Susan C. Smith vs. Christopher C. Smith No. 2013-20491

Civil Action-Law-Family Division-Divorce-Equitable Distribution-Exceptions-Report and Recommendation-Special Master-Discretion-Date of Separation-Date of Valuation of Assets-Equitable Distribution-Alimony

The parties filed Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation of the Special Master adopted by the Court, asserting that the Special Master erred in determining the date of the parties’ separation, valuing assets, dividing the marital estate and denying Plaintiff’s request for alimony.

1. In reviewing a master’s report, the court must give the fullest consideration to the credibility findings of the master, who was present to observe the witnesses and to hear their testimony. However, a master’s report only is advisory to the court, and the court is not bound by its conclusions.

2. The date of separation occurs when the parties cease cohabitating. What is meant by living “separate and apart” is defined by 23 Pa.C.S. Section 104 as complete cessation of any and all cohabitation. Cohabitation means the mutual assumption of those rights and duties attendant to the relationship of husband and wife.

3. The Special Master appropriately established February 24, 2014 as the date of separation as opposed to the date when Plaintiff filed her Divorce Complaint of June 25, 2013, as Plaintiff testified that the parties lived together, attended marital counseling sessions and resumed sexual relations after June 25, 2013, the parties testified that they ended their attempt at reconciliation on or about February 24, 2014, correspondence between the parties’ counsel confirmed February 24, 2014 as the date of separation and Defendant listed February 24, 2014 as the date of separation in response to interrogatories.

4. While the appellate courts have established the date of distribution as the preferred date for valuation of assets, the court has the discretion to adopt the date of valuation of assets that best effectuates justice. That date may be any time between separation and distribution. Marital assets that fluctuate in value should be valued as close in time as possible to the date of distribution.

5. The Special Master appropriately valued the parties’ Ameritrade account as of the date closest to the hearing rather than the date of separation when Defendant used his own funds from a personal injury settlement to establish the account, Defendant’s risky pattern of trading led to a dramatic increase in value of the account, no evidence was presented suggesting that Defendant intentionally dissipated the account and Plaintiff never filed a petition requesting that Defendant cease trading activities on the account.

6. Title 23 Pa.C.S. Section 3502 requires that marital property be divided without regard to martial misconduct in such percentages and manner as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors. Equitable distribution does not presume an equal division of marital property, and the goal of economic justice often will dictate otherwise.

7. The Special Master appropriately awarded fifty-three percent (53%) of the marital estate to Plaintiff and forty-seven percent (47%) of the marital estate to Defendant when Defendant’s income was more than double Plaintiff’s income, Defendant had experience and expertise in handling investments that Plaintiff did not share, Defendant’s retirement plan was a defined benefit plan that will provide him with more future security than Plaintiff’s 401K retirement plan and Defendant used his expertise to grow the parties’ assets from his investments.

8. The purpose of alimony is to enable a financially dependent spouse to support himself. Alimony may not be awarded to redistribute wealth or to punish an obligor spouse. Alimony is to be viewed as a secondary remedy that is available only when economic justice cannot be achieved by way of equitable distribution.

9. The Special Master appropriately denied Plaintiff’s request for alimony in light of the fact that neither party was supporting any minor child, Plaintiff was earning over $50,000.00 annually at a secure job, Plaintiff had been receiving alimony pendente lite for many months, Plaintiff had no debt and Plaintiff will have significant liquid assets at her disposal following equitable distribution.

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2013-20491, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, September 15, 2015.

M. Jannifer Weiss, Esquire, for Plaintiff Susan C. Smith

Pro Se, for Defendant Christopher C. Smith

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION – FAMILY DIVISION NO. 2013-20491

SUSAN C. SMITH, Plaintiff

v.

CHRISTOPHER C. SMITH, Defendant

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 15^TH day of September, 2015, after a careful consideration of the file, including the transcript of the hearing on February 24^th, 2015 and the Special Master’s report of July 7, 2015, the Exceptions filed by both parties in the above-captioned matter are DENIED and the recommendations of the Special Master are AFFIRMED in their entirety as follows:

1. Pursuant to Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code, Susan C. Smith (hereafter “WIFE”) and Christopher C. Smith (hereafter “HUSBAND”) are hereby divorced from the bonds of matrimony.

2. Provided that no appeal of this decision is filed, alimony pendente lite will be terminated effective immediately. If an appeal is filed, we will entertain a hearing to determine whether alimony pendente lite should continue during the pendency of the appeal.

3. The martial property, excluding the joint TD Ameritrade stock account and HUSBAND’s SERS Pension, shall be divided 53% to WIFE and 47% to HUSBAND, with an offset for credits.

4. The majority of the assets/debts shall be divided between the parties as follows:

5. HUSBAND shall receive credit for his payment of the mortgage ($5,500.00); property taxes ($3,292.06); homeowners’ insurance ($973.08) and furnace repair bill of $314.00. HUSBAND’s credits total $5,039.57.

6. WIFE is denied fair rental credit. WIFE shall receive credit for an oil bill which HUSBAND paid out of the joint TD Ameritrade account after separation ($797.77). WIFE’s credits total $398.89.

7. Within sixty (60) days of the date of the final decree, HUSBAND shall pay to WIFE the sum of $92,310.88 to effectuate equitable distribution of the above assets.

8. HUSBAND’s existing SERS pension value shall be divided equally between the parties by way of a QDRO. HUSBAND shall elect the survivor annuity option. QDRO preparation costs shall be divided between the parties.

9. The joint TD Ameritrade stock account shall be divided 53% to HUSBAND and 47% to WIFE based upon its current valuation at the time of the final Divorce Decree is entered. However, if the account has a value less than the $162,605.84, then the asset shall be valued at a minimum of$162,605.84. HUSBAND’s payment shall be made within thirty (30) days of the date of the final decree.

10. WIFE’s request for alimony is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

BRADFORD H. CHARLES, J.

APPEARANCES:

M. Jannifer Weiss, Esquire For Susan C. Smith

WEISS, WEISS & WEISS

Christopher C. Smith Pro Se

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., September 15, 2015

Rarely have we encountered a case with as much vitriolic language as has been proffered by Christopher C. Smith (hereafter “HUSBAND”) and Susan C. Smith (hereafter “WIFE”). In particular, HUSBAND has impugned the integrity of everyone who disagrees with him, and he has even requested that criminal charges be lodged against WIFE’s attorney. It is the opinion of this Court that the time has come for both parties to dial down their rhetoric and focus their attention on moving beyond their vitriolic past. Today, we will issue an Order rejecting the Exceptions filed by both parties to the Recommendation issued by a Special Master in divorce. Because we believe that the Special Master’s Recommendation effectuates economic justice for both parties, we will be affirming it. Our reasons will be highlighted in more detail below.

I. FACTS

HUSBAND and WIFE were married on September 15, 1984. During the parties’ marriage, they had one son together. He is now 27 years of age. Unfortunately, the parties’ marriage began to crumble at or shortly before the parties’ 30^th anniversary. WIFE filed a Complaint for Divorce on June 25, 2013. Subsequently, the parties attempted to reconcile. They ended up separating for the final time on February 24, 2014.

Following the parties’ final separation, significant litigation arose with respect to the parties’ divorce. On June 12, 2014, Loreen Burkett was appointed as a Special Master to hear the issue of alimony pendente lite (APL). This hearing was conducted on August 26, 2014.

Following that hearing, the Special Master recommended that HUSBAND pay $1,178.00 per month in APL. In so doing, she rejected HUSBAND’s argument that WIFE had no need for APL. HUSBAND filed timely Exceptions to the decision of the Special Master, reiterating his claim that WIFE had not established need for APL. We issued an Opinion on December 19, 2014, to affirm the Special Master’s decision. We concluded that WIFE had in fact established a need for APL. On December 30^th, HUSBAND filed a request for us to reconsider our decision, which we denied. HUSBAND then appealed to the Superior Court. On March 3, 2015, the Court quashed HUSBAND’s appeal.

A hearing was conducted on February 24, 2015 to determine equitable distribution, divorce and alimony. Though the parties had previously agreed that the date of separation was February 24, 2014, WIFE informed the Special Master in mid-February of 2015 that there was a dispute as to the date of separation. Therefore, testimony was presented at the hearing regarding the date of separation. On March 3^rd and again on March 20^th, HUSBAND requested that the Special Master exclude all evidence regarding the final date of separation.

At the February 24, 2015 hearing, HUSBAND argued that June 25, 2013 should be used as the separation date because that was the date on which the Divorce Complaint was filed. WIFE argued that the actual date on which the marriage ended was February 24, 2014. The Master concluded that the date of separation was February 24, 2014, because that was the date when parties finally decided to end their marriage. The Master also noted that the February date was the date HUSBAND listed in his answers to interrogatories as the date of separation.

On April 28, 2015, Special Master Burkett withdrew from the above-referenced case for reasons that are unknown to this Court. Ann Kline, Esquire was appointed to render a decision with respect to the economic issues disputed between the parties.

Special Master Kline issued a Report and Recommendation on July 7, 2015. She recommended that 53% of the marital assets be distributed to WIFE and 47% be distributed to HUSBAND. To accomplish this, the Special Master recommended that HUSBAND retain ownership of the marital residence and pay WIFE the sum of $93,310.88. The Special Master also denied WIFE’s request for alimony.

An issue that was hotly contested before the Special Master was how to value a TD Ameritrade account that was managed by HUSBAND. This account was initially established with $25,000.00 HUSBAND received from a personal injury settlement. Thereafter, HUSBAND engaged in a strategy of frequently buying and selling stock. Everyone acknowledged that HUSBAND’s stock-trading strategy was risky. However, it certainly was successful. By June of 2013, the Ameritrade account grew to contain over $240,000.00. Unfortunately, the value of the account then decreased. At or near the date of the Special Master’s Hearing, the value of the Ameritrade account was deemed to be $162,605.84. This is the value adopted by the Special Master for purposes of equitable distribution.

Neither HUSBAND nor WIFE was happy with the Report and Recommendation of Special Master Kline. Each filed Exceptions. Specifically, the parties presented the following issues:

 

(1) Whether the Special Master erred in determining that the date of separation was February 24, 2014 instead of June 24, 2013?

(2) Whether the Special Master erred in valuing the parties’ TD Ameritrade account?

(3) Whether the Special Master erred by inconsistently valuing various accounts possessed by the parties?

(4) Whether the Special Master erred in determining the value of the marital residence?

(5) Whether the Special Master erred in determining the percentage of marital assets to be awarded to each of the parties?

(6) Whether the Special Master erred with respect to recommending alimony pendente lite?

(7) Whether the Special Master erred by not awarding alimony?

 

The above issues were listed for argument before this Court on August 28, 2015. Having received legal arguments from the parties, we will address all of the above arguments seriatim.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Superior Court has provided guidance with respect to the scope of review we must employ.  In reviewing a master’s report, we must give “fullest consideration” to the credibility findings of the master, who was present to observe the demeanor of witnesses and hear their testimony. Schuback v. Schuback, 603 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa.Super. 1992) (citing Dukmen v. Dukmen, 420 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa.Super. 1980)).  A master’s report should not be lightly disregarded. Pasternak v. Pasternak, 204 A.2d 290, 291 (Pa.Super. 1964).  However, a master’s report is only advisory, and we are not bound by its conclusions.  Id. at 291 (citing Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 639, 641 (Pa. Super. 1956)).  Essentially, we must consider all of the evidence de novo. Id. at 291 (citing Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 639, 641 (Pa. Super. 1956)).

B. Date of Separation

HUSBAND argues that the date of separation was June 25, 2013, because that was the date on which the Divorce Complaint was filed. He acknowledged that he and WIFE made attempts to reconcile, but he argued that those efforts were sporadic and unsuccessful. WIFE responded by pointing out that she did not pursue her divorce complaint after June 25, 2013 because she considered the marriage to have been reconciled. She points to February 24, 2014 as the date on which the marriage conclusively ended.

The date of separation is when the parties cease cohabitating; living “separate and apart” is defined as the “complete cessation of any and all cohabitation.” 23 Pa.S.A. § 104. “‘[C]ohabitation’ means the mutual assumption of those rights and duties attendant to the relationship of husband and wife.” Thomas v. Thomas, 483 A.2d 945, 948 (Pa.Super. 1984). Although the statute does not address a situation where parties resume cohabitation after the filing of a complaint, we are aware of nothing prohibiting the finding of a later date than the date of the filing of the complaint as the date of separation.

Here, WIFE filed the Complaint on June 25, 2013, but the parties subsequently reconciled. WIFE testified that between June of 2013 and February of 2014, the parties lived together, attended a few marital counseling sessions, dated, resumed sexual relations and took trips to reconnect. (N.T. Feb. 24, 2015, pgs. 33-34). In addition, the parties told family and friends about their reconciliation and attended family gatherings. (N.T. Feb., pgs. 33-34). The parties agreed that they ended their attempt at reconciliation on about February 24^th, 2014. (N.T. Feb., pg. 34).

HUSBAND complains about the Special Master’s decision to declare February 24, 2014 as the separation date. He claims that the Special Master initially told the parties at the Pre-Trial Conference that she would use June 25, 2013 as the separation date. Unfortunately, the Pre-trial Conference where separation was discussed was not stenographically recorded. What is on the record is evidence that the parties had previously agreed on the February date. (N.T. Feb., pg. 34). A letter by HUSBAND’s counsel to WIFE’s counsel on March 25, 2014, confirmed this date, as did a May 9^th letter by WIFE’s counsel, confirming the valuation of assets as of the date of separation, which was listed as the February date. (N.T. Feb. Exhs. 1 & 2). Furthermore, as the Master noted, HUSBAND’s September 22, 2014 answer to interrogatory number 20, listed February 24, 2014 as the separation date. There is certainly ample evidence in the record to support the Special Master’s decision to use the February 24, 2014 separation date.

HUSBAND claims he was prejudiced when the Special Master allowed testimony at the hearing regarding the date of separation even though WIFE only notified the Special Master that the issue was in dispute mere days before the hearing. This argument is unavailing. Both parties were given the opportunity to present evidence on the issue. Moreover, the Special Master solicited legal briefs on the separation date issue. HUSBAND submitted a 44-page brief. In his Brief, HUSBAND did not allege an inability to call any specific witness. He simply complained about the Special Master’s decision to entertain the question. This was a legal argument that HUSBAND was not prevented from pursuing by virtue of the timing of the hearing. We can find no error in the Master’s decision and agree with her analysis that the date of separation was February 24, 2014. Stated simply, February 24, 2014 was the date when parties finally decided to end their marriage.

C. Value of the TD Ameritrade Account

WIFE disputes the Master’s evaluation of the parties’ TD Ameritrade account. WIFE argues that the account should be valued at $244,775.82, which was the value of the account on the date of separation. The Special Master agreed with HUSBAND that the account should be valued according to its present worth of $162,605.84, as measured closest to the date of the hearing.

Courts have discretion to adopt the date of valuation that best effectuates justice. Miller v. Miller, 577 A.2d 205 (Pa.Super. 1990). This may be any time between separation and distribution: “Valuation of property lies on a continuum so that equity requires a determination of the most fair point on that continuum to establish value.” Winters v. Winters, 512 A.2d 1211, 1214, fn. 3 (Pa.Super. 1986).

WIFE argues that HUSBAND had a duty to preserve the value of the assets, and just as any gains would accrue solely to HUSBAND, so too should he liable for any post-separation losses. WIFE points out that, if HUSBAND had left the joint account alone and not engaged in risky trading, the losses would not have been so great. WIFE’s premise may or may not be true, but WIFE’s argument fails to take into account the fact that HUSBAND’s used his own money to establish the account in the first place, and WIFE did not contribute to the account or even have the password to access it. More importantly, it was HUSBAND’s pattern of risky trading that led to the dramatic increase in value of the account. We will not allow WIFE to benefit from HUSBAND’s risky trading, but not share in the losses. Simply put, WIFE cannot have it both ways.

If HUSBAND had intentionally dissipated the asset, it would be proper to hold him to the pre-dissipation value, but there is no evidence that this was the case. In fact, the Master found HUSBAND “continued to use his best efforts after separation to increase the value of the stock account.” Master’s Report, pg. 24. We also agree with the Master’s observation that WIFE could easily have filed a petition requesting that HUSBAND cease his trading activities. She did not do so. We will not therefore allow WIFE to retroactively punish HUSBAND with 20-20 hindsight for the same trading pattern that he had previously employed.

D. Evaluation of the Other Accounts

Both HUSBAND and WIFE believe that marital assets should have been valued on dates different from those selected by the Special Master. Predictably, WIFE seeks to maximize the value of assets in HUSBAND’s possession and HUSBAND seeks to maximize the value of assets that are possessed by WIFE. In particular, HUSBAND complains that the Special Master used inconsistent dates in valuing assets. In part because the stock market rose dramatically until recently, HUSBAND proposed that the stock-based assets be valued on a date as close to divorce as is possible.

Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code does not establish a definitive date for valuing assets. Rather, a Trial Court has wide discretion to adopt a date for valuation that best effectuates economic justice between the parties. See Baker v. Baker, 861 A.2d 298 (Pa.Super. 2004); Fishman v. Fishman, 805 A.2d 576 (Pa.Super. 2002). With the above being said, our appellate courts have established a “preferred” date for valuation – the date of distribution. See Sergi v. Sergi, 506 A.2d 928 (Pa.Super. 1986), reversed on other grounds by Fratangello v. Fratangello, 520 A.2d 1195 (Pa.Super. 1987). See also Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248 (Pa.Super. 2007). In particular, “marital assets that fluctuate in value should be valued as close in time as possible to the date of distribution.” Grandovic v. Grandovic, 564 A.2d 960, 965 (Pa.Super. 1989), citing Sutliff v. Sutliff, 543 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1988). With the above being recognized, Pennsylvania’s Superior Court has clearly articulated that different valuation dates may be used “as justice dictates” based upon the unique circumstances of a given case. See Litmans v. Litmans, 673 A.2d 382 (Pa.Super. 1996). See also Fishman v. Fishman, supra.

In this case, the parties have argued about the valuation date used with respect to six assets. Those assets, and the valuation date employed, are set forth on the following chart:

Assets

Date of Valuation

WIFE’s Luxottica 401-k

Value agreed upon as of January 29, 2015

WIFE’s Luxottica Pension

December 31, 2014

WIFE’s Wells Fargo 401-k

Value agreed upon

WIFE’s TD Ameritrade IRA

January 31, 2015

HUSBAND’s TD Ameritrade IRA

January 31, 2015

HUSBAND’s ING insurance, cash surrender value

February 28, 2015

 

It is important to note that the parties agreed on the value of WIFE’s Luxottica 401-k and WIFE’s Wells-Fargo 401-k. The agreed upon value was based upon information generated in January of 2015. In addition, Exhibit 33 was presented as evidence of WIFE’s IRA account. This exhibit was dated January 31, 2015. In part because the parties agreed to value two assets as of January 2015, and in part because the only available evidence available to value another asset was dated January 31, 2015, the Special Master determined that it would be equitable to also evaluate other assets at a date as close as possible to January of 2015. We cannot and will not declare the Special Master’s decision in this regard to be unfair.

Could different valuation dates have been used by the Special Master? Without question. Would different valuation dates have made a huge difference in the valuation of assets? Not that we can discern. Was the Master’s decision with respect to how to value each of the above assets fair? Absolutely. Because we conclude that economic justice was accomplished by the manner in which the Special Master valuated assets based upon available evidence, we will not disturb the Special Master’s decision regarding valuation.

E. Value of the Marital House

We initially had difficulty discerning the nature of HUSBAND’s argument regarding the value of the marital home because the parties stipulated that the value of the home was $250,000.00. Moreover, the Special Master appropriately deducted the balance of the mortgage to determine a net value of the real estate. Apparently, HUSBAND claims that the mortgage balance should have been a higher amount. Once again, we have difficulty understanding the logic of HUSBAND’s argument.

The Special Master determined that the outstanding balance on the mortgage as of the date of the hearing was $10,818.82. (See Exh. 56). In determining a net value for the marital home, the Special Master deducted this amount from the parties’ stipulated value of $250,000.00. Our analysis of the Special Master’s math does not reveal any error in the subtraction of the mortgage amount from HUSBAND’s balance sheet of marital assets.

As best as we can discern, HUSBAND complains that he was not afforded credit for the mortgage payments he made between January of 2014 and February of 2015. The Special Master did acknowledge HUSBAND’s payment of post-separation mortgage amounts. She afforded HUSBAND with a credit for $5,500.00 in mortgage payments he made post-separation. (See Section B.11. of Special Master’s Report). After considering all other credits sought by the parties, the Special Master ultimately determined that HUSBAND should receive a net credit of $4,640.68, and she reduced HUSBAND’s obligation to WIFE by that amount.

In summary, it is clear that the Special Master adopted the parties’ stipulation with respect to the value of the home, and she properly deducted the mortgage balance that existed at the date of the hearing. With respect to HUSBAND’s payment of the mortgage post-separation, the Special Master afforded HUSBAND a credit. She even denied a fair rental credit to WIFE. How HUSBAND can complain about the Special Master’s decisions relating to valuation of the marital house is beyond our comprehension. Therefore, we will deny HUSBAND’s exception relating to the value of the marital house.

F. Equitable Distribution Percentages

The Special Master determined that marital assets should be divided by awarding 53% of most assets to WIFE and 47% of most assets to HUSBAND. Predictably, both parties expressed disappointment with the Special Master’s position. WIFE believes she should have been awarded a greater percentage. HUSBAND believes that WIFE’s percentage award should have been less.

Equitable distribution of marital property is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. That section requires that marital property be divided between divorcing spouses “without regard to marital misconduct in such percentages and in such a manner as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. “[E]quitable distribution does not presume an equal division of marital property and the goal of economic justice will often dictate otherwise.” Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citing Williamson v. Williamson, 586 A.2d 967, 970 (Pa. Super. 1991)).

In this case, the Special Master considered all of the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. We will briefly summarize some of the pertinent factors as follows:

 

(1) The age, health, station, sources of income, vocational skills, employability, liabilities and needs of each of the parties (Factor 3)

 

WIFE has been employed as a full-time optician at Visionworks for 34 years. In 2014, she earned $50,984.00. Additionally, WIFE received $1,178.00 APL per month during the pendency of the divorce.

HUSBAND has been employed with the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA). In 2014, he earned $106,417.00.

Neither party has any significant debt. Both are in good health.

Because HUSBAND’s income is more than double that of WIFE, he stands in a superior economic condition. For this reason, Equitable Distribution Factor 3 must be weighed in favor of WIFE.

(2) The opportunity for each party to acquire future assets (Factor 5)

HUSBAND earns a significantly greater income than does WIFE. He also has experience and expertise in handling investments that WIFE does not share. This disparity of income and expertise will enable HUSBAND to grow his asset portfolio in amounts and rates that WIFE will not be able to match. On the other hand, the Special Master determined that each party will be able to pay all of their recurring expenses with the income available to them. The Special Master declared that this factor should “weigh slightly” in favor of WIFE due to HUSBAND’s greater income. We agree.

(3) The sources of income available to both parties, including retirement benefits (Factor 6)

The employment income of both parties was addressed with respect to Factor 3 above. In addition, WIFE enjoys retirement plans with her employer. These plans were valued at $90,733.00. She also has two smaller retirement accounts with an aggregate value of approximately $4,500.00. In contrast, HUSBAND possesses a defined benefit pension through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. HUSBAND’s pension was valued at $252,000.00. In addition, HUSBAND has managed an Ameritrade IRA valued at roughly $30,000.00.

This factor weighs in favor of WIFE. In addition to the current values of the parties’ respective retirement plans, we cannot forget that both HUSBAND and WIFE will receive additional retirement benefits between today’s date and the date of their respective retirements. HUSBAND’s retirement is a defined benefit plan, which provides him with more future security than does WIFE’s 401-k retirement plan. In addition, HUSBAND’s employer will be contributing greater sums of money to his retirement plan than will the employer of WIFE. Given the above, we agree with the Special Master that Equitable Distribution Factor 6 must be weighed in favor of WIFE.

(4) The contribution or dissipation of each party with respect to marital assets (Factor 7)

The Special Master declared that both parties “equalized” household responsibilities during their marriage. However, because HUSBAND handled the family finances and was able to grow the parties’ assets from his investment acumen, the Special Master determined that Equitable Distribution Factor 7 “weight slightly in favor of HUSBAND.” We agree.

(5) The parties’ standard of living during the marriage (Factor 9)

The Special Master determined that HUSBAND and WIFE enjoyed an upper middle-class standard of living during the marriage. Given that they collectively earned over $150,000.00, any contrary conclusion would have surprised us. Consistent with the standard of living described by the Special Master, the parties had little debt at the time of separation. In addition, they were able to take regular vacations and enjoy eating out at restaurants. The Special Master determined that this factor “weighs in favor of an equal division of assets.” We agree.

(6) The economic circumstances of each party at separation (Factor 10)

Although both parties enjoyed full-time employment at the time of separation, HUSBAND’s income was far greater than that enjoyed by WIFE. It was for this reason that APL was awarded. With the assistance of APL, WIFE was able to adequately support herself during the pendency of the divorce. Because of the APL award, we conclude that the economic circumstances of both parties at the time of separation is relatively equal. The Special Master determined that this factor “supports an equal distribution of assets.” We concur.

There are many other factors set forth in Section 3502 of the Divorce Code. The Special Master determined that these factors either did not apply or were “neutral.” Like the Special Master, we have considered all of the factors beyond those outlined above. We concur that they do not impact a percentage of distribution decision in any meaningful way.

Stripped of superfluity, the equitable distribution factors that favor WIFE relate to HUSBAND’s superior earning capacity and ability to generate future income. These factors are not completely offset by HUSBAND’s modestly greater contribution toward generating marital assets. In the opinion of this Court, the Special Master’s decision to divide marital assets by awarding 53% to WIFE and 47% to HUSBAND effectuated economic justice between these two warring spouses. We will therefore adopt the Special Master’s decision as our own. To the extent that we have not referenced the reasoning of the Special Master within this section of our Opinion, we also incorporate the Special Master’s rationale by reference.

G. Alimony Pendente Lite

Following a hearing that occurred on August 24, 2014, WIFE was awarded alimony pendente lite (APL). HUSBAND was enraged by the Special Master’s APL decision. He filed vitriolic exceptions. Via an Opinion dated December 19, 2014, we denied HUSBAND’s exceptions. To the extent that HUSBAND continues to complain about APL, we incorporate by reference the Opinion we authored on December 19, 2014.

With the above being said, the decision we are rendering today will effectively terminate HUSBAND’s obligation to pay APL going forward. As a result of our decision today, WIFE will be awarded liquid assets. Together with her employment income, we believe that WIFE possesses sufficient assets to care for herself moving forward.

H. Alimony

Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code defines alimony as an order for support granted in conjunction with a divorce. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3103. The purpose of alimony is to enable a financially-dependent spouse to support himself/herself. Johnson v. Johnson, 864 A.2d 1224 (Pa.Super. 2004). Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super 2005). Alimony may not be awarded to redistribute wealth or punish an obligor spouse. Kent v. Kent, 16 A.2d 1158 (Pa.Super. 2011). Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have clearly articulated that alimony is to be viewed as a “secondary remedy” to be available only when economic justice cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award. Kent v. Kent, supra; Lawson v. Lawson, 940 A.2d 444 (Pa.Super. 2007).

In assessing whether alimony is necessary or appropriate, Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code has mandated the consideration of 17 factors. Although the Special Master and this Court considered all of those factors, we wish to focus only upon several. They are:

(1) The sources of income of both parties (§ 3701(b)(3));

(2) The duration of the marriage (§ 3701(b)(7));

 

(3) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support through appropriate employment (§ 3701(b)(17)); and

(4) “Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including, but not limited to, property distributed under the statutes relating to equitable distribution, to provide for the parties’ reasonable needs” (§ 3701(b)(16)).

 

The latter factor is deemed so important that if a Trial Court fails to consider it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court will remand the case on appeal. See Geyer v. Geyer, 456 A.2d 1025 (Pa.Super. 1983).

In this case, the Special Master considered all of the applicable alimony factors. After doing so, she concluded:

 

In considering all 17 of the factors regarding alimony, and relevant case law, it is determined that an award of alimony in this case is not an appropriate remedy in this case (sic). The Special Master has determined that economic justice in this case specifically requires that the award of alimony be denied. The Special Master specifically considered Wife’s need for an additional award of funds, and awarded a larger percentage of the available assets from the marriage to Wife. Had alimony been awarded, the scheme of distribution would have been different.

Specifically, the Master finds that Wife is working. There are no minor children. The recommendations of the Special Master provide for Wife’s future income needs as a portion of Husband’s pension will be placed in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order for her future benefit.

 

(Special Master’s Report at Section V.(17)).

We agree with the analysis of the Special Master. In particular, we note the following:

 

– The only child born to the parties’ marriage is now 27 years of age. Neither party is supporting any minor children.

– WIFE is employed as an optician at Vision Works earning over $50,000.00 annually. While HUSBAND’s earnings are greater, the Master described WIFE’s job as “secure.”

– WIFE has been receiving APL for many months. The Special Master noted in her Report: “Although [WIFE’s] expenses outstrip her earned income, she has been able, presumably with the help of APL, to increase her personal checking and savings account balances by a combined sum of $7,800.00…” (Section III.B.(10) of Special Master’s Report).

– WIFE has no debt. (Section IV.B.(10) of Special Master’s Report).

– Following equitable distribution of assets, WIFE will have significant liquid assets at her disposal. (Section IV.B.(16) of Special Master’s Report).

 

We are certainly aware that the 30 year duration of the parties’ marriage, HUSBAND’s considerably higher income, and HUSBAND’s extramarital affair all weigh in favor of an alimony award. Nevertheless, we conclude that the above factors outweigh the ones WIFE relies upon. In the opinion of this Court, the Special Master appropriately determined that WIFE will be able to support herself with her earnings and with the assets that will be awarded to her in equitable distribution. Accordingly, we will affirm the Special Master’s decision to deny ongoing alimony to WIFE.

III. CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code is predicated upon the precept that “economic justice” should be effectuated between divorcing spouses. It is clear to this Court that Special Master Kline accomplished this goal in this case. We understand that neither HUSBAND nor WIFE is particularly happy with the outcome recommended by the Special Master. So be it. The perceptions of the parties have been colored by their perspectives . . . and those perspectives have become even more polarized as a result of the bitter emotional turmoil that accompanied the break-up of the marriage.

The 30 years that Christopher and Susan Smith spent together cannot be erased or forgotten. Nevertheless, it is now time for both HUSBAND and WIFE to move forward with their respective lives. Doing so requires that each party accept the reality that neither will get everything from the divorce that he/she wanted. On the other hand, both parties should also recognize how fortunate they are to enjoy good, stable jobs, retirement plans, assets valued in six figures, and little debt. The vast majority of divorcing spouses are not nearly as prepared as HUSBAND and WIFE to move forward with their lives. It is our sincere hope that both HUSBAND and WIFE will take a deep breath, step back from their acrimony-fueled emotions, and recognize that things could be infinitely worse than what they now perceive them to be.

With the above being said, we will affirm the decision of the Special Master in its entirety, as we believe that the Special Master accomplished rough justice in a difficult situation. An Order to accomplish our decision will be entered today’s date.

 

1) In this regard, the Special Master obviously found WIFE’s testimony to be more credible than that presented by HUSBAND.

2) It is ironic that HUSBAND effectively states that the hearing regarding a separation date should have been pushed back to afford him with more preparation time. For over a year, HUSBAND has been complaining forcefully about how long this divorce litigation has lasted.

3) We also remind WIFE that, by any definition, an increase in value from $25,000.00 to $162,000.00 must be considered a good return on investment.

4) We wonder if HUSBAND’s argument would be any different today. Since HUSBAND filed his Brief, the stock market plummeted. Given that the parties were not officially divorced until the date of today’s Order, if we were to adopt HUSBAND’s argument that stock-based assets should be valued on the date of the divorce, the value of most of the parties’ stock-based assets would be less than what was determined by the Master.

5) The Special Master divided the TD Ameritrade stock account by awarding 53% of it to HUBSAND and 47% of it to WIFE. Although she did not provide her reasoning for dividing this asset in a manner different than all other assets, we assume that she did so because the initial investment into this Ameritrade account was made with a personal injury settlement that was attributable exclusively to HUSBAND.

6) On the other hand, we cannot forget that the Special Master credited HUSBAND for his investment work by dividing the Ameritrade account in a manner that favored HUSBAND by 53% to 47%. This mitigates the degree to which this factor can be considered in favor of HUSBAND.

7) Had it not been for the award of APL, the economic circumstances of HUSBAND would have been superior to that of WIFE.

8) Our decision also enraged HUSBAND. He filed an appeal in which he attacked the integrity of WIFE, WIFE’s attorney, his former attorney and this Court. HUSBAND’s appeal was dismissed.