Public Notices, January 5, 2022

Volume 59, No. 23

 

PUBLIC NOTICES

DECEDENTS’ ESTATES

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Lebanon Screen Printing, Inc., v. Printed Terry Finishing, Co., Noss & Mohl, LLC, et al.

 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Letters Testamentary or of Administration have been granted in the following estates. All persons indebted to the said estate are required to make payment, and those having claims or demands to present the same without delay to the administrators or executors named.

 

FIRST PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF MATTHEW J. HEVEL, late of South Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, 17042, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Verlee L. Hevel, Administrator

 

Horace M. Ehrgood, Esquire

410 Chestnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF JASON R. BUCKS, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, 17042, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executors.

 

Barry Bucks, Executor

 

Susan Bucks, Executor

 

Horace M. Ehrgood, Esquire

410 Chestnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF CHARLES L. LANTZ, JR., late of North Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, 17046, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

David M. Lantz, Executor

 

Horace M. Ehrgood, Esquire

410 Chestnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF PENROSE W. HOSTETTER, late of North Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Gail Klopp, Co-Executor

 

Rodney Hostetter, Co-Executor

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

Attorney

 

ESTATE OF BARBARA A. LIGHT a/k/a BARBARA LIGHT, late of North Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Joyce A. Graham, Co-Executor

918 Mount Zion Road

Lebanon, PA 17046

 

Marlene K. Gunnells, Co-Executor

918 Mount Zion Road

Lebanon, PA 17046

 

Mark A. Light, Co-Executor

13 Kurr Road

Richland, PA 17087

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue,

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF PATRICIA A. MILLER a/k/a PATRICIA ANN MILLER, late of Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Corine B. Marshall, Co-Executor

 

Robin D. Miller, Co-Executor

 

Michael S. Miller, Co-Executor

 

Keith D. Wagner

1. O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

Attorney

 

ESTATE OF MARY JANE SFORZA, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

John C. Sforza, Co-Executor

 

Anthony L. Sforza, Co-Executor

 

Kevin M. Richards, Esquire

P.O. Box 1140

Lebanon, PA 17042-1140

 

ESTATE OF ABNER L. LANTZ, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Amos L. Lantz, Executor

 

Anthony J. Fitzgibbons, Esquire

279 North Zinn’s Mill Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

717-279-8313

 

ESTATE OF ANNABELLE M. SNOOK a/k/a ANNABELLE V. SNOOK, late of Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Michael P. Reid, II, Executor

3649 North Third Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110-1507

 

John D. Enck, Esquire

Spitler, Kilgore & Enck, PC

522 South 8^th Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

Attorney

 

ESTATE OF ALEYSIA A. ALTLAND a/k/a ALEYSIA ARDETH ALTLAND, late of Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Carol K. Appleby, Personal Representative

 

Megan C. Huff, Esquire

Nestico Druby, P.C.

1135 East Chocolate Avenue

Suite 300

Hershey, PA 17033

 

ESTATE OF MARTHA K. NOLT, late of Richland Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executors.

 

Harlan B. Nolt, Executor

 

Clair B. Nolt, Executor

 

Anthony P. Schimaneck, Esquire

Morgan, Hallgren, Crosswell & Kane, P.C.

700 North Duke Street, P.O. Box 4686

Lancaster, PA 17604-4686

 

SECOND PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF NORMAN C. SATTIZAHN a/k/a NORMAN CHARLES SATTIZAHN, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Norman L. Sattizahn, Executor

 

Anthony J. Fitzgibbons, Esquire

279 North Zinn’s Mill Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

717-279-8313

 

ESTATE OF ROBERT L. WEAVER, SR., late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Robert L. Weaver, Jr., Executrix

 

George E. Christianson, Esquire

Christianson Meyer

411 Chestnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF JEANETTE R. ADEY, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Sandra L. Sudbury, Co-Executor

855 Bachman Rd

Annville, PA 17003

 

Michael Garrison, Co-Executor

380 Snow Drive

Lebanon, PA 17046

 

Scott L. Grenoble, Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

P.O. Box 49

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF DOROTHY ODEL ELMER BROWN a/k/a DOROTHY BROWN, late of North Cornwall Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Carol Wilson, Executrix

1443 Louser Road

Annville, PA 17003

 

Scott L. Grenoble, Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

P.O. Box 49

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF ZACHARY S. LAUDERMAN, late of Bethel Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Co-Administrators.

 

Thomas Lauderman, Jr., Co-Administrator

110 Twin Creek Dr.

Jonestown, PA 17038

 

Valerie J. Zimmerman, Co-Administrator

50 N 9^th St. #201

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

Bret M. Wiest, Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

P.O. Box 49

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF CHARLES E. KOHR, late of Jackson Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administratrix.

 

Susan M. Gibson, Administratrix

310 Ramblewood Lane

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

Timothy T. Engler, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue,

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

THIRD PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF JON E. KEENER a/k/a JON ERIK KEENER, late of Cleona Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Carole Gingrich, Executrix

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

1. O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF AUDRIE A UNDERKOFFLER, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Carol Phillips, Executrix

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

1. O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF DEBRA D. PIENTOWSKI, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Co-Administrators.

 

Daniel A. Mack, Administrator

 

Amanda L. Voshell, Administrator

 

Caleb J. Zimmerman, Esquire

Zimmerman Law Office

466 Jonestown Road

Jonestown, PA 17038

 

ESTATE OF JAMES J. HALEY, JR., late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administratrix.

 

Judith Nigro, Administratrix

250 Cedar Place

Wayne, PA 19087

 

Edmund J. Campbell, Esquire

Campbell Rocco Law

2701 Renaissance Boulevard, Fourth Floor

King of Prussia, PA 19406

 

ESTATE OF VIRGINIA E. SARABOK, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Virginia A. Sarabok, Executrix

 

Steven D. W. Miller, Esq., CELA

Miller Law Firm PC

718 Poplar Street, Suite 1

Lebanon, PA 17042               

 

ESTATE OF EDNA I. TYSON, late of East Hanover Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Linda K. Spayde, Executrix

 

Gerald J. Brinser, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF HAROLD L. MULL late of Bethel Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Kenneth E. Mull, Co-Executor

55 Mull Lane

Lebanon, PA 17046

 

Ruth Ann Funck, Co-Executor

425 Gravel Hill Road

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF DOUGLAS JAY MEYER, late of North Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Larry M. Meyer, Administrator

 

Reilly Wolfson Law Office

1601 Cornwall Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a Certificate of Organization was filed with the Corporation Bureau of the Pennsylvania Department of State, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of forming a domestic business corporation under the Pennsylvania Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 2016 (P.L. 1328, No. 170), 15 Pa. C. S. A. §8811 et. seq. as amended.  The purpose of the corporation is to invest in real estate, and to engage in any other lawful business a corporation may engage in.

The name and address of the corporation is: Sisterly, LLC, 414 Oak Lane, Palmyra PA 17078.

 

Ernest J. Woolever, Esq.

42 West Main Street

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

 

JUDGES OPINION

 

Lebanon Screen Printing, Inc., v. Printed Terry Finishing, Co., Noss & Mohl, LLC, et al.

 

Civil Action-Equity-Property Ownership-Subdivision Plan-Voided Deed-Restrictive Covenants-Third Party Beneficiary-Passage of Time

 

In 1974, the Redevelopment Authority of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, (“Redevelopment Authority”) adopted a recorded an Urban Renewal Plan with a Subdivision Plan in pursuit of the same recorded in 1981.  Pursuant to the Subdivision Plan, a parcel of land owned by the Redevelopment Authority located between the property of A.L. Hanford, Jr., (“Hanford”) and the street called for parcel A of that property to be an addition to the property of Hanford and parcel B of that property to be deeded to the City of Lebanon in order to widen the roadway.  However, the transfers did not occur pursuant to the Subdivision Plan, and the Redevelopment Authority in 1981 transferred Parcel A to Defendant Printed Terry Finishing, Co., (“Terry Finishing”) and in 2006 transferred Parcel B to Defendant Noss & Mohl, LLC (“Noss”).  After the transfer, Hanford, who had transferred his property to Plaintiff, had used Parcel A for parking, unloading and access between the building and the street.  In 2019, Printed Terry Finishing placed objects on Parcel A in order to prevent Plaintiff from using Parcel A as a thoroughfare.  Plaintiff brought causes of action including an action to void the Deed of Printed Terry Finishing to which Printed Terry Finishing has lodged a Preliminary Objection on the basis that the Amended Complaint fails to state a valid claim upon which relief may be granted.

 

1. Restrictive covenants are to be construed strictly against those seeking to enforce them.

 

2. For a restrictive covenant to be enforceable in equity, it must be in writing and intended to run with the land, the parties must be on notice regarding the covenant and it must affect the land.

 

3. While a recorded subdivision plan may constitute a restrictive covenant, a restrictive covenant is not established by a recorded subdivision plan by itself without a deed referencing the subdivision plan.

 

4. Where the language of the deeds with regard to the transfers of the parcels is not consistent with the language of the Subdivision Plan, there is no precedent for a third party beneficiary to enforce the terms of a subdivision plan and Plaintiff and its predecessors failed to assert any property right based upon the Subdivision Plan for over forty (40) years, the record fails to establish a property right that is enforceable by Plaintiff.

 

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2020-00968, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, July 16, 2021.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION­ – LAW

LEBANON SCREEN PRINTING, INC.   :

                                                                                    :

:           No. 2020-00968

1. :

:

PRINTED TERRY FINISHING, CO                    :

NOSS & MOHL, LLC, ET AL                               :

 

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 16^th day of July, 2021, upon review of the entire file, briefs submitted by both parties, and in accordance with the attached Opinion, it is hereby ordered that Defendant Printed Terry Finishing, Co.’s Preliminary Objection to the first cause of action in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED and Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing a cause of action to enforce the Subdivision Plan. A copy of this order is to be served upon the PLAINTIFF, the PLAINTIFF’s attorney, the DEFENDANT Printed Terry Finishing, Co.’s attorney, the DEFENDANT Printed Terry Finishing, Co., the DEFENDANT Noss & Mohl, LLC’s attorney.

 

 

 

 

BY THE COURT:

___________________________J.

                                                            BRADFORD H. CHARLES

BHC/ts

 

 

cc: Loren Schrum, Esquire

Edward J. Coyle, Esquire

Heather Eggert, Esquire

Court Administration

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION­ – LAW

LEBANON SCREEN PRINTING, INC.   :

:           No. 2020-00968

1. :

:

PRINTED TERRY FINISHING, CO                    :

NOSS & MOHL, LLC, ET AL                               :

 

APPERANCES

 

Loren Schrum, Esquire                                               For Lebanon Screen Printing

REILLY WOLFSON

 

Edward J. Coyle, Esquire                                           For Printed Terry Finishing

BUZGON DAVIS

 

Heather Eggert, Esquire                                             For Noss & Mohl

HENRY & BEAVER

 

OPINION BY CHARLES, J. July 16, 2021

This is a dispute about enforcement of a prescriptive easement and that issue will ultimately proceed to trial. We have been asked by Plaintiff to decide whether a novel theory of property ownership should be included in that trial.  Today, we respond by rejecting Plaintiff’s novel theory, thereby insuring that trial will be focused upon the legal theory that is really the gravamen of this dispute.

1. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1974, the Redevelopment Authority of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania adopted and recorded an Urban Renewal Plan. Pursuant to the Urban Renewal Plan, in 1981, the Redevelopment Authority and the City of Lebanon recorded a Subdivision Plan. The Subdivision Plan divided a parcel of land owned by the Redevelopment Authority—which existed between A.L. Hanford, Jr.’s (hereafter HANFORD) property and street—into Parcel A and Parcel B. A note attached to the Subdivision Plan stated “Parcel ‘A’ was intended to be an addition to property of HANFORD, and “Parcel ‘B’ was intended to be an addition to City of Lebanon for widening of Willow Street.

Despite the Subdivision Plan, Parcel A was never transferred to HANDFORD and Parcel B never became a part of Willow Street. In 1981, the Redevelopment Authority transferred Parcel A to Defendant, Printed Terry Finishing (hereafter PRINTED TERRY). In 2006, the Redevelopment Authority transferred Parcel B to the other defendant, Noss & Mohl (hereafter NOSS).

Following the transfers, HANFORD installed doors on the Willow Street side of his building that abutted Parcel A. Since then, HANFORD, his successors in title, and tenants have used Parcel A for parking, unloading, and access between HANFORD’s building and Willow Street. At some point between 1981 and today, HANFORD transferred his property to Plaintiff, Lebanon Screen Printing (hereafter LSP).

In late 2019, an agent of PRINTED TERRY began placing concrete blocks, piles of soil, and rocks on Parcel A for the purpose of preventing LSP from using Parcel A as a thoroughfare. Consequently, LSP started this action on August 19, 2020. He alleged five causes of action. Following preliminary objections by PRINTED TERRY, LSP amended their complaint to only allege three causes of action: (i) action to void PRINTED TERRY’s deed; (ii) irrevocable license[1]; and (iii) easement by prescription. PRINTED TERRY has raised another round of preliminary objections to the first count on the grounds that the count fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude, for the reasons articulated below, that PRINTED TERRY’s preliminary objection to Count 1 should be sustained.

 

1. DISCUSSION

LSP has crafted a novel theory of property law that would have us ‘enforce’ a 40 year-old Subdivision plan to void PRINTED TERRY’s deed and extend some kind of ownership or use right to LSP. Counsel for LSP, however, was very elusive in stating what exactly they were claiming. In oral argument, counsel for LSP did acknowledge that LSP is not trying to enforce the subdivision plan as a contract. This admission indicates LSP is not trying to enforce an ownership right because without enforcing a contract the ownership of the parcel cannot be transferred. Thus, the only way to come close to what LSP is proposing would be a restrictive covenant.[2]

For a restrictive covenant to be enforceable in equity it must be intended to run with the land, be written, the parties must be on notice as to the covenant, and it must affect the land. See Logston v. Penndale, Inc., 576 A.2d 59, 61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Connor, 855 A.2d 873, 880 (Pa. 2004). A recorded subdivision plan, like the one here, seems initially to fairly easily meet some of these requirements. First, it is written. Second, the recording gives constructive notice to all parties. See id. (holding the recording of a covenant gives future owners constructive notice even in the absence of actual notice). Third, this restriction on who may own or use the land clearly affects the land as opposed to a merely personal covenant.[3] See Caplan v. City of Pittsburg, 100 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. 1953). The intent element is a much more fact intensive issue, but the recording would indicate an intent to have the covenant run. See Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 855 A.2d at 879. Thus, it would initially seem a restrictive covenant could exist here.

Despite these indications seemingly in favor of a restrictive covenant, there is no case in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that has ever created a restrictive covenant from only a subdivision plan. LSP relied heavily on Doylestown Twp. v. Teeling in their brief to establish a narrative that the subdivision plan was sufficient. In Doylestown Twp., the deeds conveying the property directly referenced the subdivision plan. 635 A.2d at 659. So, in that case the subdivision plan and the deed together established a restrictive covenant. Id.

This case, in contrast to Doylestown Twp., does not have a deed and subdivision plan working together to establish the restrictive covenant. As opposed to Doylestown Twp., this deed was lacking a claim that the conveyance itself was pursuant to the subdivision plan. Thus, to establish a restrictive covenant from only the reference in the deed or the subdivision plan alone would go beyond Doylestown Twp.[4]

Further, a very expansive reading of Doylestown Twp. could indicate that a subdivision plan paired with a reference to the subdivision plan in the deed, without a pursuant conveyance, can create a property right. 635 A.2d at 659 (holding a reference stating that the conveyance was pursuant to the subdivision plan paired with the subdivision was sufficient). But even that expansive reading would not be sufficient because the reference to the subdivision plan in the deed is not consistent with the subdivision plan.[5] The subdivision plan states “Parcel ‘A’ intended to be an addition to property of A.L. Hanford, Jr.,” but the deed restricts the property to “uses specified in the subdivision plan.” The term “addition” conveys an ownership right, but the term “use” implicates only the utility of the property; thus the deed’s ‘reference’ to the subdivision plan is not completely consistent with the subdivision plan. So, even if a reference alone was sufficient to establish a restrictive covenant,—which no Pennsylvania court has ever established—this ‘reference’ is not sufficient because the deed does not actually reference the same right as the subdivision plan.

Additionally, LSP has not indicated a single case where a third party beneficiary enforced the terms of the subdivision plan. LSP cited Auman v. Grimes as a case where a party was not part of a subdivision plan tried to enforce the terms of the plan. 527 A.2d 1045 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Yet, the plaintiff in Auman was actually trying to enforce the terms of an easement separate and distinct from subdivision plan, so Auman does not aid LSP’s argument. Id. at 1046.  We have been unable to find any case holding the opposite. Thus, there is not a property right here and if even if there was a property right it would not be enforceable.

On top of all of the above, we cannot forget that the Subdivision Plan upon which Plaintiff relies was created forty (40) years ago.  At no point since 1981 did LSP or its predecessors in title attempt to assert any sort of ownership right to Parcel A based upon the Subdivision Plan.  To the extent that passage of time can cause a legal right to evaporate, we conclude that the failure of LSP and its predecessors to assert any property right based upon the Subdivision Plan for forty (40) years now prevents LSP from asserting such a right.[6]

 

III.       CONCLUSION

As to this objection, we have bent over backwards to attempt to find any legal avenue to save the LSP’s first cause of action. But, even if we take large leaps of logic to build a more specifically pleaded claim and find a sliver of a property right in Pennsylvania jurisprudence, LSP still fails to establish an enforceable property right. LSP’s claim fails individually for any and all of the following reasons:

• LSP failed to claim a specific property right;
• LSP failed to show case law where a subdivision plan alone was sufficient to establish a property right;
• LSP failed to show case law where a subdivision plan along with a reference to the subdivision plan in the deed without a pursuant conveyance was sufficient to establish a property right;
• LSP failed to show case law where a third party beneficiary was able to enforce a subdivision plan; and
• LSP, and its predecessors in title, made no effort to enforce the Subdivision Plan for nearly forty (40) years prior to the litigation now before this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, we cannot and do not allow the first cause of action in LSP’s Amended Complaint to go forward.

 

 

[1] Defendants initially filed Preliminary Objections to Count 2 as well as Count 1.  At oral argument, the Preliminary Objections as to Count 2 were withdrawn without prejudice to the ability of Defendants to file a Motion for Summary Judgment or a Motion for Compulsory Nonsuit at a later time.

[2] This is a cause of action LSP has not explicitly claimed, but in an attempt to assume counsel for LSP had some legal basis for count 1 we are going to assess the cause of action as a restrictive covenant. This assumption is further enforced by LSP’s heavy reliance on Doylestown Twp. v. Teeling which dealt with the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. 635 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).

[3] LSP has not exactly stated the restriction, but the most logical restriction would be a restriction on alienation because the subdivision plan indicated ultimate sale—rather than just use—to A.L. Hanford. But, if it is a restriction on alienation that essentially binds the lots together for eternity, the restriction would be void. See Grossman v. Hill, 122 A.2d 69, 72 (Pa. 1956).

[4] There has never been a case in a Pennsylvania court where a subdivision plan or reference to a subdivision plan alone, without some additional action like the conveyance of the property pursuant to the subdivision plan, was sufficient to establish a restrictive covenant or any other enforceable property. Thus, Doylestown Twp. had a reference, a subdivision plan, and a conveyance in pursuit of the subdivision plan.

[5] As a general matter of interpretation, restrictive covenants “are to be strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce them.” Covey v. Gross, 547 A.2d 580, 583 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (explaining that courts generally disfavor limitations on the right to use and enjoy personal property).

[6] As noted at the outset of this Opinion, Plaintiff’s claim predicated upon a prescriptive easement will proceed to trial.  The Subdivision Plan will likely be admissible in evidence as it relates to the prescriptive easement issue. Nothing we decide today prevents either party from introducing or admitting the Subdivision Plan in evidence at the time of trial.  All we conclude today is that a separate cause of action cannot be predicated exclusively upon the Subdivision Plan.