Public Notices, December 8, 2021

Volume 59, No. 19

 

PUBLIC NOTICES

DECEDENTS’ ESTATES

TRUST NOTICE

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Arelys Guzman, v. Jonathan Rideout

 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Letters Testamentary or of Administration have been granted in the following estates. All persons indebted to the said estate are required to make payment, and those having claims or demands to present the same without delay to the administrators or executors named.

 

FIRST PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF EUGENE C. HOSTETTER a/k/a EUGENE CLYDE HOSTETTER, late of North Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased September 5, 2021. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors on October 26, 2021.

 

Edwin N. Hostetter, Co-Executor

 

Sheila J. Schwenk, Co-Executor

 

Hazen Law Group

2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 202

Harrisburg, PA 17110

 

ESTATE OF RANDY J. YERGER, late of Bethel Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Debra A. Yerger, Executrix

437 School Drive

Fredericksburg, PA 17026

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF TESSIE E. ONDRUSEK, late of Myerstown Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Lisa R. Layser, Executrix

140 North College Street

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF NATHAN E. KELLER, late of Heidelberg Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Jonathan S. Keller, Executor

306 S. Carpenter St.

Newmanstown, PA 17073

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067           

 

ESTATE OF ALFRED W. MILLER, late of North Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Leona M. Rega, Executrix

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF CLIFFORD S. WIKE, a/k/a CLIFFORD STERLING WIKE, a/k/a CLIFFORD S. WEIK, late of Heidelberg Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Trish A. Mills, Executor

733 Farmwood Lane

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

John D. Enck, Esquire

Spitler, Kilgore & Enck, PC

522 South 8^th Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

SECOND PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF VINCENT D. GAGLIARDO, SR., a/k/a VINCENT GAGLIARDO, SR., late of Bethel Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Jennifer Hoffman, Executrix

20 West Market Street

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

Latisha B. Schuenemann, Esquire

Leisawitz Heller Abramowitch Phillips, P.C.

2755 Century Boulevard

Wyomissing, PA 19610

 

ESTATE OF MICHAEL J. ANNIBALI, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administratrix.

 

Georgianne E. Annibali, Administratrix

193 East Market Street

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

Joseph M. Farrell, Esquire

201/203 South Railroad Street

P.O. Box 113

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF MARY H. HOKE, late of North Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Edward R. Puchalik, Executor

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

1. O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF ANDREW J. DZWONCHYK, JR., late of Union Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased 11/08/2021. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Daphne L. Hoke, Administrator

 

George W. Porter, Esquire

909 E. Chocolate Ave.

Hershey, PA 17033

 

ESTATE OF MICHAEL R. BARKER, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Jamison Barker, Administrator

 

Candis A. Tunilo, Esquire

Nestico Druby, P.C.

1135 East Chocolate Avenue, Suite 300

Hershey, PA 17033

 

ESTATE OF ERNEST R. WAGNER, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Gloria K. Wagner, Executor

 

Reilly Wolfson Law Office

1601 Cornwall Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

THIRD PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF EUGENE J. BLOUCH, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Fidelity Bank, James O’Brien, Executor

 

Samuel G. Weiss, Jr., Esquire

Weiss Burkett, LLC

802 Walnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF KENNETH E. MARK, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Kathleen M. Kimmel, Executrix

 

Kevin M. Richards, Esquire

P.O. Box 1140

Lebanon, PA 17042-1140

 

ESTATE OF RICHARD G. MOYER, late of Myerstown Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Scott J. Moyer, Executor

289 S. Mountain Rd.

Robesonia, PA 19551

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF SANTOS SANCHEZ a/k/a SANTOS SANCHEZ RIVERA, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executrixes.

 

Yaniza Sanchez, Co-Executrix

928 Walnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

Erica Calderon, Co-Executrix

564 Blue Mountain Road

Fredericksburg, PA 17026

 

David R. Warner Jr., Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF MARLENE E. ZIMMERMAN, late of South Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

John E. Zimmerman, Executor

202 Sheep Hill Road

Newmanstown, PA 17073

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF BERNADETTE S. SAYLOR, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Debra L. Meyerhoffer, Co-Executor

 

Cynthia L. Saylor, Co-Executor

 

William H. Saylor, Jr., Co-Executor

 

Anthony J. Fitzgibbons, Esquire

279 North Zinn’s Mill Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

717-279-8313

 

ESTATE OF CHARLES R. DUCKWORTH, late of South Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased October 5, 2021. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Sarah K. Langello, Executrix

 

Attorney Bruce J. Warshawsky, Esquire

Cunningham, Chernicoff & Warshawsky, P.C.

2320 North Second Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110

 

ESTATE OF ROBERT DALE SPRINGER, late of South Londonderry Township, Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Robert Dale Springer, Jr., Executor

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF FRANK DUBBS, JR. a/k/a FRANK D. DUBBS, JR., late of Myerstown Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executrixes.

 

Tina M. Albright, Co-Executrix

1147 Mountain Road

Pine Grove, PA 17963

 

Sheila R. Allison, Co-Executrix

181 W. Main Street

Fredericksburg, PA 17026

 

Edward Coyle, Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF MARY A. BAIOCCO, late of South Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Tino Michael Baiocco, Administrator

2400 Gates Avenue

Redondo Beach, CA 90278

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF RICHARD B. CARROLL, SR., late of North Cornwall Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executrixes.

 

Diane L. Carroll, Co-Executrix

 

Debra J. Carroll-Weaver, Co-Executrix

 

Jon F. Arnold, Esquire

410 Chestnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF PAULA P. EVANS, late of Cornwall Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Lee A. Stickler, President and CEO of Cornwall Manor, Executor

 

Reilly Wolfson Law Office

1601 Cornwall Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

TRUST NOTICE

 

NOTICE OF TRUST ADMINISTRATION of the Birdella R. Wise a/k/a Birdella I.M. Wise Living Trust dated July 22, 1996 (the “Trust”), following the death of Birdella R. Wise a/k/a Birdella I.M. Wise, late of North Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania on September 4, 2021 (the “Decedent”), is hereby given.

 

All persons having claims against the Decedent or Trust are requested to present them for settlement and all persons indebted to the Decedent or Trust are requested to make immediate payment to:

 

Thomas J. Wise and Frank J. Wise

Successor Death Co-Trustees

1834 Lake Drive

Lebanon, PA  17046

Or to:

Christa M. Aplin, Esquire

JSDC Law Offices

11 East Chocolate Avenue, Suite 300

Hershey, PA 17033

(717) 533-3280

 

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT

 

Notice is hereby given by the North Cornwall Township Authority of its intention to file Articles of Amendment with the Secretary of the Commonwealth on December 22, 2021. The registered office of the North Cornwall Township Authority is located at 320 South 18th Street, Lebanon, PA 17042. The Articles of Amendment are to be filed under the provisions of 53 Pa.C.S. § 5605, related to the amendment of articles of municipal authorities. The proposed amendment will add a provision to the articles of incorporation to increase the term of existence of the North Cornwall Township Authority to a date fifty (50) years from the date of approval of the articles of amendment.

 

Amy B. Leonard, Solicitor

 

 

 

JUDGES OPINION

 

Arelys Guzman, v. Jonathan Rideout

 

Civil Action-Law-Negligence-Motor Vehicle Accident-Summary Judgment-Deposition Testimony-Separate Action-Assured Clear Distance Rule-Testimonial Affidavits

Three lawsuits were filed following a two (2) vehicle collision involving vehicles operated by Jesus Guzman-Rosado (“Guzman-Rosado”) and Jonathan Rideout (“Defendant”).  In a separate action from the within action, Guzman-Rosado testified during a deposition that he rear-ended Defendant’s vehicle after Defendant came to a sudden stop that precluded him from avoiding the collision.  Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the Guzman-Rosado’s statements at that deposition absolve him from liability for the collision in the within action, as Guzman-Rosado had a duty to operate his vehicle in such a matter that he could stop it without collision under the assured clear distance rule.

 

1. Summary judgment may be granted only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 

2. In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.

 

3. Testimonial affidavits of the moving party or witnesses, even if uncontradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for the entry of summary judgment since the credibility of testimony is a matter for the jury.

 

4. An exception exists to the rule that testimonial evidence generally is not sufficient to support an award of summary judgment when the testimonial evidence is an admission from the non-moving party.

 

5. While an individual’s violation of the assured clear distance rule constitutes negligence per se, the assured clear distance rule is not applicable when the colliding driver is confronted with a sudden emergency.

 

6. The deposition testimony of a witness in separate litigation cannot be construed as an admission in the instant litigation where it is the role of the jury to apportion responsibility in a motor vehicle collision and Arelys Guzman (“Plaintiff”) was not present at or a party to the deposition in the separate action where the testimony was elicited.

 

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2017-01515, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, November 9, 2020.

 

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA

 

CIVIL DIVISION

 

 

ARELYS GUZMAN                           :

                                                          :                                                                                                                           :       

1. :        NO. 2017-01515

                                                          :       

JONATHAN RIDEOUT                    :                                                                                                                           :

ORDER OF COURT

 

 

 

AND NOW, this 9^th day of November, 2020, in accordance with the attached Opinion, the Order of Court with respect to the issues now before us is as follows:

1. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence is DENIED. The Plaintiff shall not be precluded from asserting any claims predicated upon the Defendant’s alleged negligence.

 

BY THE COURT:

 

__________________________J.

BRADFORD H. CHARLES

BHC/gb

Cc:    Court Administration (order only)

Jason J. Schibinger, Esq.// 525 South 8^th Street, Lebanon, PA 17042

George H. Eager, Esq.// 1347 Fruitville Pike, Lancaster, PA 17601

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA

 

CIVIL DIVISION

 

 

ARELYS GUZMAN                           : 

                                                          :                                                                                                                           :       

1. :        NO. 2017-01515

                                                          :       

JONATHAN RIDEOUT                    :       

:

APPEARANCES

 

 

JASON J. SCHIBINGER, ESQ.      For Plaintiff

 

GEORGE H. EAGER, ESQ.            For Defendant

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., November 9, 2020

 

Before us is the question of whether statements made by Jesus Guzman-Rosado during a deposition in a separate matter is sufficient to absolve Jonathan Rideout (Hereinafter DEFENDANT) of liability stemming from a two-car collision.  Because Mr. Guzman-Rosado’s statements are testimonial and because they were uttered in a legal proceeding separate and apart from this one, they are not sufficient to support the entry of summary judgment in the above captioned case. Therefore, this Court will deny DEFENDANT’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a two-vehicle collision that occurred on October 8, 2015.  The collision involved vehicles driven by Jesus Guzman-Rosado and the DEFENDANT.  Three lawsuits were filed as a result of the accident.  One was initiated by the DEFENDANT against Mr. Guzman-Rosado.  Another was filed by passenger Angela Guzman against DEFENDANT.  The third is the above-captioned litigation.

Mr. Guzman-Rosado was deposed on December 21, 2017 with respect to the DEFENDANT’s lawsuit that was filed against him.  In his deposition, Mr. Guzman-Rosado testified that he rear-ended the DEFENDANT’s vehicle.  He stated that he was driving three to four (3-4) car-lengths behind the DEFENDANT’s vehicle and within the posted twenty-five (25) mile per hour speed limit.  However, he argued that the DEFENDANT came to a complete and sudden stop and he was not able to avoid a collision.

In this case, the DEFENDANT has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the deposition of Mr. Guzman-Rosado.  The Motion for Summary Judgment is predicated almost entirely upon Mr. Guzman-Rosado’s testimony in the litigation between himself and the DEFENDANT.  Neither the Plaintiff nor the Plaintiff’s counsel were present at that deposition.  In part because of this, Plaintiff opposes the DEFENDANT’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

1. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Summary Judgment may be granted only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dean v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Pa. 2000), citing P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm’n, 723 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1999). The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Id.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part:

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or

 

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.

 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.  The purpose of the rule is to eliminate cases where a party cannot prevail on a claim or a defense.  See  Eaddy v. Hamaty, 694 A.2d 639, 649 (Pa.Super. 1997); Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2, Explanatory Comment–1996.

Our standard for ruling upon a motion for summary judgment is well settled.  The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.  Hayward v. Medical Center of Beaver County, 608 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. 1992) (citations omitted). Summary judgment may be entered only in cases where the right is clear and free from doubt.  Id.

Furthermore, the “rule is firmly established” that testimonial, not documentary, affidavits of the moving party or his witnesses, even if uncontradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for the entry of summary judgment, since the credibility of the testimony is still a matter for the jury. Borough of Nanty-Glo v. Am. Sur. Co. of New York, 163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932).

 

III.    ANALYSIS

The DEFENDANT argues that Mr. Guzman-Rosado’s deposition established that the car accident resulted solely from his violation of the assured clear distance rule.  The DEFENDANT points out that Mr. Guzman-Rosado had a duty to operate his vehicle in such a manner that he could bring it to a stop without colliding with anything in front of him.  See, e.g. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3361: Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. 1983)[1].  Plaintiff responds by pointing out that no depositions have been conducted in this case.  Plaintiff also argues that it would be unfair to base summary judgment on a deposition at which her attorney did not have the opportunity to supplement the record by asking his own questions.

Under the Nanty-Glo rule outlined above, testimonial evidence is not generally sufficient to support the award of summary judgment.  However, an exception exists when the testimonial evidence is an admission from the non-moving party.  See, e.g.Bank of America v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2014).  Can the deposition of Mr. Guzman-Rosado in separate litigation be construed as an admission in this litigation?  We believe that fairness requires us to answer this question in the negative.

In almost every automobile accident case, an argument can be made that both drivers were partially at fault.  The degree of responsibility assigned to each party is variable and depends upon a multitude of fact-specific considerations.  All of those facts need to be fleshed out during discovery…and material issues regarding those facts can arise from a variety of sources.  Of course, the two drivers involved in the accident are sources.  However, so are witnesses, such as the Plaintiff.  Here, we cannot foreclose the possibility that the DEFENDANT was also partially at fault in causing this accident because he effectuated a sudden stop without apparent cause.  We also cannot forestall as a matter of law that the “sudden emergency” doctrine is inapplicable here.  It is generally for a jury to assign percentages of responsibility based upon the circumstances evident in this case.

More pertinent is the fact that when a factual record is created, it must be created by both parties to the pending litigation.  In this case, the Plaintiff could certainly have had questions of Mr. Guzman-Rosado that could impact how comparative responsibility is apportioned.  As Plaintiff points out, her attorney was not involved in the deposition of Mr. Guzman-Rosado that is relied upon by the defense.

We are simply not comfortable basing an award of summary judgment on testimonial evidence provided in separate litigation by only one driver involved in the accident.  Accordingly, we cannot and will not grant the DEFENDANT’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

 

[1] Althoug an individual’s violation of the assured clear distance rule constitutes negligence per se (See, Spearing v. Starcher, 532 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. 1987), it is not applicable when the colliding driver is confronted with a “sudden emergency.” See, Cannon v. Taber, 642 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 1994).