally reduced hours or minimized income in an effort to affect a child support calculation. Neither do we. Therefore, we will accept the findings of the DRHO that were predicated largely upon actual documented earnings. FATHER’s exceptions regarding the income and earning capacity conclusions of the DRHO will therefore be denied.

Full-Time Versus Part-Time Work Hours

In Keller v. Young, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2008-5-0598 (April 4, 2012), we addressed the question “What constitutes full-time employment?” In Keller, a mother worked an average of 35.85 hours per week as a dental technician. Father argued that we should prorate Mother’s income to a 40-hour work week and give her an earning capacity based upon that 40-hour work week calculation. We rejected this argument and stated:

“We were not able to locate any appellate decision that defined full-time employment within a child support dispute. However, Courts have been required to discern the meaning of “full-time employment” within other contexts. For example, in an unemployment compensation context, the Commonwealth Court stated the following:

“The term “full-time work” is undefined in the law. Part-time work is defined, however, in [34 Pa. Code § 63.35(a)] as “work other than normal full-time work of a claimant with a regular base-year employer which is ordinarily performed for less than the total number of hours or days customarily worked in the business, occupation or industry.” In applying this definition, we are required to look to the individual circumstances of the claimant’s employment, rather than focus on the number of hours worked.” Baldwin-Whitehall School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 848 A.2d 1021 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004).

Unlike Pennsylvania, the Federal government does look at hours worked per week in determining full-time employment. For statistical purposes, anyone working 35 hours per week or more is considered to be a “full-time worker.” The United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (March 28, 2012) at www.census.gov/spc. The Bureau of Labor Statistics similarly uses 35 hours per week as the line of demarcation between full-time workers and part-time workers. See United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Glossaryat www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm#F.

Generally, when a phrase such as “full-time employment” is not specifically defined by statute or by appellate precedent, the ordinary English language meaning of the words must be applied. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903. Within the Random House Dictionary of the English language, we located a definition of full-time employment as: “Working or operating the customary number of hours each week, day or month.” Similarly, the Miriam-Webster online dictionary defines full-time employment as “The amount of time considered the normal or standard amount for working during a given period.” See www.miriam-webster.com/dictionary.

From the above, we reach the following conclusions:

Full-time employment is not predicated solely upon the number of hours a person works.
In determining whether someone works on a full-time basis, the Court must examine what is considered “customary or standard” for others similarly situated.
Whether the employer considers the employee to be “full-time” is a factor that must be afforded great weight.
Even if hours per week are used as the barometer for full-time employment, 35 hours per week appears to be the line of demarcation between full and part-time employment.”

FATHER asserted that an award of support must be fair and consistent with the circumstances of the parties. Strawn v. Strawn, 664 A.2d 129 (Pa.Super 1995) (citing Myers v. Myers, 592 A.2d 390, 395 (Pa.Super 1991)). FATHER argued that earning capacities should not exceed the amount the party can earn from one full-time position. Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-2(d)(4).

FATHER posited that the DRHO erred by concluding that he has a “greater” than full-time earning capacity. MOTHER noted that the DRHO used the actual income of the parties in determining the Child Support Order.

This Court agrees with MOTHER that the DRHO’s calculations for Child Support Order are based largely on actual income determinations. As stated above, the DRHO recognized the unique aspects of the parties’ profession, specifically that they work in a specialized field with a seasonal component, and that it is not easy to find one full-time job working with birds of prey. Based on the circumstances this Court finds the determinations of income for both parties to be fair and consistent. Strawn, supra.

We do not agree with FATHER’s assertion that the DRHO assigned him a “greater than” full-time income. FATHER testified that that he works more than 40 hours per week. (N.T. 51). Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-2(d)(4) does not require the trier-of-fact to consider the “hours” worked, but that the “amount” of earning capacity should not generally exceed what the party could earn from one full-time position.^[3] The latest U.S. Census determined that the per capita income in Lebanon County from 2017-2021 was $32,226. U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Lebanon County, Pennsylvania. The DRHO determined FATHER’s monthly net income to be $2,763.01, which would be $33,156.12 annually. We find that, by FATHER’s own admission, he is working full-time. Moreover, the DRHO awarded him an earning capacity that roughly equates to what most working adults earn in Lebanon County. This Court denies FATHER’s seventh Exception.

Deviation from the Basic Child Support Obligation

FATHER argued the DRHO should have deviated from the Basic Child Support Obligation in his favor because MOTHER is living with her parents, who provide for her needs and the needs of V.G.M.

In Haag v. Haag, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2016-5-0146 (Aug. 11, 2016), a mother resided with her parents without cost to her or the children. We stated:

“Almost all parents are required to expend money for housing and related expenses. In fact, United States Census Bureau information reveals that the average American family spends roughly 30 percent of income on housing. See www.census.gov. See also, Wall Street Journal Guide “How Much You Should Spend On A Home” found at www.guides.wsj.com. In this case, though, MOTHER has been afforded housing at little or no expense for both herself and the parties’ daughter. So long as this paradigm continues, it constitutes an “unusual” situation. In the parlance of the Support Guidelines, MOTHER has an “unusually” low housing expense, and she has “other income in the household” in the form of her parents’ financial ability to pay housing expenses.”

FATHER asserted that pursuant to Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-1(d),the DRHO must consider factors set forth in Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-5 to determine if there should be a deviation from the Support Guidelines. He argued that unusual needs and fixed obligations may be a factor, Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-5(b)(1), as may other household income Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-5(b)(3), and the parties’ relative assets and liabilities, Pa.C.R.P. 1910-16-5(b)(5). FATHER cites J.P.D. v. W.E.D., 114 A.3d 887 (Pa.Super 2105), in which the Superior Court held that a deviation was warranted where the Father did not have to pay for his own expenses and necessities.

MOTHER testified that she resides with her parents and is not responsible for paying any utilities or the mortgage, and her parents purchase diapers and wipes. FATHER argued that MOTHER only pays for childcare and the child’s clothing, and FATHER supports himself. (N.T. at pp. 13-14).

MOTHER asserted that Pa.R.C.P.1910.16-1(d) dictates that there is a rebuttal presumption that the amount of the award determined from the guidelines is the correct amount of support and should be deviated from only if the DRHO determined the amount from the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. MOTHER argued that the DRHO must consider all relevant factors to decide if there are special needs or circumstances that warrant a deviation from the guidelines. Dicenzo v. Heary, 136 A.3d 1028, (Pa.Super. 2016, Unpub.) citing Susane D. v. Stephen W., 65 A.3d 965 (Pa.Super 2013) and Elias v. Spencer, 673 A.2d 982 (Pa.Super. 1996).

MOTHER posited that it is not unusual for grandparents to assist with the financial needs of grandchildren. She argued that her parents’ help should not be a basis for deviation. MOTHER is correct that many grandparents assist with their grandchildren. However, not every grandparent provides housing and living expenses for their children and grandchildren. It is “unusual” that an adult with a child has the luxury of living without rent or a mortgage in the current inflated housing market. Inflation and the scarcity of properties to buy or rent means that families are spending record amounts for a residence.^[4] We applaud the grandparents in this case for their contributions in making life better for their daughter and grandchild. However, they are saving MOTHER significant expenses, and as with the Mother in Haag, supra, this constitutes an “unusual” situation”. As for MOTHER’s argument that a deviation would decrease FATHER’s duty to support his child, it is true that the amount he would pay in child support would decrease, but that is the purpose of a deviation.

This Court will grant FATHER’s eighth exception. We will deviate from strict compliance with the Child Support Guidelines. We will do so in part because MOTHER is living without significant cost because of the help of her own parents. As we will discuss in Section E infra, we will also deviate because FATHER’s percentage of custody is very close to the 40% threshold that would mandate deviation, and for the period of time between November 4, 2022, and January 12, 2023, FATHER’s periods of custody actually exceeded the 40% threshold. (See, Section F). Our deviation will be set forth in our final Order.

Childcare

FATHER claims that MOTHER made a unilateral decision to place V.G.M in the Goddard School for daycare. He stated that extended family members on both sides of the family were available to provide childcare.

In determining whether to expect a nurturing parent to seek childcare, the trial court must balance factors such as the age and maturity of the child, the availability and adequacy of others who might assist the custodial parent, and the adequacy of available financial resources if the parent does remain at home. Doherty v. Doherty, 859 A.2d 811, 813 (Pa.Super. 2004) citingCommonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400 (Pa.Super. 1977).

Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-6(a)Child Care Expenses, provides the following:

“The trier-of-fact shall allocate reasonable child care expenses paid by the parties, if necessary to maintain employment or appropriate education in pursuit of income. The trier-of-fact may order that the obligor’s share is added to his or her basic support obligation, paid directly to the service provider, or paid directly to the obligee…”

A party is under no obligation to utilize the other party’s services for daycare during their custodial time. Mooney v. Doutt, 766 A.2d 1271 (Pa.Super 2001). In Mooney the Father took issue with the inclusion of daycare expenses, since he was willing and able to provide such services himself. The Superior Court agreed with the trial court that the mother was under no obligation to agree to utilize the father as a daycare provider. Id at 1275.

In the case of Amato v. Amato, 284 A.3d 893 (Table) 2022 WL 3088530(Pa.Super. 2022)^[5], the Father argued that the Court erred by directing Father to pay his proportional share of the child’s daycare expense where Mother enrolled the children over Father’s objection, the parties shared legal custody, and Father’s mother was willing to continue to care of the child at no cost as she has done since the child was born. Mother testified that the child was enrolled in daycare for three days a week and Father did not raise any objection. In Amato, the Court held childcare was a necessity due to the work schedules of the parties. Furthermore, Father did not raise any objection when Mother informed him that the child was enrolled in daycare for three days a week. With respect to paternal grandmother’s ability to provide childcare, the record did not contain any evidence as to her availability and circumstances in which she could care for the child. Accordingly, the Superior Court determined that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Father to pay a portion of the child’s daycare expense.

In Aponte v. Aponte, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2011-5-0209, the parties enjoyed a 50-50 custody arrangement. MOTHER sought childcare expenses even for periods of time when the children were with their father. In addressing this issue, we stated:

“In her report, the DRHO acknowledges that MOTHER seeks reimbursement of childcare expenses for periods during which FATHER actually has physical custody of the children. Despite MOTHER’s assertion in her brief that this is “the norm”, we cannot and will not accept the premise that a father who enjoys equal physical custody of his children should pay unused childcare expenses for the same period of time when he is expending money to care for the children who are in his care.

We are not saying that it will never be appropriate for one parent to reimburse the other for childcare expenses for periods of time when the children are not actually in daycare. However, this is not a scheme that we will lightly approve.”

FATHER averred that the DRHO should not have included childcare expenses in the amount of $486.10 for the first tier of the Order. FATHER objected to the child attending childcare, because the extended family on both sides are available to provide care for V.G.M. (N.T. at pp. 14-15 and pp. 36-37).

MOTHER noted that FATHER signed a Stipulation for Custody that included V.G.M attending the same childcare. MOTHER asserted that a child of two working parents needs childcare. She argued that using childcare two days/week is not unreasonable. MOTHER testified that putting the entire childcare burden on family members would not be fair (N.T. at pp. 15 and 19). Also noted is the fact that a facility like The Goddard School will provide socialization with peers and early childhood education in a way that family members cannot.

FATHER admitted that he agreed to The Goddard School for childcare at the mediation in January 2023 (N.T. 37). The parties have also agreed that they will continue to seek childcare options that are closer to Hershey, so that it would be an equal distance between their houses. FATHER has reached out to see about moving the child to another daycare, but there is no availability for immediate enrollment. (N.T. pg. 11).

Decisions regarding childcare should be addressed in Custody Court. In custody proceedings, courts can assess the suitability of people and entities tasked with providing childcare services, the court can weigh the peculiarities of work and school schedules, as well as the safety of neighborhood environments. As a general rule, when a Custody Court renders a decision regarding childcare, that decision should not be overruled in Child Support Court and a court determining child support must do its best to make the finances work in order to ensure that the Custody Order is followed.

With the above being said, this Court is not naïve. We recognize that issues pertaining to custody and support will often intersect. We also recognize that many, if not most, Custody Orders are silent as to issues pertaining to daycare. Thus, there will be circumstances when a Child Support Court will be required to assess the expense, suitability and availability of childcare options. In such circumstances, a Child Support Court will be required to weigh the resources of the parties, the cost of the proposed program, the benefits of the proposed program to the child, and the availability of other less expensive alternatives. Of course, when weighing these factors, the court will also have to assess the financial ability of both parents to pay what could be a significant childcare expense.

In this case, we are fortunate because a decision regarding childcare was rendered in Custody Court. In fact, everyone acknowledges that FATHER agreed to use the Goddard School as a childcare facility for V.G.M. At least as of the present time, this decision in Custody Court ends the inquiry before us. We will enforce the agreement reached by the parties to use The Goddard School that was addressed before the Custody Conciliator. At least for the foreseeable future, we will include the cost of The Goddard School as part of our Child Support award. We therefore conclude that the DRHO did not err by including childcare expenses in FATHER’s Support Order.^[6]

Substantial Physical Custody

FATHER’s tenth Exception pertains to the DRHO calculation of shared physical custody November 4, 2022, through January 12, 2023. FATHER argued that the DRHO erred in her calculation of the percentage of overnights that V.G.M. spent with FATHER.

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P 1910.16-4(c)(1): “When a child spends 40% or more of the annual overnights with the obligor, a rebuttable presumption arises that the obligor is entitled to a reduction in the basic child support obligation to reflect the obligor’s increased direct spending on the child during the obligor’s custodial time:

(ii) Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2), the trier-of-fact shall calculate the adjustment pursuant to the formula set forth in subdivision (a)(1)(Part D) or (a)(2)(Part II).”

FATHER claimed that it is undisputed that he had custody of V.G.M. six (6) of fourteen (14) overnights from November 4, 2022 through January 12, 2023. FATHER asserted that the DRHO incorrectly calculated FATHER’s custodial period at 37.5%, and it should be 43%, based on evidence (Ex. A). (N.T. at pp. 4-5; Ex. 1-2).

MOTHER insisted that FATHER erroneously calculated that he had the child six of fourteen overnights. She said that the correct numbers are that he had the child five of fourteen nights, and the DRHO percentage is accurate.

The parties stipulated to the Custody Order issued by this Court on January 13, 2022, and that prior to that they were following the Recommendations of Conciliator that was issued on November 7, 2022. FATHER’s Attorney stated that under the latter, FATHER had the child six (6) of fourteen (14) overnights. There was no objection, and the DRHO admitted the documents by stipulation. (N.T. pp. 4-5).^[7]

Under the heading of “Other findings pertinent to decision: (continued)” (DRHO Recommendation at pg. 4a), the DRHO calculated that FATHER had the child 137 overnights, based upon the following:

One uninterrupted week of vacation^[8] 7 days
Friday-Saturday nights every other week (25X3) 75 days
Wednesday and Thursday nights in off week (25X3) 50 days
Alternating holidays 3 days
Night before Father’s Day weekend 1 day
Christmas 1 day

Total 137 days

The DRHO then divided 137 days into 365 days to arrive at an approximation of 37.5%.^[9]

In this case the proper formula for the calculation of the percentage of overnight stays with the child is found in Pa.R.C.P 1910.16-4(a)(1)(Part D). Line 25(a) of that formula states, “Percentage of Time Obligor Spends with Children (divide number of overnights with the obligor by 365 and multiply by 100)”. As seen above, this is exactly the formula that the DRHO employed.

The DRHO obviously expended considerable effort to determine FATHER’s percentage of custody. In doing so, she followed the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4. We cannot and will not declare the DRHO’s analysis of this issue to be erroneous.

With the above having been concluded, we cannot ignore the fact that the DRHO’s calculations result in a percentage that is very close to the 40% threshold established in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c)(1). We also cannot ignore that during one specific period of time for which support was ordered, FATHER’s percentage of custody actually exceeded the 40% threshold. Given these facts, we will consider the relatively expansive nature of FATHER’s physical custody as another factor to be considered in deviating from the formula-driven support amount. Thus, while we will reject FATHER’s exception that seeks to specifically apply a shared custody formula modification, we will consider FATHER’s argument via our decision to deviate from the formula amount.

Child Support Award

FATHER believes that the amount of recommended child support for November 4, 2022, through January 12, 2023, is excessive. He also argues that recommended child support amount from January 13, 2023, and going forward is excessive.

This Court has wide discretion as to the proper amount of child support. Johnson v. Johnson, 153 A.3d 318 (Pa.Super 2016). Child support is awarded pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322, to assure that persons similarly situated are treated similarly. The Guideline is based upon the “reasonable needs” of the child and the ability of the obligor to provide support. The primary emphasis of the Guideline is the net incomes and earning capacities of the parties, making allowable deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as the parties’ assets. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a).

There is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which results from the application of the Guideline is the correct amount of support to be awarded. A written or specific finding on the record that the application of the guideline would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(b).

The cost of raising a child is a function of custom, the child’s needs, and the parents’ financial status. An award of support is intended to provide for more than bare necessities. Sutliff v. Sutliff, 528 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Pa. 1987). A child support order must be fair and non-confiscatory, considering the circumstances of the parties, and must make allowance for the reasonable living expenses of the supporting parent. Fennell v. Fennell, 753 A.2d 866, 868 (Pa.Super. 2000). Stated differently, the Court must consider the reasonable expenses of raising the child, and the respective abilities of the parents to support their child based on the needs, customs, and financial status of the parties, with each party’s ability to pay dependent on that party’s property, income, and earning capacity.

FATHER averred that DRHO incorrectly overestimated his part-time earnings from Refreshing Mountain and the Hershey Falconry Experience. He insisted that his total gross income per year should have been $25,394.30 instead of $41,504.22. MOTHER argued that it is unclear why FATHER asserted that his income is $25,394.30, when the documents that he provided show otherwise.

This Court is unclear why FATHER omits his earnings from Miller Wildlife in his argument. Regardless of his reason, we determined above that the DRHO did not err in her calculations for FATHER’s earning capacity. We deny FATHER’s eleventh and twelfth Exceptions as it pertains to his claim that his income was incorrectly calculated. However, we recognize that a deviation from strict compliance with the Support Guidelines will be necessary as outlined above.

Credibility of Testimony

FATHER argued that the DRHO found MOTHER to be a more credible witness than FATHER. His arguments on this issue incorporate many assertions that he made on other issues above.

In the instant case, a transcript has been prepared. In Lippi v. Lippi, C.P.Leb.Co. No. 2007-5-0676 (May 7, 2013), we described the standard of review to be employed when a transcript of the DRHO hearing has been prepared. We stated:

“Our Superior Court has provided guidance with respect to the scope of review that we should ordinarily employ. In reviewing a DRHO’s report, we must give “fullest consideration” to the credibility findings of the DRHO, who was present to observe the demeanor of witnesses and hear their testimony. Schuback v. Schuback, 603 A.2d 194 (Pa.Super. 1992); Dukmen v. Dukmen, 420 A.2d 667 (Pa.Super. 1980). A DRHO’s report should not be lightly disregarded. Pasternak v. Pasternak, 204 A.2d 290 (Pa.Super. 1964). However, the DRHO’s report is only advisory, and we are not bound by its conclusions. When we have a transcribed record to review, we must consider all of the evidence de novo and make an independent determination of the amount of support due and owing.” Id. (citing Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 689 (Pa.Super. 1956).”

Even in a de novo review, the DRHO’s credibility findings must be given great weight. This Court has frequently cited Smith v. Smith, 43 A.2d 371 (Pa.Super. 1945) with respect to credibility determinations. In Smith, the Superior Court stated:

“Although we are not concluded by a master’s findings upon credibility, his judgment upon that vital factor is entitled to the fullest consideration, and especially in a contested case. He possesses an advantage not granted to us. He sees the parties and their witnesses face to face and observes their appearance and demeanor as they testify. We are restricted to the cold type of the record from which temperament and personality have been subtracted. Yet the demeanor of witnesses is the very touchstone of credibility; in the absence of reactions produced by other applicable tests, the appearance and demeanor of witnesses are the litmus by which the presence of truth is revealed. They are trifles light as air, imponderables, but for all that they are luminous integrants which ineluctably enter into the calculation by which trustworthiness is appraised. The spontaneous gesture, the lifting of an eyebrow, the shrug of the shoulders, the intonation of the voice, the flash of the eye, the facial expression – these are a few of the vital and influential indicia of credibility which the master observes and by which he is guided. The mental and psychological impact of these inarticulate expressions experienced by a master form the basis for a conclusion which, to borrow the telling phrase of an anonymous master, “will depend upon a judgment or intuition more subtle than can be objectively demonstrated.” Frequently, they speak more eloquently and possess greater significance than the verbal utterance which they accompany, yet they cannot be reproduced upon the record submitted to the reviewing court.”

FATHER argued that the DRHO erred in determining that MOTHER’s testimony on the issues of childcare and earning capacity was more credible than FATHER’s testimony. He asserted that there is no support on the record for the DRHO decision. FATHER claimed that the parties testified differently to FATHER’s objection to the Goddard School for V.G.M. FATHER said that he testified that the family could watch V.R.M, and that Goddard School is an unnecessary expense. (N.T. at pg. 15). He insisted that MOTHER’s own testimony reveals that family members are available to watch V.G.M. while the parties are working. He also noted that MOTHER did not dispute his testimony that MOTHER made a unilateral decision to enroll V.G.M. in daycare. (N.T. at pp. 14, 36-37).

FATHER asserted that testimony demonstrated that MOTHER worked more during the parties’ relationship than after they separated. However, he argued that the DRHO failed to include MOTHER’s prior income in her earning capacity calculation. (N.T. at pg. 16).

MOTHER is unclear where the DRHO indicated that she believed MOTHER to be more credible than FATHER. However, she asserted that DRHO is permitted to make credibility determinations. In the Interest of R.M., 120 A.3d 380 (Pa.Super. 2008) citing In the Interest of R.N., 951 A.2d 363 (Pa.Super. 2008).

As stated above, this Court will give the DRHO’s credibility determinations great weight. Just because FATHER did not like the DRHO’s findings of fact or recommendations, does not mean that he can supplant them with his own. In point of fact, the DRHO questioned the positions of BOTH parties at the time of the hearing. The DRHO stated:

“I do think, Counsel, that your client and Ms. Rash are in the same position as each other. For the two clients to come in and say I can do my thing; I have multiple buckets and make my income, but I want the other person to work full time and do something different, I am searching for the word, it strikes me as kind of silly on the part of everybody here to be making that argument back and forth to each other. I will leave it at that. I will look at their whole situation in light of all of the testimony and exhibits.” (N.T. at pg. 51).

Also, as stated above the DRHO came to this conclusion about the parties’ arguments about earning capacities:

“During the course of the hearing each party seemed to be arguing that the other party should be held to a greater/full-time earning capacity. The Hearing Officer rejects this argument from both sides.” (DRHO Recommendations at pg. 4).

To the extent that FATHER is arguing that the DRHO lacked the ability to render a credibility decision, we categorically reject FATHER’s assertion. To the extent that FATHER seeks to challenge the decisions of the DRHO based upon the premise that those decisions were predicated upon non-credible evidence, we also reject that argument. The reality is that the DRHO rendered a difficult decision based upon confusing information. To the extent that the DRHO’s ultimate decision conflicts with FATHER’s perception of reality, so be it. We will deny FATHER’s thirteen exception relating to credibility.

III. CONCLUSION

The term “double standard” is defined as: “A rule or principle which is unfairly applied in different ways to different people.” In this case, the DRHO was clearly frustrated at what she perceived to be an effort by both parties to impose a double standard. Most of the arguments proffered by FATHER that we have addressed in this Opinion fall within this category. As to most of FATHER’s thirteen arguments, we conclude that the DRHO rendered appropriate decisions based upon viable evidence. For all of the reasons outlined above, we reject FATHER’s efforts to apply a double standard.

With the above being said, several of FATHER’s arguments have resonated. Based upon those arguments, we will employ a deviation analysis under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5.

The DRHO applied the Child Support Formula strictly and reached the conclusion that FATHER should pay the sum of $1087.00 per month between November 4, 2022 and January 12, 2023, and $907.29 per month following January 12, 2023. We do not quarrel with the DRHO’s application of the formula. However, we will deviate from it given the circumstances we have articulated in the foregoing Opinion. In the opinion of this Court, a child support award of $850.00 per month between November 4, 2022 and January 12, 2023, and $750.00 per month after January 12, 2023, would be an appropriate award given the formula amounts and the deviation reasons we have relied upon as set forth above.

An Order to effectuate this decision will be entered today’s date.

[1] FATHER did not testify that he would be working less as an employee compared to being a contracted individual for Refreshing Mountain, so it is reasonable to estimate the same number of hours for 2022 and 2023.

[2] FATHER’s W-2 shows that his annual income from the Hershey Falconry Experience was $12,394.30. (Ex. 6). MOTHER’s W-2 shows that her annual income from the Hershey Falconry Experience was $8,347.34. (Ex. 4).

[3] We have recognized a limited exception to this Rule in cases where a parent chooses to create an abnormally high number of children. In cases where a parent creates more than five (5) children, we have sometimes afforded an earning capacity based upon the premise that the parent with more mouths to feed must work harder than normal to provide for the large number of children he or she has chosen to create. This limited exception is not applicable in this case.

[4] By March 2023, housing’s contribution rose to 2.6 percentage points, making up half of annual CPI inflation. For perspective, before the pandemic housing would typically contribute about 1 percentage point to inflation. An Update on Housing Inflation in the Consumer Price Index | CEA | The White House

[5] Amato is a non-precedential decision. We cite it as educational but not authoritative.

[6] If FATHER has changed his mind regarding The Goddard School, and we suspect he has, he will have two options. His first option will be to pursue a change of childcare arrangements in Custody Court. His second option will be to wait until V.G.M. is older so that he could then argue in Support Court that a significant change of circumstances has occurred that would warrant a modification of support.

[7] Admission of a document cannot be equated with a binding stipulation of fact.

[8] MOTHER also had the child for one week of vacation.

[9] The DRHO noted that the actual days is likely slightly less because of duplication and overlaps in holidays, weekends, and vacations.

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Judges Opinions, — November 5, 2024 15:20 — 0 Comments

Margaret Alice Rash, v. Patrick Goss Miller

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