Public Notices – February 26, 2020

Volume 57, No. 30

 

PUBLIC NOTICES

DECEDENTS’ ESTATES

TRUST NOTICE

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Debra Carpenter v. Lawrence Carpenter

 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Letters Testamentary or of Administration have been granted in the following estates. All persons indebted to the said estate are required to make payment, and those having claims or demands to present the same without delay to the administrators or executors named.

 

FIRST PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF JUNE LOUISE HAAG, a/k/a JUNE L. HAAG, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Gaeton Bernard Foschini, Executor

Steven D.W. Miller, Equire

P.O. Box 121

Cornwall, PA 17016

 

ESTATE OF JAMES M. WARD, late of Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Jane M. Ward, Executrix

Kevin M. Richards, Esquire

P.O. Box 1140

Lebanon, PA 17042-1140

 

ESTATE OF ROBERT A. HENRY, a/k/a ROBERT ALAN HENRY, late of Millcreek Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Ryan A. Henry, Executor

Kevin M. Richards, Esquire

P.O. Box 1140

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF DAVID R. LONG, a/k/a DAVID LONG, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Keith Fernsler, Executor

Anthony J. Fitzgibbons, Esquire

279 North Zinn’s Mill Road

Suite D

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF ARLENE A. FANOCOVIC late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Anthony J. Fitzgibbons, Executor, Esquire

279 North Zinn’s Mill Road

Suite D

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF NANCY HILES, late of Annville Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Michael Hiles, Co-Executor

James Hiles, Co-Executor

960 E. Queen Street

Annville, PA 17003

 

ESTATE OF SUSAN L. SWEITZER, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Clarence W. Sweitzer, Administrator

7 Woodland Road

Reading, PA 19610

 

Brett M. Fegely, Esquire

Hartman, Valeriano, Magovern & Lutz, P.C.

1025 Berkshire Blvd., Ste. 700

Wyomissing, PA 19610

 

ESTATE OF ISAAC J. WAMPLER, late of North Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Mervin D. Wampler, Co-Executor

Wayne E. Wampler, Co-Executor

7136 Union Deposit Road

Hummelstown, PA 17036

 

Keith D. Wagner, Esquire

Brinser Wagner

6 East Main Street

PO Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

 

SECOND PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF RUTH N. FISHER, late of West Cornwall Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Eugene F. Fisher, Jr., Executor

190 South Aspen Drive

Mount Joy, PA 17552

 

Karl Kreiser, Esquire

553 Locust Street

Columbia, PA 17512

 

ESTATE OF BONNIE L. WEST, late of Cornwall Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

John M. Gruber, Esquire, Executor

Russell, Krafft & Gruber, LLP

930 Red Rose Court, Suite 300

Lancaster, PA 17601

 

ESTATE OF FRANCES M. REINHARD, late of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Cynthia A. Felty, Co-Executrix

Marc A. Reinhard, Co-Executor

Loreen M. Burkett, Esquire

Weiss Burkett

802 Walnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF DAVID M. ENGLEHART, late of Jackson Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Malisa J. Rutt

1401 W. Main Street

Newmanstown, PA

 

Donna Long Brightbill, Attorney

Long Brightbill

315 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF RICHARD H. HEVERLING, JR., a/k/a RISHARD H. HEVERLING, late of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administratrix.

 

Renee Heverling, Administratrix

Loreen M. Burkett, Esquire

802 Walnut Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF MILDRED M. HOUSER, late of Jackson Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Marlene E. Deiss, Executrix

2 Laurel Drive

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steinder & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF DORIS M. HORST, late of Jackson Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

JoAnn L. Roschel, Executrix

4 Fisher Terrace

Willow Street, PA 17584

 

Kenneth C. Sandoe, Esquire

Steiner & Sandoe, Attorneys

36 West Main Avenue

Myerstown, PA 17067

 

ESTATE OF HELEN G. SHAAK, late of South Lebanon Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Shirley Hains, Executrix

Estate of Helen G. Shaak

Reilly Wolfson Law Office

1601 Cornwall Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

THIRD PUBLICATION

 

ESTATE OF PAULINE M. POPP, late of North Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Donald Popp, Executor

 

Keith D. Wagner, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF MANLEY L. LAYMAN, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Larry Layman, Executor

133 East Patrick Road

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

Daryl J. Gerber, Esquire

The Law Office of Daryl J. Gerber

46 East Main Street

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF PATRICIA A. SCHOOLS, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Douglas G. Brandt, Co-Executor

1289 Mt. Wilson Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

Joan E. Smith, Co-Executrix

7 Ladderback Lane

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

Daryl J. Gerber, Esquire

The Law Office of Daryl J. Gerber

46 East Main Street

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF JOYCE I. GRIMES, late of Jackson Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Lisa A. Filter, Executrix

Estate of Joyce I. Grimes

Reilly Wolfson Law Office

1601 Cornwall Road

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF WALTER H. SPERAW, JR., late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executor.

 

Daniel J. Speraw, Executor

474 E. Main Street

Annville, PA 17003

 

Michael S. Bechtold, Esquire

Buzgon Davis Law Offices

P.O. Box 49

525 South Eighth Street

Lebanon, PA 17042

 

ESTATE OF GLADYS L. LAUDERMILCH, a/k/a GLADYS LOCKWOOD LAUDERMILCH, late of South Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Glenn C. Laudermilch, Administrator

Kevin M. Richards, Esquire

P.O. Box 1140

Lebanon, PA 17042-1140

 

ESTATE OF AUDREY FERN LENTZ, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Natalie Scicchitano, Executrix

Sean M. Pierson, Esquire

105 East Oregon Road

Lititz, PA 17543

 

 

ESTATE OF KENNETH R. OXENREIDER a/k/a KENNETH OXENREIDER, late of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Executrix.

 

Dianna Schlegal, Executrix

Neal A. Rice, Esquire

Legacy Law, PLLC

15 N. Spruce Street

Lititz, PA 17543

 

ESTATE OF STARR M. SKISHALLEY, late of Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned Administrator.

 

Steven M. Skishalley, Administrator

Keith D. Wagner, Esquire

P.O. Box 323

Palmyra, PA 17078

 

ESTATE OF LINDA M. MARTZ, late of the City of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, deceased. Letters Testamentary have been granted to the undersigned Co-Executors.

 

Michael T. Heffelfinger, Co-Executor

Becky J. Diaz, Co-Executrix

Joseph J. Plunkett, Esquire

Plunkett & Graver, P.C.

2030 Tilgham Street

Suite 202

Allentown, PA 18104

 

 

TRUST NOTICE

 

Notice of the death of Rena Faye Kreiser, late of North Londonderry Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, Settlor of the Wilbur C. Kreiser and Rena Faye Kreiser Revocable Living Trust, dates 10/5/01 and amended 8/24/13, is hereby given. All persons indebted to said Trust are requested to make prompt payment and those having claims to present the same, without delay to:

 

Successor Trustees: Daniel W. Kreiser, David W. Kreiser, & Diane K. Zorn

Care of David A. Peckman, Esquire

Peckman Chait LLP

29 Mainland Road

Harleysville, PA 19438

 

 

Judge’s Opinion

 

Debra Carpenter v. Lawrence Carpenter

 

Civil Action-Law-Prenuptial Agreement-Modification-Contracts-Intent of the Parties-Unambiguous Language-Quitclaim Deed-Nominal Consideration

 

Prior to the parties’ marriage in December of 2010, the parties entered into a Prenuptial Agreement under which any increase in value of the residential property owned by Defendant prior to marriage was to be subject to equal division between the parties.  Following Plaintiff’s filing of a Complaint in Divorce in December of 2015, Plaintiff prepared and executed a Quitclaim Deed with regard to the residential property conveying her interest in that property to Defendant.  Defendant subsequently filed a Petition to Enforce Prenuptial Agreement with the primary issue being whether the execution of the Quitclaim Deed constituted a valid modification of the Prenuptial Agreement otherwise affording Plaintiff one-half (1/2) of increase in value of the residential property during the marriage.

 

1. Both prenuptial and postnuptial agreement are contracts that are governed by the law of contracts.

 

2. The goal of interpreting a contact is to ascertain and to give effect to the parties’ intent.

 

3. If the express language of a marital contract is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is determined from that language alone. If the express language of a marital contract is ambiguous, parole or extrinsic evidence can be admitted to ascertain the intent of the parties.

 

4. It is not the role of the judiciary to address subsequent misgivings or later regrets of a party to a contract.

 

5. Nominal consideration can form sufficient consideration for a contract.

 

6. Since the Prenuptial Agreement permitted modification of its terms if the modification were in writing and executed by both parties and the Quitclaim Deed through which Plaintiff divested all interest in the residential property was in writing and was signed by the parties, the Quitclaim Deed constituted a valid modification of the Prenuptial Agreement otherwise affording Plaintiff rights with regard to the residential property.

 

7. In light of the fact that the Quitclaim Deed with regard to the residential property was exchanged as part of a broader division of marital assets, the nominal amount of consideration set forth therein of $1.00 and/or good and valuable consideration set forth adequate consideration for that exchange.

 

L.C.C.C.P. No. 2015-20910, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, June 21, 2019.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA

 

CIVIL ACTION – FAMILY DIVISION

 

 

DEBRA CARPENTER,                                           :           2015-20910

Plaintiff                                                                      :

1. :                      

                                                                                    :

LAWRENCE CARPENTER,                                 :

Defendant                                                                  :

                                                                                               

 

 

ORDER OF COURT

 

 

AND NOW, this 21^st day of June, 2019, upon consideration of the issue raised by the parties, and in accordance with the attached Opinion, the Order of this Court is as follows:

1. The Quit Claim Deed executed by the parties on December 12, 2015 constituted a valid modification of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, and the terms of said Quit Claim Deed are clear and unambiguous.
2. In accordance with the terms of the Quit Claim Deed, Debra Carpenter no longer is entitled to one-half of the increase in the value of 111 Furnace Street during the course of the parties’ marriage. The entirety of the value of 111 Furnace Street shall be the sole and exclusive property of Lawrence Carpenter.
3. Consistent with this Court Order and this Opinion, the parties shall proceed to finalize their divorce in accordance with the Pennsylvania and Lebanon County Rules of Court governing divorce proceedings.

 

BY THE COURT,

                                                                         

                                                   , J.

                                                                        BRADFORD H. CHARLES

 

 

BHC/pmd

 

cc:        Keith D. Wagner, Esq.

George Christianson, Esq.

Court Administration (order only)

 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA

 

CIVIL ACTION – FAMILY DIVISION

 

 

DEBRA CARPENTER,                                           :           2015-20910

Plaintiff                                                                      :

1. :                      

                                                                                    :

LAWRENCE CARPENTER,                                 :

Defendant                                                                  :

                                                                                               

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Keith D. Wagner, Esq.                                               FOR Debra Carpenter

 

George Christianson, Esq.                              FOR Lawrence Carpenter

 

 

Opinion, Charles, J., June 21, 2019

 

Abraham Lincoln once quipped: “He who represents himself has a fool for a client.”  In this case, Debra Carpenter (hereafter DEBRA) prepared and signed a Quitclaim Deed that no lawyer would have ever approved.  She handed that deed to Lawrence Carpenter (hereafter LAWRENCE) as part of the parties’ divorce arrangement.  Now, she wishes to disavow her decision.  For reasons that will follow, we will hold DEBRA to the improvident decisions she made in 2015.

 

1. FACTS

LAWRENCE and DEBRA were married in December of 2010.  Prior to the marriage, the parties entered into a Prenuptial Agreement dated November 11, 2010.  Paragraph 5 of that Prenuptial Agreement pertained to property at 111 Furnace Street in Lebanon that was owned by LAWRENCE.  Stripped of superfluity, the Prenuptial Agreement provided that any increase in value of the property during the term of the marriage “shall be subject to an equal division between the parties.”  Exhibit 1

Unfortunately, the parties’ marriage lasted only five years.  In December of 2015, DEBRA requested a divorce.  As LAWRENCE and DEBRA worked to disengage themselves from each other, they met at the office of a notary to transfer vehicles so that each would exclusively own one of the vehicles that had been purchased and/or possessed during the marriage.

Shortly after the parties’ separation, DEBRA chose to purchase her own real estate.  She borrowed money against her retirement fund (Exhibit 10) and she borrowed money from a mortgage company in Virginia Beach, Virginia. (Exhibit 11).  Somehow, DEBRA also developed a belief that she would have to divest herself totally of any interest she possessed in the property at 111 Furnace Street in Lebanon.  Therefore, she prepared a Quitclaim Deed that stated:

Grantor does hereby convey, release and Quitclaim all of the Grantor’s rights, title and interest in and to the above-described property…So that neither Grantor nor Grantor’s heirs, legal representatives or assigns shall have, claim or demand any right or title to the property, premises or appurtenances, or any part thereof.

 

Exhibit 2. The Quitclaim Deed was signed on December 12, 2015 and delivered by DEBRA to LAWRENCE simultaneous with their transfer of vehicles to each other.

Nothing happened for roughly three years.  In 2018, LAWRENCE apparently decided that it was time to finalize the divorce, and he filed an affidavit under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code on November 30, 2018 in an effort to accomplish this goal.  On December 28, 2018, DEBRA filed a counter-affidavit by which she did not oppose the entry of a divorce decree.  However, she indicated in her counter-affidavit that she did wish to pursue a claim for division of property.  She simultaneously filed an Amended Complaint in Divorce on December 28, 2018 seeking equitable distribution of property.  Thereafter, negotiations commenced between counsel.  According to one letter dated December 28, 2018, there were disputes regarding personal property and the 111 Furnace Street real estate.  LAWRENCE’s attorney took the position that the Quitclaim Deed signed by DEBRA released any right that DEBRA may have had to any value relating to the 11 Furnace Street property.  DEBRA’s attorney took the opposite position.

On March 20, 2019, LAWRENCE filed a Petition to Enforce Prenuptial Agreement.  The primary focus of the motion was to procure a divorce that DEBRA was apparently delaying.  A hearing was scheduled before this Court on the Petition to Enforce Prenuptial Agreement.

On April 23, 2019, the parties appeared before this jurist.  Both counsel indicated that the primary issue in dispute was whether DEBRA was entitled to one-half of the increase in value of 111 Furnace Street in Lebanon during the term of the parties’ marriage.  LAWRENCE took the position that the Quitclaim Deed resolved that issue in his favor.  DEBRA took the position that the Quitclaim Deed should be deemed to have no impact at all on the Prenuptial Agreement.  We issue this Opinion to resolve the limited issue of whether the Quitclaim Deed executed on December 12, 2015 constitutes a valid modification of the Prenuptial Agreement that would otherwise afford DEBRA with one-half of the marital increase in value of 111 Furnace Street.

 

1. DISCUSSION

Both prenuptial and postnuptial agreements are contracts.  As such, they are governed by the law of contracts.  See, e.g., In RE: Estate of Bullotta, 838 A.2d 594 (Pa. 2003); Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333 (Pa. Super. 2007); Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. 2006).  As with all contracts, the goal of interpreting an agreement is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent.  See Laudig v. Laudig, 624 A.2d 651 (Pa. Super. 1993).  A court construing a marital agreement must look first to its express language; if the language is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is determined from that language alone.  Krip v. Krip, 849 A.2d 1159 (Pa. 2004).  If a contract is ambiguous, then parole or extrinsic evidence can be admitted to ascertain the intent of the parties.  Laudig v. Laudig, supra.

“It is not the role of the Judiciary to address subsequent misgivings or later regrets of a party to a contract.” Temple University v. Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, 690 A.2d 712, 716 (Pa. Super. 1997).  At times, this rule will require a Court to enforce even unfavorable contract obligations.  See Temple University, supra.  As stated by a noted commentator, “Parties are free to enter into bargains they may later regret, and bad deals are as enforceable as good ones, provided the agreement is free of fraud or duress.” See 17 Lest’s Pennsylvania Practice, Family Law Section 7:3 (7^th Ed.), citing Colonna v. Colonna, 791 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. 2001).

In this case, the terms of the agreements now before this Court are clear and unambiguous.  The Prenuptial Agreement limits DEBRA’s interest in 111 Furnace Street to the increase in value during the term of the marriage.  Paragraph 16 of the Prenuptial Agreement permits modification provided that the modification is in writing and executed by both parties.  In December of 2015, the parties met at the office of a notary to resolve financial issues.  As part of that meeting, both parties signed a Quitclaim Deed whereby DEBRA released all claims she might have to 111 Furnace Street.  The language of the Quitclaim and Deed is quite clear, and it resolves the limited issue now before us.  To the extent that DEBRA may have possessed rights under the Prenuptial Agreement to share in the value of 111 Furnace Street, she gave up those rights when she signed and delivered the Quitclaim Deed—a modification, in writing and signed by both parties, of the terms of the 2010 Prenuptial Agreement.

In her brief, DEBRA attempts to argue that the Quitclaim Deed pertained only to the Elm Street property that she sought to purchase.  She also argues that there was no actual consideration for the Quitclaim Deed, because the nominal amount of $1.00 set forth in the deed document was never in fact paid.

We disagree with DEBRA’s arguments.  First, on its face, the written Quitclaim Deed signed by both parties completely and unconditionally divests DEBRA of all interest in the Furnace Street property. While DEBRA claims that her “true intention and purpose” was not to relinquish any claim she had to the equity in the Furnace Street property but rather to satisfy a technical requirement in financing the Elm Street property, the document she both drafted and endorsed includes no language limiting the document’s applicability to that narrow purpose.  Since the language of the document is unambiguous, we look only to the document itself to determine DEBRA’s intent. That clearly stated intent is this: to relinquish completely all of her rights and interest in the Furnace Street property.  Moreover, it was DEBRA who prepared the Quitclaim Deed.  Even if the language of the deed were not completely clear, it would have to be interpreted against the party who created it, in this case DEBRA.  See, e.g.,  Cordero v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, 794 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa.Super.2002); Rusiski v. Pribonic, 515 A.2d 507, 510, 511 Pa. 383, 390 (Pa.,1986).

We also disagree with DEBRA’s argument regarding the lack of consideration for the Quitclaim Deed. Under Pennsylvania law, even nominal consideration can support an agreement.  See, e.g., Walsh v. Bucalo, 423 Pa.Super. 25 (Pa.Super.,1993). Even if, as DEBRA argues, the one dollar consideration was never paid, the Quitclaim Deed expressly provides for alternative consideration: “One Dollar ($1.00) and/or other good and valuable consideration.” Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).  In this case, the Quitclaim Deed to the Furnace Street property was exchanged as part of a broader division of marital assets.  Indeed, it was DEBRA – not LAWRENCE – who requested the Quitclaim Deed for reasons that were beneficial to her and not to LAWRENCE.  Moreover, LAWRENCE transferred his interest in a vehicle to DEBRA, and he signed a Release of Marital Claims forgoing all interest in the Elm Street property DEBRA was about to purchase.^[1] Based upon the above, we conclude that the December 12, 2015 Quitclaim Deed was supported by adequate consideration.

 

III.    CONCLUSION

In anticipation of marriage, DEBRA and LAWRENCE entered into a Prenuptial Agreement in 2010. That Agreement included provisions governing the real property LAWRENCE brought to the marriage, specifically property located at 111 Furnace Street, Lebanon. The Prenuptial Agreement specifically provided that any increase in the value of the property during the term of the marriage “shall be subject to an equal division between the parties,” a provision DEBRA has since sought to enforce.   Importantly, however, the Prenuptial Agreement also included a modification provision, specifically permitting modifications as long as those modifications were in writing and signed by both parties.

We specifically find that DEBRA modified the 2010 Prenuptial Agreement in 2015, when she drafted, endorsed and delivered–without the benefit of legal counsel–an unconditional, unambiguous and valid Quitclaim Deed to the 111 Furnace Street property. In so doing, she gave up all claims or interests in that property, including any claim to an equitable share in the increase of its value during the course of the parties’ marriage.

That DEBRA now says she intended otherwise cannot be binding upon this Court.    Instead, our decision is determined by the clear and unambiguous language of the Quitclaim Deed.  It was DEBRA who requested the Quitclaim Deed. It was DEBRA who prepared the Quitclaim Deed. DEBRA may now regret her choice to execute and deliver the Quitclaim Deed.  She may now regret her choice to forego legal counsel for its preparation.  Unfortunately for DEBRA, she does not get a mulligan.  She is bound by the choices she made.

We will enter an appropriate Order simultaneous with this Opinion.

 

 

 

 

 

[1] DEBRA argues this act cannot serve as consideration, because LAWRENCE had no valid claim to the Elm Street property, which was purchased by DEBRA post-separation without the use of marital funds. We disagree with that conclusion. LAWRENCE’s execution of the Marital Release for the purchase of the Elm Street property was something DEBRA pursued and needed. LAWRENCE’s execution of that document was of value to DEBRA, even if the Elm Street property itself had only limited value to LAWRENCE.  Moreover, by signing the release, LAWRENCE gave up any argument he may have had that marital assets/funds were invested into the Elm Street property.